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WHERE EAST MEETS WEST IN WATER LAW:
THE FORMULATION OF AN INTERSTATE
COMPACT TO ADDRESS THE DIVERSE
PROBLEMS OF THE RED RIVER BASIN
MARGuERITE ANN CHAPMAN*
Introduction
The completion of the Red River Compact in 1978 and its subsequent
approval by Congress in 1980 was an important milestone both in the proper
management of an increasingly precious natural resource and in the use of
the interstate compact device to address the multifaceted problems of a re-
gion such as the Red River basin. The overall objective of this article is to
examine the formulation and approval of the Red River Compact in ad-
dressing the diverse problems arising within the watershed of the Red River
system.
Part I assesses the divergent legal, environmental, and intergovernmental
problems which shaped the compact. The genesis of the compact, of course,
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did not occur in a political or legal vacuum. In order to provide a context
in which the negotiations were undertaken, part II of this article chronicles
the adjustment of interstate disputes from colonial days until the middle of
the twentieth century when the impetus to negotiate the Red River Compact
began. The principal alternative mechanism for resolving interstate water
problems, i.e., resort to litigation, is discussed in part III, which also reviews
the enunciation by the Supreme Court of the basic principles applicable to
interstate water disputes. As a background to the preliminary assessment of
the compact made herein, part IV examines the expansion of federal au-
thority over the nation's waters. Part V reviews the impetus to negotiate
the compact, charts the progress of the deliberations from 1956 until congres-
sional approval of the compact in 1980, and recounts some of the difficulties
encountered during the negotiations. Finally, part VI explains the compact's
structure and primary powers and offers a preliminary assessment of its
accomplishments. In sum, this article endeavors not only to describe the
development of the compact and to explain and evaluate its provisions, but
also to assess the position of this compact in the nation's history of the
adjustment of interstate disputes.
I. The Red River Compact in Perspective
The Showdown at Denison Dam
More than a hundred and fifty persons watched at high noon, May 12,
1978, as the duly authorized representatives of the states of Arkansas, Lou-
isiana, Oklahoma, and Texas and of the United States government assembled
atop Denison Dam on the Red River near Denison, Texas, to sign the Red
River Compact.' The formal signing of this multipurpose compact expressed,
inter alia, the agreement of the four signatory states to an equitable ap-
portionment of the water of the Red River system, 2 the sixth longest river
1. States Ink Water Pact, Oklahoman & Times, May 13, 1978, at 3, col. 1. An editorial
in one Oklahoma newspaper heralded the historic signing of the compact as "at least a start
at facing up to Oklahoma's future water needs," which constituted "easily Oklahoma's No.
I problem of the 1980's and '90's." Time to 'Divvy Up', Daily Oklahoman, May 9, 1978, at
8, col. 1. The same editorial couched the apportionment of water made by the compact in
terms of state versus federal control of decision making, observing that while "[i]t's not much
fun to share Oklahoma water with other states.... it's better for these states to make those
sharing decisions than for Uncle Sam to do the dividing-up for them." Id. The signing of the
Red River Compact was viewed by one news analyst as possibly "the first step in keeping
waters from the Red River Basin from later being drawn off by arid regions demanding relief
through federal courts." E. Kelley, Historic Red River Water Pact Ready for Signing, Sunday
Oklahoman, May 7, 1978, at 1, col. 1. An official of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board
(OWRB) commented that presidential approval of the compact 'would make it difficult' from
a legal standpoint for Texas to use the basin's tributaries as a source of water for piping it
to the thirsty High Plains region." Id. However, the exportation of water from the system is
not prohibited by the compact. See infra text accompanying notes 550-554.
2. Red River Compact, art. I, § 1.01(b), Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94
Stat. 3305 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Red River Compact, with applicable U.S. Stat.]. For
purposes of the compact, "Red River" means the stream below the crossing of the Texas-
[Vol. 38:1
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in the United States? The ceremony ended more than twenty-two years of
congressionally authorized negotiations between and among the four states
over the creation of an interstate legal framework for the conservation and
development of the Red River system, one of the greatest resources of the
Southwest.
4
The official signing ceremony culminated sixty formal meetings of the Red
River Compact Negotiation Commission (RRCNC)5 since the enactment by
Congress and the promulgation by President Dwight Eisenhower on August
11, 1955, of legislation specifically consenting to the negotiations.6 During
the ensuing year and a half following the formal signing ceremony, the
compact was ratified by the respective legislatures of the signatory states
and approved by the Congress.7 The Red River Compact became legally
effective and binding on December 22, 1980, when President Jimmy Carter
approved the consent legislation.8
Oklahoma state boundary at longitude 100' west. Id. § 3.01(b), 94 Stat. 3307. "Red River
basin" denotes all of the natural drainage area of the Red River and its tributaries east of the
New Mexico-Texas state boundary and above its junction with the Atchafalaya and Old rivers in
Louisiana. Id. § 3.01(c). The term "Red River system" is used interchangeably with "water of
the Red River basin" to refer to the water originating in any part of the Red River basin and
flowing to or into the Red River or any of its tributaries. Id. § 3.01(d), 94 Stat. 3308.
3. See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 520 (1941), citing
H.R. Doc. No. 541, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 17 (1938).
4. 126 CONG. Rac. H11386 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Hall).
5. Minutes of the 60th Meeting of the Red River Compact Negotiation Comm'n (RRCNC),
at 1 (May 12, 1978). Although governmental records generally refer to the commission that
negotiated the Red River Compact as the "Red River Compact Commission," the author uses
"Red River Compact Negotiation Commission" or "RRCNC" to denote the commission that
negotiated the compact and to distinguish it from the Red River Compact Commission or
"RRCC," the interstate agency created to implement the compact. Unlike other river basin
compacts, no bound volume of the official records of the negotiations has ever been compiled
for the Red River Compact. See Verbatim Transcript, Red River Compact Comm'n, at 21 (2d
Annual Meeting, Apr. 27, 1982). Photocopies of the official minutes of the meetings of the
RRCNC and the Red River Compact Commission and other records of the deliberations cited
herein are on file in the author's office at the University of Tulsa College of Law in Tulsa,
Okla., and in the office of the Oklahoma Law Review in Norman, Okla.
6. Act of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 784, 69 Stat. 654.
7. Louisiana ratified the compact in 1978. 1978 La. Acts No. 71. The legislatures of
Oklahoma, Texas, and Arkansas ratified the compact the following year. 1979 Okla. Sess.
Laws, ch. 136, §§ 1-2 (codified at 82 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1431-1432 (1981)); 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws
ch. 261, § I (codified at TEx. VATER CODE Am. §§ 46.001-46.013 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83));
1979 Ark. Acts No. 201 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1601 to 9-1603 (Supp. 1983)).
The Red River Compact was approved by the U.S. Senate on Sept. 24, 1980. S. 2227, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 1-4, 126 CONG. REC. S13327-31 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1980). After amending
the enactment clause of the Senate version of the consent legislation, the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives approved the compact on Dec. 1, 1980. 126 CONG. REc. HI1380-91 (daily ed. Dec.
1, 1980). The Senate gave its final approval to the consent legislation, with the enactment clause
as amended by the House, on Dec. 12, 1980. 126 CONG. REc. S16384-89 (daily ed. Dec. 12,
1980).
8. Acts Approved on Dec. 22, 1980, by the President, 16 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 2842
(Dec. 29, 1980).
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As discussed herein, the problems of the Red River basin are very different
from those in other river basins for which compacts have been negotiated
in the past. 9 Denison Dam, which impounds the waters of the Red River
and its tributaries to form Lake Texoma, was a fitting location for the
historic signing ceremony for many reasons associated with these problems.
Denison Dam and Texoma Reservoir, the only main-stem lake on the Red
River, were completed by the Army Corps of Engineers in 1943 after five
years of intense opposition by the state of Oklahoma and local Oklahoma
interests.' 0 The dam is symbolic of the traditional animosity of state and
local governmental interests to domination by the federal government, over-
tones of which were heard sometimes during the negotiations. The dam is
also representative of the extensive federal interests and activities in the basin,"
which complicated the negotiations. Most of the decisions concerning the
9. The climatic, hydrologic, and geological conditions of the Arkansas River basin are
similar to those in the Red River basin. See Minutes of the 6th Meeting of the RRCNC, at
2 (Apr. 23-24, 1957). However, three separate compacts were negotiated for the Arkansas River
system. Arkansas River Compact of 1948, Colorado-Kansas, infra note 173, 63 Stat. 145;
Arkansas River Basin Compact of 1965, Kansas-Oklahoma, infra note 174, 80 Stat. 1409;
Arkansas River Basin Compact of 1973, Arkansas-Oklahoma, infra note 174, 87 Stat. 569.
The negotiation of the compacts for the Arkansas River system between two states at a time
probably facilitated the completion of the compacts. In contrast, the Red River Compact was
negotiated between and among the four interested states, thereby complicating the process with
a number of factors. See infra text accompanying notes 13-74.
10. Wilson, Denison Dam Construction Ended An Era, Tulsa World, Feb. 19, 1984, at
8B, col. 3. The report of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, transmitted to Congress on Mar.
12, 1938, recommended the construction of Denison Dam for the dual purposes of flood control
and hydroelectric power development. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313
U.S. 508, 519 (1941) (summarizing the legislative history of congressional authorizations and
appropriations for the construction of the dam). The proposed dam and reservoir was opposed
by the state of Oklahoma and by farm owners, including the Fred Chapman family who owned
more than 6,000 acres of prime farmland known as "Washita Farms" or "Chapman Farms"
along the Red and Washita rivers. Tulsa World, Feb. 19, 1984, at 8B, col. 3. In October,
1939, Oklahoma filed a motion in the Supreme Court for leave to file a bill of complaint
seeking to enjoin the U.S. Secretary of War from proceeding with construction of the project.
See Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. at 510-11 n.l. Oklahoma's motion for leave to
file was denied by an equally divided Court. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson v. Woodring, 309
U.S. 623 (1940). Oklahoma then filed a motion in U.S. District Court seeking to enjoin the
construction of the dam on the basis that the authorizing legislation and the project exceeded
the power of Congress and contravened the sovereign and proprietary rights of the state of
Oklahoma. Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 37 F. Supp. 93, 95 (E.D. Okla. 1941). The
three-judge federal district court sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss Oklahoma's com-
plaint. Id. at 94, 99. On June 2, 1941, a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the decree of
the federal district court. 313 U.S. at 509-10, 535. The dam was completed in 1943, and Lake
Texoma was created by the impoundment of the waters of the Red and Washita rivers. Tulsa
World, Feb. 19, 1984, at 8B, col. 3.
11. See generally S. Doc. No. 13, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-83, 765-1011 (1957). See also
Statement regarding Interests of the U.S. Dep't of Army, Corps of Eng'rs, in Connection with
Negotiations for Red River Compact, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana, at 1-8 (Mar.
1959) and Statement of Interests in Interstate Compact Negotiations, Red River Basin [U.S.
Dep't of Interior], at 1-8 (1960).
[Vol. 38:1
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apportionment of the water of the basin entailed meticulous evaluation of
existing and proposed federal projects located there.'
2
The Climatic and Hydrologic Diversity of the Basin
Denison Dam occupies an almost totemic position in the Red River basin.
Since drainage of the upper 39,700 square miles of the basin is controlled
by Denison Dam, 3 the dam and Lake Texoma divide the river and its enor-
mous drainage basin into two major and highly contrasting segments. 4 The
climate in the upper portion of the basin above Denison Dam is semiarid
near the headwaters of the river in the high plains of western Oklahoma
and Texas.' The average annual rainfall is relatively small and the resulting
stream flow is inadequate to meet all existing needs. 6 The major concern
in the high plains is the provision of adequate water supplies for domestic,
municipal, and irrigation uses.'
7
In the huge portion of the river basin below Denison Dam, the climate
is humid, rainfall increases to about sixty inches per year in places, and
damaging floods occur at times. 8 Even though water disposal, particularly
flood control and drainage, is important in the lower reaches of the basin
below the dam, water shortfalls also occur, particularly during droughts.' 9
Moreover, the water shortages that have occurred in the past are anticipated
for the future as the economy in the region expands. Lying between the
semiarid high plains of the West and the humid coastal plain of the lower
eastern portion of the basin is the transitional area of the central lowlands.
Rainfall in the central area increases progressively as one goes east, reaching
12. See infra notes 476-486 and accompanying text.
13. 126 CONG. REc. H11385 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Danielson). The
total drainage area of the Red River basin, including the Ouachita-Black River system, is 93,450
square miles. RRCNC, Draft Eng'g Advisory Comm. Report (J. Bliss ed. Sept. 5, 1967) [here-
inafter cited as 1967 RRCNC Draft Eng'g Rep.]. A map of the Red River basin is located
infra in the text at page 91.
14. Red River Compact and Caddo Lake Compact: Hearings on H.R. 7205 and H.R. 7206
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., attachment 1, at 1 (1980) (statement for the record by
Col. Alan L. Laubscher, Assistant Director of Civil Works, Corps of Eng'rs, U.S. Dep't of
the Army) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Statement by Col. Laubscher]. The environmental
characteristics of the basin reflect the varied climate and terrain: antelope are seen near the
headwaters and alligators are found at the lower end; plant life changes from mesquite in the
headwaters area to pine forests in the transitional reaches and finally to semitropical bayous
in the lower eastern portion of the basin. Id. at 2.
15. Id. at 1.
16. Id. For a more detailed description of the variations in the river system, see 1967 Draft
RRCNC Eng'g Rep., supra note 13, at 15-16, 19.
17. See 1967 Draft RRCNC Eng'g Rep., supra note 13, at 39.
18. Id. at 28, 39, 41. See also "The Purposes and Accomplishments of the Red River
Compact Comm'n," Address by Henry C. Beckman, Federal Representative and Chairman,
RRCNC, at Meeting of Red River Valley Ass'n, at 3 (Mar. 23, 1957) [hereinafter cited as
Beckman Address to Red River Valley Ass'n].
19. See Beckman Address to Red River Valley Ass'n, supra note 18, at 3.
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an average high of forty-five inches per year just west of the Arkansas-
Oklahoma state line.
20
The extremes in climatic, hydrologic, and topographic conditions in the
river basin had enormous implications for the negotiations. For example,
Louisiana, the southernmost downstream state on the river, lacked any res-
ervoir sites of significant size and therefore could not store water in times
of high flow to fulfill future needs. 2' Consequently, Louisiana was primarily
concerned with some assurance of flow, preferably on a daily basis, during
periods of drought.3 The upstream states, particularly Oklahoma and Texas,
have reservoirs to capture rain as it falls and were comfortable in negotiating
an apportionment of the water in terms of annual allocations. 23 Under no
circumstances, however, did the upstream states wish to agree to release
water from storage to guarantee flows to the downstream states of Arkansas
and Louisiana. 24 Finally, Oklahoma and Texas wanted to preserve in the
compact the flexibility to make transbasin diversions and transfers from the
Red River system, an idea that initially received a cool reception from Loui-
siana.2Y The subject of importation and exportation of water was addressed
in the compact.
20. See 1967 Draft RRCNC Eng'g Rep., supra note 13, at 39.
21. RRCNC Legal Advisory Comm., Red River Compact with Supplemental Interpretive
Comments of the Legal Advisory Committee 14 (Sept. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Supplemental
Interpretive Comments].
22. Id.
23. Hearings, Statement by Col. Laubscher, supra note 14, at 14.
24. Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 14.
25. Initially, the engineering advisers for Louisiana proposed that the unanimous consent
of the downstream states be a condition precedent to the diversion of water from the Red
River watershed whenever proposed diversions would interfere with or decrease the stipulated
low flows set forth in the compact. Memorandum from Daniel V. Cresap & C.K. Oakes,
Louisiana representatives to RRCNC Eng'g Advisory Comm., at 3 (Aug. 29, 1961) (regarding
proposed method for the equitable apportionment of the water of the Red River basin below
Denison Dam). When the subject of transbasin diversions arose again in 1965, Louisiana sought
the inclusion of a compact provision stipulating that water removed from the main stem of
the Red River below Denison Dam shall not be exported from the Red River basin without
the unanimous consent of the commissioners of the signatory states. Draft Transcript of 34th
Meeting of RRCNC, at 5, 16-17 (Apr. 1-2, 1965). Texas then insisted that it could not properly
use its water supplies or meet its statewide water requirements without provision for transbasin
diversions. Id. at 5, 15-18. For example, if Dallas needed water to satisfy a severe municipal
shortage, Texas would have to divert the water from the Red River basin below Denison Dam.
Id. at 18. Oklahoma Commissioner Guy H. James also opposed Louisiana's position on trans-
basin diversions, pointing out that no state can invest monies in diversion projects as long as
any state, in effect, has a veto power over the exportation of water. Id. at 17. Oklahoma
wanted to protect its investments in the Central Oklahoma Project, a study to determine the
practicability of transbasin water conveyance from the Red River basin reservoirs in southeastern
Oklahoma to the vicinity of Oklahoma City. See Minutes of 31st Meeting of RRCNC, at 4
(Sept. 9-10, 1964). For a brief description of the Central Oklahoma project, see U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENO'RS, SouTHwEsTERN Div., WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT BY THE U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENO'RS, OKLAHOMA 91 (Jan. 1979). The Louisiana commissioner later elaborated
upon his state's position, maintaining that while Louisiana did not wish to preclude the Central
Oklahoma Project from going forward, Louisiana objected to any transbasin diversions pending
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss1/9
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Water Quality Problems
Denison Dam and Lake Texoma also demarcate the great variations in
the chemical quality of the surface waters of the Red River basin. The water
quality of the tributaries in the eastern portion of the basin, with some
exceptions, has generally been rated from good to excellent. 26 Some of the
tributaries arising in the Ouachita Mountains have been given water quality
ratings of superior.27 On the other hand, the waters of the tributaries up-
stream from Lake Texoma have generally been rated from poor to unsat-
isfactory, primarily because of chloride and sulfate contamination from
natural and man-made sources. 28
Ten natural sources contribute about two-thirds of the 3,300 tons of chlo-
ride that enters Lake Texoma on an average basis each day.29 Other tri-
butaries flowing into the lake dilute the contamination and cause the lake
to serve as a water quality "equalizing pond." 30 In the most western portion
of the basin, salt springs and seeps arising from salt-saturated underlying
formations contribute large quantities of briny water to the tributaries, ren-
dering the water unusable for most purposes. s' The tributaries also pick up
large quantities of sulphate and gypsum overlying most of the high plains.3 2
When negotiations on the Red River Compact began, little was known
of any practicable and cost-effective methodology for reducing the salt con-
tamination.33 Many of the ideas advanced for reducing the natural deteri-
oration of the water had the potential for materially affecting stream flows
and water quantity.34 Consequently, the compact negotiators had to be ever
the consummation of agreements on the division of water in the Red River basin. Minutes of
35th meeting of RRCNC, at 3 (Jan. 19-20, 1966). When Dolph Briscoe became governor of
Texas, he declared on Nov. 27, 1973, that the greatest need of his state was to provide more
water to the dry land of west Texas. See Statement Regarding the Position of Texas on the
Red River Compact, Minutes of 49th Meeting of RRCNC, app. statement, at 3 (June 13, 1974).
According to Texas Commissioner H. Deskin Wells, Governor Edwin Edwards of Louisiana
announced in May, 1974 that he had "changed his mind" about transbasin diversions from
the Mississippi River system to west Texas and now favored water exportation plans. Id. at
4. The Red River system used to be a major tributary of the Mississippi River; in fact, the
development of the Red River is an important chapter in the lengthy history of flood control
on the Mississippi River. Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. at 516. The water of
the Red River was subsequently captured by the Atchafalaya River, the drainage system of
which ultimately empties into the Gulf of Mexico.
26. See 1967 Draft RRCNC Eng'g Rep., supra note 13, at 51.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 51-52.
29. See TUJLSA DIST., U.S. ARmy CORPS OF ENG'RS, RED RIVER CHLORIDE CONTROL PROJECT:
PROJECT OVERVIEW AND EcoNomuc REANALYSIS 2 (rev. Apr. 1983).
30. Statement of RRCNC Eng'g Subcomm. on Stream Pollution Control presented to Meet-
ing of Southwest Section, Am. Water Works Ass'n, 3 (Oct. 20-21, 1959) [hereinafter cited as
RRCNC Subcomm. Rep. to AWWA].
31. Id. at 4-5.
32. Id. See also 1967 Draft RRCNC Eng'g Rep., supra note 13, at 52.
33. See Beckman Address to Red River Valley Ass'n, supra note 18, at 3.
34. See Progress Report of RRCNC Eng'g Subcomm. on Stream Pollution Control, at 2
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
8 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1
mindful that control methods attempted in the future might reduce the amount
of water flowing through the river system even though the water would be
of better quality.
Although substantial progress has now been made in reducing and con-
trolling man-made pollution in the Red River basin, historically the major
sources of this pollution have been salts discharged into the water from oil
and gas well operations and from industrial wastes. 5 The negotiators con-
sidered very carefully the role the compact should take in the abatement
and control of the pollution in the river basin.
State and federal water pollution control laws were in their embryonic
stages when negotiations commenced in 1956 on the Red River Compact.
Each of the four states participating in the negotiations already had an
agency for dealing with water pollution within its jurisdiction. 6 Most of the
negotiating commissioners wanted an interstate agency established to ad-
minister the Red River Compact that would have power to address interstate
pollution in the basin effectively, but without encroaching on the jurisdiction
of the individual state agencies or duplicating their efforts.37 Because of the
evolutionary strengthening of water quality laws, particularly at the federal
(Apr. 23-24, 1957), attached to Minutes of 6th Meeting, supra note 9. By 1957 the ideas
advanced for controlling natural contamination included underground injection, construction
of large retention basins to provide for disposal by solar evaporation, and installation of re-
tention basins with regulated discharges during times of flood flows. Id. Any of these methods
of control of natural pollution might materially affect the flow characteristics of the Red River
system. Id. The chloride control alternatives recently evaluated by the Corps of Engineers
include: importation of fresh water to dilute the brine at salt sources; construction of desal-
ination plants; transportation of brine by pipeline to the Gulf of Mexico; construction of dams
and diversion systems upstream from salt sources to bypass fresh water around the salt-emission
areas; suppression of brine emissions from large isolated springs by application of hydrostatic
pressure; construction of a total impoundment dam downstream from salt sources in areas
with relatively small drainage areas; collection of brine from subsurface or surface sources and
disposal of it in a manner that prevents environmental damage; and no action by the federal
government, thereby leaving the resolution of the problem to municipal, industrial, and ag-
ricultural users. See RED RIVER CiLORIDE CONTROL PROJECT, supra note 29, at 5-6. Unless
natural pollution sources are controlled, municipal and industrial water users will be forced
either to rely on more expensive alternatives for their water supply or risk damage to equipment.
Id. at 6. Agricultural users are faced with the choice of having lower crop yields or growing
lower value, salt-tolerant crops. Id.
35. See 1967 Draft RRCNC Eng'g Rep., supra note 13, at 52. Much of the industrial waste
apparently has come from industries allied with oil production. See RRCNC Subcomm. Report
to AWWA, supra note 30, at 4.
36. See RRCNC Subcomm. Report to AWWA, supra note 30, at 1-2. The 1959 composition
of the RRCNC Engineering Subcommittee on Stream Pollution Control was representative of
three different types of state pollution-control administration: Texas and Oklahoma retained
administration of pollution problems within their state departments of health; Arkansas had
a pollution control commission established within its state department of health; and Louisiana
vested responsibility in a separate state agency.
37. See Letter from Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to L.R. Matthias, Exec. Vice
Pres., Red River Valley Ass'n, at 1 (May 21, 1962) [hereinafter cited as Beckman Letter to
Red River Valley Ass'n]. Beckman wrote this letter in response to criticism by the Red River
Valley Association that the negotiations of a compact for the Red River system were proceeding
too slowly.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss1/9
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level, and the difficulty of reaching a consensus on the enforcement authority
of the interstate administrative body, the negotiators redrafted the pollution
provisions of the compact several times during the course of the delibera-
tions."
The compact drafters also concluded early in the negotiations that a read-
ily available and neutral forum for the litigation of water pollution issues
arising between states under an interstate compact was imperative to effective
compact enforcement.3 9 Federal statutory law in force at the time the ne-
gotiators initially drafted the pollution provisions of the compact gave the
United States Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction in controversies between
statesA° However, the interstate water pollution controversies litigated be-
tween states until the middle of the twentieth century had proved the Su-
preme Court to be an inadequate forum for the resolution of interstate water
quality disputes. The strategy pursued by the Red River Compact negotiators
resulted in the 1962 passage of federal legislation of general application to
address this jurisdictional matter.
4'
Reconciling the Divergent State Water Laws
Though the boundaries of the four signatory states to the Red River Com-
pact are obviously not coterminous with the Red River basin, their respective
legal systems nevertheless reflect the climatic and hydrologic extremes in the
basin. The water laws of Arkansas and Louisiana largely adhere to the prin-
ciples of the riparian rights doctrine developed by the humid states of the
East.42 The water laws of Oklahoma and Texas contain many of the elements
38. See Rough Draft of Red River Compact, art. V (Apr. 24, 1957). See also Memorandum
from Richard M. Huff, Chairman, RRCNC Legal Advisory Comm. to Henry C. Beckman et
al., at 1-10 (Feb. 12, 1958); Minutes of 9th Meeting of RRCNC, including attached Reports
of the Eng'g Advisory Comm. and the Legal Advisory Comm. (Feb. 26-27, 1958); Minutes
of 38th Meeting of RRCNC, at 3 (Mar. 28, 1967). For background and history of the evolution
of water quality laws, see generally 1 A. REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw four-1 to four-154
(1972) [hereinafter cited as REITZE]; W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 354-550 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as RODGERS]; Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW INSTrUTE, FEDRA, LENVIRONMENTAL LAw 682-791 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert
eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Zener].
39. See Progress Report of RRCNC Legal Advisory Comm., at 1 (Feb. 26, 1958), appended
to Minutes of 9th RRCNC Meeting, supra note 38. The Legal Advisory Committee maintained
that although the interstate administrative entity contemplated by the compact should have
authority to proceed under the enforcement provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Act of
1956, that law alone was "not adequate for proper enforcement of pollution abatement." Id.
The committee suggested that, if practicable, the act of Congress approving the Red River
Compact should recognize the jurisdiction of federal district courts in certain legal actions to
abate interstate water pollution. Id. See also Letter from Texas RRCNC State Comm'r Buster
Cole to Hon. Sam Rayburn, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, at 1 (Jan. 25, 1961).
40. S. REP. No. 2211, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3282-86 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 2211].
41. Act of Oct. 15, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-830, § 1, 76 Stat. 957 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §
466g-1 (1982)).
42. Arkansas' reasonable use theory of riparian rights is set forth in Harris v. Brooks, 225
Ark. 436, 443-45, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133-34 (1955). See also NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, A SUM-
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of the appropriation doctrine fashioned by the arid western states to allocate
an inadequate supply of water.
43
Under the riparian rights doctrine, the right to use water is usufructory
in character and is governed by the ownership of land bordering a stream. 44
Under the natural flow theory of riparian rights, every proprietor of water
is entitled to the usual flow of a natural stream undiminished in quantity
MARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 3-4, 117-25 (R. Dewsnut & D. Jensen eds. 1973) [here-
inafter cited as NWC SummARY-DIoEST OF STATE WATER LAWS]. For a discussion of the
development of Louisiana's complex water laws, see NWC SUMMARY-DiGEST OF STATE WATER
LAWS, supra, at 347, 352-58. The classification of Louisiana as a riparian doctrine jurisdiction
is an oversimplification since a provision in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 apparently adopted
the riparian system as the cornerstone of Louisiana water law. Id. at 347, 352. The Louisiana
Civil Code was based upon the Code Napoleon. See Wiel, Waters: American Law and French
Authority, 33 HAv. L. Rav. 133, 134 (1919). Upon becoming a state, Arkansas "received"
the English common law; although the riparian rights doctrine is sometimes said to be based
upon English common law, in the early English common law there was little litigation over
the private use of water. Grimes, Lex Aquae Arkansas, 27 ARK. L. REv. 429, 430 (1973).
Thus, Arkansas, like many other states, adapted the common law of water rights to fulfill its
own local needs. Id. For additional background on riparian rights in Arkansas, see generally
L. MACK, WATER LAW IN ARKANSAS 9-13, 37 (1963). The adequacy of the current water law
of Arkansas in addressing the changing needs of the state was assessed recently by several
authors, including the well-known water law expert, Professor Frank J. Trelease. See J. JACKSON
& L. MACK, ARKANSAS WATER LAW: WHY WAIT FOR THE CRISIS? (1982); Looney, Modification
of Arkansas Water Law: Issues and Alternatives, 38 ARK. L. REv. 221, 222-23, 238-67 (1984)
(summarizing the development of a proposal for a comprehensive water code for Arkansas
that was rejected by the legislature in 1983); Trelease, A Water Management Law for Arkansas,
6 U. ARK. Lrrra RoCK L.J. 369 (1983). The acquisition and utilization of water rights in
Louisiana has been examined by a number of writers. See generally Yiannopoulos, Common,
Public, and Private Things in Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 21 LA. L.
REv. 697, 699, 701-02, 706-29 (1961); Comment, Water Rights in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REv.
500-11 (1956); Comment, Acquisition of the Right to Use Water, 29 TUL. L. REv. 554-65
(1955).
43. For examples of appropriative elements in the surface water laws of Oklahoma and
Texas, see 82 OKLA. STAT. §§ 105.2, 105.9-105.18 (Supp. 1983) and TEx. WATER CODE ANN.
§§ 5.021-5.030 (Vernon 1972). See also NWC SUmMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS, supra
note 42, at 5-6, 603-13, 699-711. Oklahoma water law has been discussed at length by Professor
Joseph Rarick. See generally Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface, The Water
Conservation Storage Commission and the 1965 and 1967 Amendments, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 1-
16 (1971); Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface under the 1963 Amendments,
23 OKLA. L. REv. 19-70 (1970); Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface in the
Pre-1963 Period, 22 OKLA. L. REv. 1-44 (1969); Rarick, The Streams of Oklahoma as a Source
of Municipal Water Supply, 30 OKA. B.A.J. 1281-95 (1959); Rarick, The Right to Use Water
From a Stream, 29 OKLA. B.A.J. 1958-64 (1958); Rarick, Appropriate vs. Riparian, A Pre-
liminary Examination, 10 OKLA. L. REv. 416-27 (1957). A history and an analysis of Texas
water law was published in 1961 by the Texas Board of Water Engineers. See W. HUTCHINS,
THE TEXAS LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 1-4, 9-17, 77-83, 101-490 (1961). Hutchins' exposition on
Texas' water law is slowly becoming outdated. NWC SUMMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS,
supra note 42, at 700.
44. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 371, 383 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as CRmBET]. A usufruct is "the right of enjoying a thing, the property of which is vested
in another, and to draw from the same all the profit, utility and advantage which it may
produce, provided it be without altering the substance of the thing." Id. at 383. See also 7
R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 310 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
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except for domestic uses and unimpaired in quality. 45 Although early pro-
nouncements by the Arkansas Supreme Court spoke in terms of the natural
flow theory, Arkansas later made a reasonable relaxation of the theory while
preserving the superiority of water use for domestic purposes, including
watering livestock, over other uses such as fishing, recreation, swimming,
and navigation. 46 The Arkansas Supreme Court also ruled in 1954 that a
riparian owner cannot remove water from the watershed and sell it com-
mercially. 47 In 1957, Arkansas enacted legislation empowering the state under
certain circumstances to allocate water along streams in times of shortage. 4s
Arkansas' neighboring state of Louisiana seemingly adopted the riparian
system for the entire state in an early provision of the Louisiana Civil Code.
4 9
However, in recent years the riparian doctrine in Louisiana has been di-
minished by state statutes authorizing the creation of public corporations
that have exclusive control over the distribution of water within their ter-
ritorial boundaries.5 0
Under the western appropriation doctrine, water rights are derived from
the usage of water for a beneficial purpose rather than from land owner-
ship.5 Appropriative rights are quantifiable, and superiority of right to use
water on an overappropriated stream is based upon priority in time.5 2 Tech-
nically, Oklahoma and Texas have been traditionally classified as "hybrid"
water law jurisdictions, originally recognizing the riparian rights doctrine to
a certain extent but subsequently converting to the western appropriation
system while preserving existing riparian rights.5 3 Both Oklahoma and Texas
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 209-12 (1979) (explaining the history of riparian
rights and comparing and contrasting the natural flow theory with the reasonable use theory).
See also Grimes, supra note 42, at 438-39.
46. Compare Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 181 Ark. 216, 226, 26 S.W.2d 57,
61 (1930); Taylor v. Rudy, 99 Ark. 128, 132, 137 S.W. 574, 575 (1911); and St. L. Sw. Ry.
v. Mackey, 95 Ark. 297, 299, 129 S.W. 78, 79 (1910) with Nilsson v. Latimer, 281 Ark. 325,
664 S.W.2d 447, 450 (1984); Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 443-45, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133-34
(1955); and Thomas v. LaCotts, 222 Ark. 171, 177, 257 S.W.2d 936, 940 (1953).
47. Harrell v. City of Conway, 224 Ark. 100, 104, 271 S.W.2d 924, 927 (1954).
48. 1957 Ark. Acts 81; 1969 Ark. Acts 180; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1304 (Supp. 1983)
(empowering the Arkansas Soil and Conservation Commission with the authority "to make"
allocations among persons taking water from streams during periods of shortage, to the extent
and in the manner provided by law" ). For regulations governing the allocation of water during
shortages, see 7 Ark. Admin. Reg. 101 (1983-84).
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 661 (1870) ("He whose estate borders on running water, may use
it as it runs, for the purpose of watering his estate, or for other purposes."). For a discussion
of water rights in Louisiana predicated upon article 661, see Comment, Acquisition of the
Right to Use Water, supra note 42, at 562-63.
50. See Comment, Water Rights in Louisiana, supra note 42, at 509-10. See also NWC
SUMNiARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWs, supra note 42, at 353-54.
51. CLARK, supra note 44, at §§ 272-73; 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE
NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 491-502 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HUTCHINS, NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES].
52. 1 HUTCHINS, NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, supra note 51, at 508-10, 569-70.
53. D. GETCHES, WATER LAW 6 (1984); F. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER
LAw 12 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as TRELEASE]. See also Ausness, Water Use Permits
in a Riparian State: Problems and Proposals, 66 Ky. L.J. 191, 194 (1977).
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later adopted permit systems as the means of acquiring appropriative rights.14
For these reasons, the water laws of Oklahoma and Texas are the most
complicated of the four signatory states.
One of the greatest challenges to the compact negotiators was reconciling
these divergent water laws and dealing with certain problems attendant to
them. The negotiations were particularly complicated on the apportionment
of the water of Reach II, which involved all four states. Reach II consists
of the portion of the Red River from Denison Dam to the point where it
crosses the Arkansas-Louisiana state boundary and all of the tributaries that
contribute to the flow of the river within this reach." Oklahoma and Texas
had fully appropriated the ordinary flow of the reach within their boundaries
before the compact was approved. 6 By the very nature of their riparian
systems, Arkansas and Louisiana had not defined or quantified water usage
within their respective states, although they had conducted studies in an
effort to establish present and future needs.5
7
Not all of the problems during the negotiations stemmed from the prob-
lems of the upstream states' appropriation rights versus the downstream
states' riparian rights. In the western portion of the Red River basin where
water has always been a precious commodity, Texas and Oklahoma had
some difficult compromises to make.58 This area is included in Reach I of
the basin, the portion of the Red River and its tributaries from the New
Mexico-Texas state boundary to Denison Dam. 9 The Lugert-Altus Reservoir
in Oklahoma, built in conjunction with the W. C. Austin Project developed
by the United States Bureau of Reclamation in the 1940s, was central to
this dispute. 60 The reservoir had the capability of impounding nearly the
entire flow of two important tributaries of the Red River, the North Fork
and Sweetwater Creek. 6' The Lugert-Altus Irrigation District claimed all of
the water of which it was capable of impounding with a priority date of
1949, based upon the date the reservoir was built. 62 Texas refused to rec-
ognize that any additional impoundments of which the Irrigation District
was capable would legally forestall development of uses in Texas of the water
of these two streams. 63 The resolution in September of 1976 of the long-
standing dispute between Oklahoma and Texas over the Lugert-Altus Res-
ervoir and the use of the water of the North Fork and Sweetwater Creek
was a major breakthrough in completing the compact. 64
54. See 3 HuTcmNs, NwETEEN WEsT~mi STATES, supra note 51, at 423-40, 503-35 (1977).
55. Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.12(b), 94 Stat. 3307.
56. Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 14.
57. Id.
58. Hearings, Statement by Col. Laubscher, supra note 14, at 2.
59. Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.12(a), 94 Stat. 3307.




64. Hearings, Statement by Col. Laubscher, supra note 14, at 2.
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Arkansas also encountered difficulties in reconciling its reasonable use
modification of the early riparian rights doctrine with the demands made
by Louisiana in the apportionment of the water of Reach IV, the tributaries
east of the Red River in Arkansas that cross the Arkansas-Louisiana state
boundary.65 From a policy standpoint, Arkansas objected to any specific,
quantitative apportionment of the waters of these interstate streams, and
particularly the Ouachita River system flowing from Arkansas into Loui-
siana.6 Arkansas argued that an apportionment of the water of these in-
terstate streams would give users in Louisiana assured rights that Arkansas
was unable to grant its own citizens.67 Since the major problem in this por-
tion of the river basin was too much water, rather than too little, Arkansas
maintained that the inclusion of specific apportionments of water between
the two states served little useful purpose to either state s.6 A creative solution
to this problem was ultimately found.
When deliberations on the Red River Compact commenced in 1956, a
number of compact commissions elsewhere had apportioned the water of
interstate streams based on present and projected conditions of develop-
ment.69 These commissions had recognized historic stream flows and existing
beneficial uses, protected vested water rights obtained under state law, and
estimated the future needs for the water in the basin.
70
Unfortunately, early attempts to utilize the present-usage/future-needs ap-
proach in the Red River basin were frustrating. Just as effective state water
administration is dependent upon centralized water rights records that are
complete and accurate,7' such records are also important in the planning
process attendant to the deliberations associated with the allocation of water
in an interstate river basin. Oklahoma and Texas had reasonably complete
water rights records dating from the enactment of their permit systems. The
65. Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.12(d), 94 Stat. 3307.
66. See Position Statement of State of Arkansas Regarding Red River Compact, Minutes
of 48th Meeting of RRCNC, enclosure two, at 1-2, (Nov. 8, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Arkansas
Position Statement of Nov. 1973]. The negotiators were also concerned with how a compact
provision can be enforced in a riparian state that has not delegated authority to a state agency
to issue water rights, a problem common both to Arkansas and Louisiana but which applied
only to Arkansas since Louisiana is the last downstream state on the river. See Memorandum
of Conference between Representatives of the States of Louisiana and Arkansas, at 2 (Dec.
10, 1959).
67. See Arkansas Position Statement of Nov. 1973, supra note 66, at 1-2. Arkansas reit-
erated its previous suggestion made in 1966 that the Ouachita River basin not be included in
any compact apportioning the water of the Red River basin. Id. at 1. Arkansas considered the
Ouachita as a part of the Lower Mississippi River system and pointed out that the Ouachita
River system had been considered as a separate hydrologic unit in the formulation of com-
prehensive river basin plans. Id. Louisiana unequivocally objected to the deletion of the Ouach-
ita basin from the proposed compact. Id. at 1-2.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Assignment and Scope of Work of the RRCNC Eng'g Advisory Comm. presented to
Meeting of Southwest Section, Am. Water Works Ass'n, at 4 (Oct. 20-21, 1959) [hereinafter
cited as Assignment and Scope of Work of EAC].
70. Id.
71. NWC SuMniARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS, supra note 42, at 16.
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downstream riparian states, on the other hand, lacked essential information
on present water usage. Moreover, since reasonableness of water use is de-
termined in light of all the existing factors and circumstances, water rights
arising under the riparian system defy precise measurement.
7 2
If present uses cannot be determined with a reasonable degree of accuracy,
naturally the task of making supportable and realistic projections for future
water needs is very difficult and, ultimately, quite conjectural. 73 As a result,
the present-usage/future-needs approach was not very useful in deciding how
to apportion the water. However, the Corps of Engineers' determinations
of the drainage areas of the river and the hydrological and meteorological
data supplied by the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the National
Weather Service, and other governmental agencies were essential to intel-
ligent apportionment decision making.7 4
The Effect of the Compact on Intergovernmental Relations
The formulation and approval of the Red River Compact had important
implications for intergovernmental relations at the local, state, and federal
levels. The various legal entities authorized by the laws of the four signatory
states include river authorities, drainage and levee districts, irrigation and
watershed improvement districts, regional water distribution districts, and
metropolitan water and power authorities.
75
Although not officially involved in the negotiations, representatives of
local entities, such as the Red River Authority of Texas and the Lugert-
Altus Irrigation District, often attended the negotiating sessions and actively
conferred with the compact negotiators from their respective states. 6 The
negotiators encouraged input not only from various governmental entities
but also from individuals and nongovernmental organizations, such as the
Red River Valley Association.7 7 Public input throughout the deliberations
was exceptionally strong.78 The negotiating commissioners understood the
72. Id. at 17.
73. Assignment and Scope of Work of EAC, supra note 69, at 5.
74. Id. at 3.
75. NWC StnMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS, supra note 42, at 122, 349-51, 606-07,
706 (describing water-related legal entities authorized by the laws of Arkansas, Louisiana, Okla-
homa, and Texas, respectively).
76. The Red River Authority of Texas was created by the Texas legislature in 1959. See
1959 Tex. Gen. Laws 604, ch. 279. After it was established, representatives from the Red River
Authority attended many meetings of the negotiators and their technical advisers. See, e.g.,
Tentative Minutes of RRCNC Eng'g Advisory Comm., at 1 (May 19-20, 1960). The legal counsel
to the Lugert-Altus Irrigation District regularly conferred with the Oklahoma compact com-
missioner and the technical advisers concerning substantive provisions of the draft compact.
See Letter from Robert B. Harbison to Guy N. Keith, Okla. Comm'r, at 1-4 (Apr. 4, 1972).
77. See, e.g., Beckman Address to Red River Valley Ass'n, supra note 18, at 4.
78. Meetings of the RRCNC were typically attended by representatives of those federal,
state, and local agencies that had interests in certain agenda items before the RRCNC. On
occasion, legislators of some of the states also were present, and members of the press observed
the proceedings on an irregular basis. The amount of public interest and input is revealed by
the attendance lists attached to the minutes of the Ist through 61st meetings of the RRCNC.
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need to have the support of these groups when the compact was eventually
presented to the respective state legislatures and the Congress for ratification.
The negotiators of the Red River Compact were particularly interested in
one aspect of federal-interstate relations. From the earliest years of the de-
liberations, the negotiators squarely tackled what they perceived as a po-
tential impediment to the future enforcement of the compact-the sovereign
immunity of the United States to cases and controversies involving the con-
struction or application of the compact. 79 Because of the extensive federal
presence in the Red River basin, the participation of federal officials in the
drafting of the compact, and the role of the federal representative contem-
plated in the future administration of the compact, the negotiators were
concerned that the courts might deem the United States to be an indispen-
sable party in litigation between the signatory states arising under the com-
pact.80 A vigorous exchange of views took place for several years between
officials of the United States Department of Justice and the Legal Advisory
Committee to the negotiating commissioners. s1 A partial waiver of sovereign
iinmunity was ultimately secured from the Congress.
From a broader perspective, the choice of the traditional interstate com-
pact, rather than the federal-interstate compact, as the model for adjusting
multijurisdictional problems of the Red River basin was a decision of major
significance. The difference between these two types of compacts is subtle
but important.8 2 The conventional interstate compact is an agreement be-
79. Letter from Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to Perry Morton, Assistant Att'y
Gen., Lands Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, at 2 (July 28, 1958). Chairman Beckman expressed
the desire of the RRCNC to draft a compact that would avoid the impasse that occurred in
litigation between Texas and New Mexico over the Rio Grande Compact when the Court ruled
that the federal government was an indispensable party; the United States, of course, had not
waived its sovereign immunity to suit. See also Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
80. The Department of Justice did not agree with the suggestion that the mere making of
a compact and approval of it by Congress would be construed as requiring the United States
to be a party to litigation arising under the compact. See Letter from Perry Morton, Assistant
Att'y Gen., Lands Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, at
2 (Sept. 30, 1958). Morton noted that the Supreme Court did not assign any reasons for its
conclusion in Texas v. New Mexico that the United States was an indispensable party. Id. at
2-3. The Department of Justice had argued the indispensability of the federal government on
two grounds: (1) the object of this litigation was to control the operation of drainage and
irrigation works belonging to the federal government, and (2) the relief sought would interfere
with the water rights of the Pueblo Indians, wards of the United States. Id. In contrast, the
Supreme Court had held that the Secretary of Interior was not a necessary party in litigation
to determine the relative rights of Nebraska and Wyoming to the water of the North Platte
River. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40, 43 (1935). Cf. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon,
462 U.S. 1017, 1023 (1983) (reflecting the refusal of the Supreme Court to follow the rec-
ommendation of the Special Master that an action by Idaho against Oregon and Washington
over rights to the anadromous fish that migrate between the Pacific Ocean and spawning
grounds of Idaho be dismissed without prejudice for failure to join the United States as an
indispensable party).
81. See, e.g., Letter from Perry Morton, Assistant Att'y Gen., Lands Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, at 1-6 (Mar. 29, 1960).
82. Hearings, Statement by Col. Laubscher, supra note 14, at 4. See also Muys, Interstate
Compacts and Regional Water Resources Planning and Management, 6 NAT. RESOURCES LAW.
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tween two or more states on matters of mutual concern that are susceptible
to cooperative treatment. 3 Some legal scholars assert that the consent of
the Congress to any interstate compact dealing with water resources is man-
*dated by the compact clause of the Constitution, but congressional consent
does not make the United States a formal party to the agreement.8 4 A federal
representative ordinarily participates in the negotiations of a conventional
interstate compact to ensure that federal interests are not impaired and to
serve as a neutral facilitator of the negotiations."a Neither federal partici-
pation in the deliberations nor the consent of the Congress to the compact
necessarily legally binds the United States to the provisions set forth in the
compact.
8 6
The federal-interstate compact, on the other hand, is an agreement by
two or more states and the federal government on matters of mutual interest
in which the Congress joins the United States as a signatory party, con-
tractually bound by the compact's provisions.8 7 The first federal-interstate
compact was the Delaware River Basin Compact approved by Delaware,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and the United States in 1961-sev-
enteen years before completion of the Red River Compact. 8 The Susque-
hanna River Basin Compact, a similar federal-interstate compact, was adopted
by New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the United States in 1970-
eight years preceding the signing ceremony for the Red River Compact at
153, 159-63 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Muys]. Muys's article summarizes a 454-page study
completed by him in 1971 for the National Water Commission. See NATIONAL WATER COM-
MISSION, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS 105-88 (Legal Study No. 14, NTIS No. PB 202 998)
[hereinafter cited as Muys, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS, to distinguish the lengthier study
from the article in the Natural Resources Lawyer].
83. Hearings, Statement by Col. Laubscher, supra note 14, at 5.
84. Muys, supra note 82, at 174 ("there is a very strong presumption that any compact
or agreement dealing with water resources is subject to the consent requirements of the compact
clause") (emphasis in the original). The Supreme Court in 1894 suggested that congressional
consent was necessary when interstate compacts or agreements contained provisions "which
might affect subjects placed under the control of Congress, such as commerce and the navigation
of public waters, which is included under the power to regulate commerce." Wharton v. Wise,
153 U.S. 155, 171 (1894). The limited role of the federal government in the administration of
a conventional interstate water compact is discussed by Col. Laubscher of the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers and by Muys. See Hearings, Statement by Col. Laubscher, supra note 14, at 5-
6, and Muys, supra note 82, at 159 (describing the role of the federal representative to tile
permanent compact commission as "little more than an honored observer").
85. Muys, supra note 82, at 159.
86. Id. at 160. Although not legally bound to the provisions set forth in a compact, federal
officials may feel a moral obligation to refrain from actions that might interfere with compact
implementation. See Goslin, Interstate River Compacts: Impact on Colorado, 6 DEN. J. INT'L
LAW & POLICY 415, 432 (1976).
87. MUYS, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS, supra note 82, at S-4. See also COMPTROLLER
GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT
COMMISSIONS: USEFUL MECHANISMS FOR PLANNING AND MANAGING RIVER BASIN OPERATIONS I
(CED-81-34 Feb. 20, 1981) [hereinafter cited as GAO REP. ON FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACTS].
88. Delaware River Basin Compact, Act of Sept. 27, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat.
688 (1961). See also GAO REP. ON FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACTS, supra note 87, at 1.
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Denison Dam.89 The model of the federal-interstate compact that emerged
from these two agreements confers extremely broad powers upon the regional
administrative agency created to administer the compact.9
Some of the drafters of the Red River Compact were exposed to the theory
of the federal-interstate compact in 1959. 91 Certain provisions of the Del-
aware River Basin Compact were examined by several of the legal advisers
to the Red River Compact Negotiation Commission for possible adaptation
to the Red River Compact.92 In view of the many federal projects and ex-
tensive interests in the Red River basin, the failure of the negotiators to
consider the federal-interstate compact as a device to meet their objectives
is baffling.
The Goals of the Negotiators
Every effort was made to draft clear and unequivocal language that would
preclude, insofar as possible, any chance of the courts having an opportunity
to make a different construction of the terminology than that which was
intended, possibly thwarting the objectives of the compact. 93 As a supplement
to the compact, interpretive comments were prepared by the RRCNC Legal
Advisory Committee.94 Although the Suliplemental Interpretive Comments
do not attempt to cover every possibility arising under the compact, they
nevertheless spell out the intent of the compact negotiators with regard to
each article of the compact.
An official report of the RRCNC Engineering Advisory Committee, dated
May 12, 1978, also supplements the text of the compact. This report graph-
ically presents the boundaries of the basin, the five reaches of the river
system, and the subbasins within each reach and lists the pertinent data
concerning both existing and proposed reservoirs in the basin. 95 Another
89. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Act of Dec. 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat.
1509 (1970). See also GAO REP. ON FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACTS, supra note 87, at 1.
90. See Muys, supra note 82, at 160-62.
91. All of the commissioners received a copy of an address by Mitchell Wendell in 1959
to the Interstate Conference on Water Problems. See "Water Compacts-Problems and Prog-
ress," Address by Mitchell Wendell to Interstate Conference on Water Problems, under auspices
of the Council of State Governments, at 6-8 (May 29, 1959) (discussing the need for a new
federal-interstate arrangement in the water resources area and advancing the idea of a federal-
interstate compact) and Letter from Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to RRCNC State
Comm'rs, at 1 (Nov. 23, 1959). Several commissioners apparently attended the conference.
92. See Letter from Richard Huff, RRCNC Legal Advisory Comm. Chairman, to Homer
Belanger, RRCNC Legal Adviser for Louisiana, at 1-3 (Jan. 15, 1962) (calling attention to
language in the Delaware River Basin Compact concerning federal district court jurisdiction
in certain interstate controversies arising under the compact and disagreeing with the sovereign
immunity provision of the compact).
93. See Beckman Letter to Red River Valley Ass'n (May 21, 1962), supra note 37, at 2.
94. Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21.
95. Eng'g Advisory Comm., RRCNC, Rep. of the Eng'g Advisory Comm. to the Red River
Compact Comm'n (May 12, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 RRCNC Eng'g Rep.]. Though
dated May 12, 1978, the report was not completed until sometime later. See Minutes of 61st
Meeting of RRCNC, at 1-3 (Sept. 19, 1979).
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report of the Engineering Advisory Committee completed in June, 1970 con-
tains detailed stream flow and other hydrologic data and was used extensively
during the negotiations.
9 6
Most water law compacts in existence when negotiations began on the Red
River Compact were primarily single-purpose in their focus. 97 Pollution con-
trol compacts in effect then were utilized primarily in the East, by virtue
of its lengthier industrial history, 98 and water allocation compacts were uti-
lized predominantly in the West. 99
The negotiators of the Red River Compact recognized the interrelation-
ships between water quantity and water quality, the need for the maintenance
of an adequate supply of water for navigation in the lower reaches of the
basin, the impact of flood control and drainage on water utilization, and
the importance of planning in the conservation, management, and future
development of water resources in the basin. Although the greatest achieve-
ment of the compact is the equitable division of the waters of the basin
among the four signatory states, the compact also seeks to advance multiple
objectives and to avoid the jurisdictional and procedural problems experi-
enced by other river basin compact commissions.' °
II. The Adjustment of Interstate Disputes From 1656 Until 1956
Colonial and Constitutional Mechanisms for Interstate Dispute Resolution
The intergovernmental relations problems created by competing uses of
the water of the Red River system'0' typify the long-standing questioning
over the appropriate relationship between the individual states and the fed-
eral government, which dates to the birth of the United States. 02 The Con-
stitution included two important mechanisms for resolving interstate problems:
(1) article I, section 10 authorizes a state with the consent of Congress to
enter into any agreement or compact with another state;03 (2) article III,
96. Eng'g Advisory Comm., RRCNC, Rep. of the Eng'g Advisory Comm. to the Red River
Compact Comm'n (June 1970) (containing detailed stream flow and other hydrologic data and
water resources development and planning data) [hereinafter cited as 1970 RRCNC Eng'g Rep.].
See also 1978 RRCNC Eng'g Rep., supra note 95, at 2 (describing utilization of 1970 report
during compact negotiations).
97. See Address by Wendell, supra note 91, at 4.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 79-80.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 10, 38-40, 58-64, & 75-81.
102. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34
YALE L.J. 685, 685 (1925).
103. U.S. CoNsT. art. I. § 10, cl. 3: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power. . . ." The
legislative power of the Congress is set forth in article I. The recognition in article I, section
10 of the authority of the states to enter into compacts is actually couched in negative terms,
not only setting forth the role of Congress in such matters but also expressing a limitation
upon the exercise of the "compacting authority" of the states. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 102, at 691 & n.25.
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section 2 grants original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of the United
States over "[c]ontroversies between two or more states."' These two con-
stitutionally recognized methods for settling interstate disputes were pat-
terned after two forms of adjustment for settling problems among the
colonies." 5
For a hundred years preceding the American Revolution, the common
practice among the colonies was to resolve a dispute over an interjuris-
dictional matter, such as a boundary problem, by appointing a joint com-
mission to discuss the situation and negotiate a resolution of the problem.' 6
Agreements reached by the colonies were then subject to approval by the
Crown.10 7 If a negotiated solution did not seem feasible or if negotiations
stalemated, the colonies also had the option of appealing the controversy
to the Crown. 08 The Crown, in turn, usually referred the controversy to a
royal commission.'0 A decision by the royal commission could be appealed
to the Privy Council." 0 Thus, the settling of disputes among the colonies
through agreements approved by the Crown and by "litigation" on appeal
to the Privy Council were precursors of the compact clause requirement of
the consent of Congress "as a prerequisite to the validity of [a]greements
by the States" and of article III powers vested in the Supreme Court."' In
sum, "The framers [of the Constitution] . . . astutely created a mechanism
of legal control over affairs that are projected beyond State lines and yet
may not call for, nor be capable of, national treatment. They allowed in-
terstate adjustments but duly safeguarded the national interest." 2
104. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; . . . -to Controversies between two or
more States; ....
In all Cases . . . in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction ....
105. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 102, at 692-95.
106. Apparently the resolution of boundary disputes was a significant problem among the
colonies and occurred with some frequency because of the "ill-surveyed territory" and the
"vague and expansive" language of the colonial charters. Id. Boundary controversies existed
between eleven states at the time the Constitution was adopted. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 883, 893 (1838).
107. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 102, at 692-95 & n.29 (citing the opinion of Lord
Mansfield in the second controversy between Massachusetts and Connecticut, which was quoted
in South Australia v. Victoria, 12 C.L.R. 667, 704 (1911)).
108. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 102, at 692-95 & nn.29 & 32. Frankfurter and Landis
noted that the records of the Privy Council reflected the appeal in 1773 of a boundary dispute
between New York and New Jersey.
109. Id. This procedure "bore the characteristics of a litigation." Id. In 1740, a dispute
between Massachusetts and New Hampshire was settled by appeal to the Crown and referral,
in turn, to the Royal Commission. Id. & n.30.
110. Id. However, as Frankfurter and Landis pointed out, "the Privy Council was not for-
mally set apart through its Judicial Committee as a judicial organ until (1833). . . ." Id. &
n.31.
I 11. Id. at 694.
112. Id. at 695.
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The Resolution of Interstate Boundary Disputes:
The Red River Experience
Historically, interstate compacts were used initially by the colonies and
later by the states to resolve boundary disputes. Since rivers and lakes form
the boundary between many states, the subject matter of compacts frequently
involved interstate waters." 3 The judicial power of the Supreme Court was
also invoked in boundary controversies. Frequently, however, litigation either
did not settle the boundary dispute or failed to settle the problem perma-
nently." 4 In fact, the Supreme Court on occasion encouraged the states to
negotiate an agreement settling their boundary problems."
5
The inability of litigation to resolve boundary problems perhaps is best
illustrated by the virtually unending dispute over the correct boundary of
the Red River, an issue that arose initially between the United States territory
and the state of Texas and later between the states of Oklahoma and Texas.
When federal legislation was enacted in 1890 "provid[ing] a temporary gov-
ernment for the Territory of Oklahoma" and "enlarg[ing] the jurisdiction
of the United States Court in the Indian Territory," Congress acknowledged
an existing controversy between the federal government and the state of
Texas over the ownership of a tract of land lying between the North and
South forks of the Red River east of the 100th meridian and designated by
Texas as "Greer County, Texas.""1
6
In accordance with a congressional directive in the Act of 1890, the At-
torney General of the United States filed an original action in equity in the
Supreme Court to determine whether the North Fork or the South Fork of
the Red River was the correct boundary.17 Relying upon the Treaty of 1819
between the United States and Spain and interpreting the "Melish map"
attached thereto, the Court held in 1896 that the boundary was along the
south bank of the main channel of the Red River and of the South Fork
of the Red River, commonly known as Prairie Dog Town Fork, until it
intersected the 100th meridian of longitude astronomically determined."' As
a result of the Court's decision, approximately one and a half million acres
of rich farming land once claimed by Texas were officially designated a part
113. Id. at 696 & app. A. See also R. LEACH & R. SUGO, JR., THE ADMINISTRATION OF
INTERSTATE COMPACTS 5 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LEACH & SUGO]; Muys, supra note 82, at
154-55.
114. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 102, at 696. From 1832 to 1846, litigation between
Rhode Island and Massachusetts over a boundary dispute was pending in the Supreme Court.
Id. at 705 & n.87. A controversy between Missouri and Iowa initiated in 1848 and "decided"
by the Court in 1850 was reopened forty years later for "final disposition." Id.
115. Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U.S. 273, 283 (1920); Washington v. Oregon, 214 U.S.
205, 217-18 (1909). See also Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 102, at 696 & n.42.
116. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 25, 26 Stat. 81, 92.
117. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646-47 (1892) (holding that the Supreme
Court "has jurisdiction to determine the disputed question of boundary between the United
States and Texas").
118. United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1, 90 (1896).
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of the United States territory, encompassing an area part of which later
became the state of Oklahoma. 19
The Court's decision in 1896 did not completely settle the location of the
Red River boundary between Oklahoma and Texas. During the early 1900s
rich oil and gas deposits were discovered in great quantities in the beds of
the Red River adjacent to Wichita County, Texas. 20 Conflicting claims to
these deposits and the danger of armed conflict between the rival aspirants
for the oil and gas prompted the state of Oklahoma to file an original action
against Texas in the Supreme Court in 1919 over the ownership of the bed
of part of the "boundary reach" of the river.'2' The United States intervened
in this action as trustee of Indian allottees of property contiguous to the
river and as owner in its own right of a large part of the bed and islands
therein.'2 Texas counterclaimed against Oklahoma for an adjudication of
a dispute over a strip of land along the western boundary of Oklahoma
adjoining the Texas Panhandle.
2
1
The Court enjoined Texas from further leasing, permitting, or licensing
of any part of the bed of the Red River lying between the south bank of
the river as it existed at the date of the ratification of the Treaty of 1819
and the 100th degree of west longitude and the southeastern corner of the
state of Oklahoma. 124 The Court also appointed a receiver and empowered
him to take possession of the controverted property and to conserve and
control all oil and gas operations in the area.'25
On April 11, 1921, the Court held that its decision in 1896 in the celebrated
"Greer County controversy" conclusively determined the boundary between
Texas and what is now Oklahoma to be along the south bank of the river. 26
However, the Court then directed that evidence be taken and further hearings
conducted to determine the physical location of the south bank. 27 The Court
enunciated criteria for locating the bank and referred to three commissioners
appointed by the Court the task of marking the boundary in accordance
with these principles.2 s Although the Red River had been surveyed in 1874,
the processes of avulsion, accretion, and erosion had physically altered the
119. Id. at 91.
120. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 84 (1921). See also G. FoREMAN, A HisToRY oF
OKLAHM 332 (1942) (also describing the Greer County case and subsequent litigation between
Texas and Oklahoma over the Red River boundary).
121. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 70-75 (1921).
122. Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372 (1920).
123. FoR.mN, supra note 120, at 334.
124. Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372 (1920).
125. Id. at 373-76.
126. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 92-93 (1921). While the case was being litigated,
possession of part of the river was taken and held by intimidation and force. Oklahoma v.
Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 579-80 (1922). Armed conflicts between rival aspirants for the oil and
gas were narrowly averted. Id. The Texas militia had been called to enforce orders of Texas
courts, and a similar effort was made to summon the Oklahoma militia. FoR.MAN, supra note
120, at 332-34.
127. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 602, 608 (1921).
128. Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606, 640 (1923).
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relation of the river to the surveyed tracts, and the task of marking the
boundary ultimately proved to be very time-consuming.
29
Meanwhile, the Court resolved the counterclaim in favor of Texas. The
decision as to the counterclaim was based upon a determination by the Court
that the 100th meridian in the strip along the Panhandle had been erro-
neously located and surveyed. As a result, more than twenty thousand acres
of land claimed by Oklahoma passed to Texas.'30
Although the interstate boundary was eventually marked along the south
bank of the Red River, the state of Oklahoma had no proprietary interest
in either the floodplain or the other expanse of land designated as the south
half of the river bed, both of which were held in the receivership., 3' The
determination by the Court that the boundary was along the south bank of
the river only negated the claims by Texas and its grantees and lessees to
a proprietary interest in the river bed and in the proceeds of the oil and
gas removed from it.132 The floodplain area belonged to Texas and its gran-
tees. 33 Since no part of the Red River within Oklahoma was navigable under
the "navigability in fact" test, title to the bed of the river never passed
from the United States to Oklahoma upon Oklahoma's admission into the
Union. 34 The allottees and vendees of the United States, who acquired title
to property that had once formed a reservation along the river for the Kiowa,
Comanche, and Apache tribes, took title to the middle line of the stream
bed, and the remainder of the bed belonged to the United States.'
3
1
As the years passed, many of the bends and curves in the 539 miles of
the crooked and winding river boundary between Oklahoma and Texas con-
tinued to be altered both by gradual forces and by avulsion. 3 6 As a result
of the natural alteration of the river in relation to past surveys of the bound-
ary line, private quarrels erupted between Oklahoma families and Texas
citizens over the river bed. 37 The guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court
in the 1920s have been utilized by the federal courts in resolving these private
feuds. 31
129. Id. at 620.
130. See FoREMAN, supra note 120, at 334.-
131. Oklahoma v. Texas, 265 U.S. 505, 508 (1924).
132. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 582 (1922).
133. Oklahoma v. Texas, 265 U.S. 505, 508 (1924).
134. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586-91 (1922).
135. Id. at 592-96.
136. See FOREmAN, supra note 120, at 334. The distance of the Red River boundary between
Oklahoma and Texas is only 321 miles when measured in a direct line. Id.
137. See, e.g., Gipson, Families Feud over Red River Sand Flats, Tulsa Tribune, Jan. 9,
1984, at 1A, col. 2 (describing a ten-year-old feud over 900 acres of sand flats sandwiched
between two ranches along the boundary stretch of the Red River).
138. James v. Langford, 701 F.2d 123, 124 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 702
(1984) (applying the 1923 Supreme Court decision fixing the interstate boundary and setting
forth the standards to be applied in determining the location of the south bank of the river
at any particular location). Although the federal district courts lack jurisdiction to determine
the state line as the political boundary of two states in a private dispute, they do have juris-
diction to decide the location of the river bank and to resolve all disputed property ownership
issues between the private parties. Id. at 126.
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The location of the Red River boundary determined by the Supreme Court
in the "Greer County" case in 1896 and the definition of the boundary
enunciated in Oklahoma v. Texas in the 1920s were applied by the Court
in the 1980s in an original action brought by Texas against Oklahoma over
the effect of the construction of Denison Dam and Lake Texoma upon the
interstate boundary adjacent to Grayson County, Texas. I39 In the final anal-
ysis, the length of time consumed, the pages of testimony and exhibits en-
tered into evidence, the expenses involved, and the number of decrees and
orders entered by the Supreme Court in litigation involving the Red River
boundary not only suggests the limitations of litigation in solving perma-
nently interstate problems of this nature, but is surely unprecedented in this
nation's history of boundary disputes. 40
Early Experiences in Handling Interstate Problems:
The Case for Compacts
Although interstate compacts had colonial antecedents, they had seldom
been utilized during the 110 years from the birth of the nation to the dawn
of the twentieth century. 141 During that period, Congress established the
139. Texas v. Oklahoma, 457 U.S. 172, 172, 175 (1982) (concluding that the construction
of Denison Dam and Texoma Reservoir did not alter the boundary between Texas and Okla-
homa as it existed prior to such construction in any manner whatsoever).
140. The Red River bed litigation during the 1920s produced a record of nine printed volumes
of more than 5,500 pages of testimony taken by a special master under orders of the Supreme
Court. See FOREMAN, supra note 120, at 334. Nearly fifty decrees or orders of some nature
were entered by the Court in the controversy between Oklahoma and Texas and the United
States, as intervenor, which arose in the 1920s over the river bed: 252 U.S. 372 (1920); 253
U.S. 465 (1920); 254 U.S. 280 (1920); 254 U.S. 603 (1921); 254 U.S. 615 (1920); 256 U.S. 70
(1921); 256 U.S. 602 (1920); 257 U.S. 308 (1921); 257 U.S. 609 (1921); 257 U.S. 611 (1921);
257 U.S. 616 (1921); 257 U.S. 621 (1922); 258 U.S. 574 (1922); 258 U.S. 606 (1922); 259 U.S.
565 (1922); 260 U.S. 606 (1923); 260 U.S. 705 (1922); 260 U.S. 711 (1923); 261 U.S. 340 (1923);
261 U.S. 345 (1923); 261 U.S. 606 (1923); 262 U.S. 505 (1923); 262 U.S. 724 (1923); 264 U.S.
565 (1924); 265 U.S. 76 (1924); 265 U.S. 490 (1924); 265 U.S. 493 (1924); 265 U.S. 500 (1924);
265 U.S. 505 (1924); 265 U.S. 513 (1924); 265 U.S. 573 (1924); 266 U.S. 298 (1924); 266 U.S.
303 (1924); 266 U.S. 546 (1924); 266 U.S. 583 (1924); 267 U.S. 452 (1925); 267 U.S. 580 (1925);
268 U.S. 252 (1925); 269 U.S. 314 (1926); 269 U.S. 536 (1925); 269 U.S. 539 (1926); 272 U.S.
21 (1926); 273 U.S. 93 (1927); 274 U.S. 713 (1927); 276 U.S. 596 (1928).
141. Only twenty-one compacts became effective between 1789 and 1900; these compacts
were used "only as last resorts to settle boundary and jurisdictional disputes between pairs of
states." LEACH & SUGG, supra note 113, at 5. During this time, the compact was regarded as
simply an alternative to judicial resolution of a dispute rather than as an instrument for the
positive exercise of power. Id. These twenty-one compacts neither created a permanent admin-
istrative agency to implement the compact nor included as many as three states as signatory
parties. Id. By 1920 the total number of compacts entered as many as three states had edged up
to 36. F. ZIMMERIAN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS ix (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ZrmERMAN & WENDELL]. During the two decades of 1920 to 1940, twenty
compacts were concluded by the states, and one hundred additional compacts were negotiated
between 1941 and 1975. Id. Many of the compacts concluded after the turn of the century
were multistate in scope and established permanent interstate agencies to administer the com-
pacts. LEACH & SUGG, supra note 113, at 5-6. The compacts approved during the twentieth
century added "a new dimension for state power." Id. at 6.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
principle of a federal role in forming compacts in the natural resources area
with the passage of the Weeks Act in 1911. This act gave the consent of
Congress "to each of the several states . . . to enter into any agreement or
compact . . . with any other state or states, for the purpose of conserving
the forests and water supply" of the signatory states.
42
Nearly ten years later in an action brought by New York against New
Jersey to enjoin the completion of a sewer system that would discharge
sewage into New York Bay, the Supreme Court recognized its own inade-
quacy to afford relief in controversies involving interstate water problems .
4a
Just as the Court in cases involving boundary disputes had counseled the
states to try to resolve their problems through interstate compact rather than
by judicial decree, the Court in New York v. New Jersey advised the litigants
that:
IT]he grave problem of sewage disposal presented by the large
and growing populations living on the shores of New York Bay
is one more likely to be wisely solved by co-operative study and
by conference and mutual concession on the part of represent-
atives of the States which are vitally interested than by proceed-
ings in any court however constituted.
4
During the same period, the ratification of the New York Port Authority
Compact of 1921 and the concomitant establishment of an administrative
agency to oversee the implementation of its provisions expanded the tra-
ditional concept of an interstate compact. The New York Port Authority
experience suggested the value of "imaginatively adapt[ing] ... the compact
idea" to solve "problems presented by the growing interdependence, social
and economic, of groups of states forming distinct regions.' 45
142. Act of Mar. 1, 1911, ch. 186, 36 Stat. 961. The advance blanket consent given by the
Weeks Act to a vague class of future compacts before they were actually formulated has been
criticized as a "practical abandonment by Congress of its constitutional responsibility to review
all interstate compacts in order to protect and promote the national interest." Muys, supra
note 82, at 174. By giving consent in advance of the negotiation and completion of the compact,
Congress foreclosed an opportunity to assess the impact of the compact on federal interests.
Id. However, the 43rd Annual Governors' Conference advocated the enactment by Congress
of general consent-in-advance legislation, which would authorize the states to negotiate compacts
in unspecified broad fields of action. LEACH & SUGo, supra note 113, at 10 n.8.
143. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921). See infra text accompanying note
263.
144. Id. Officials of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut heeded the advice of the Court
and negotiated the New York Harbor (Tri-State) Interstate Sanitation Compact of 1935. See
S.J. Res. 159, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 49 Stat. 932 (1935). The Tri-State Compact was formulated
in recognition of the "grave menace to the health, welfare, and recreational facilities of the
people living in [the area surrounding and adjacent to the Harbor of New York] occasioned
by the serious pollution of the harbor, coastal and tidal waters attendant to the tremendous
growth of population and development in the area." 49 Stat. 932. The New York Harbor
litigation is examined in depth in part III. See infra text accompanying notes 230-239.
145. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 102, at 729. See also LEACH & SUGo, supra note 113,
at 6-7 (asserting that "[tihe most important single event in the use of the interstate compact
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Legal scholars also began to raise serious questions about the advisability
of attempting to resolve complex multijurisdictional disputes, such as in-
terstate water controversies, in the courts or through congressional enactment
of national legislation. As Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis noted in
their study of interstate compacts published in May of 1925, "litigation had
added confusion, not settlement [of interstate water problems]" because the
judicial process "is too static and too sporadic for adjusting a social-eco-
nomic issue continuously alive in an area embracing more than a half a
dozen States."' 46 Because of the range, the intricacy, and the technicality
of the facts, most interstate water controversies simply are not amenable to
judicial resolution and constitute a heavy burden on the Court's time,
"therefore affect[ing] the quality of judgment which the Court is capable
of exercising."'' 47 Moreover, the political aspects of an interstate dispute "are
not readily satisfied through litigation."'
48
Instead, Frankfurter and Landis wrote, interstate water problems are best
handled through legislation that is "coterminous with the region requiring
control" (e.g., in the case of an interstate stream or lake, the geographic
unit is its drainage area, which, in all likelihood, encompasses parts of more
than one state). 49 National legislation enacted by the Congress did not seem
to be a feasible alternative at this time to effectively address regional prob-
lems because national legislation would be difficult to formulate and could
result in excessive federal control. Therefore, Frankfurter and Landis con-
cluded, "[c]ollective legislative action through the instrumentality of compact
by states constituting a region furnishes the answer."' 50
The Evolution of Interstate Water Compacts
Colorado pioneered the movement in the West to settle interstate disputes
over waters primarily used for irrigation by the compact method.,' During
the decade from 1920 to 1930, Colorado negotiated and concluded the Col-
agency was probably the establishment and success of the Port of New York Authority, based
on a compact concluded in 1921"). For the contents of the compact, see Port of New York
Authority Agreement of 1921, 42 Stat. 174, amended by 42 Star. 822. For a detailed account
of the development of the Port Authority, see generally E. BARD, Tim PORT OF NEw YORK
Aumroirrv 5-26 (1942).
146. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 102, at 701. For a discussion of some problems
associated with the resolution of interstate water disputes, see Bannister, Interstate Rights in
Interstate Streams in the Arid West, 36 HARv. L. REV. 960, 968-77 (1923).
147. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 102, at 705.
148. Id. at 705-06.
149. Id. at 702, 707.
150. Id. at 708.
151. Muys, supra note 82, at 155. Compacts generally were not used for any water-related
purposes, other than boundary problems, navigation, and fishing rights, until 1922 when the
Colorado River Compact was concluded. Id. For a discussion of Colorado's role as a pioneer
in the utilization of compacts, see generally Comm. OF THE IRRIGAnON Div. ON INTERSTATE
WATER RIGHTS, AM. Soc'Y oF Crvi ENG'RS, FNAL REPORT ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS
1852 (1939) (Transactions Paper No. 2055) [hereinafter cited as 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSTATE
WATER PROBLEMS].
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orado River Compact with Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming; 52 the La Plata River Compact with New Mexico;" 3 the South
Platte River Compact with Nebraska;5 4 and the "temporary" Rio Grande
Compact with New Mexico and Texas. 55 The Colorado River Compact,
152. Colorado River Compact of 1922, Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057,
1064 (1928). Although the compact was signed by a duly authorized commissioner representing
the state of Arizona, that state later declined to ratify the compact until 1944 because of its
concern that the agreement would permit California to preempt most of the allocation of the
water of the lower Colorado basin under Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). MuYs,
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS, supra note 82, at 22. Since the states within the Colorado River
basin could not initially agree among themselves upon the share of water each state was to
receive, Congress made an apportionment that was forced upon the states through the enactment
in 1928 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928). See Ladd, Federal
and Interstate Conflicts in Montana Water Law: Support for a State Water Plan, 42 MONT.
L. REv. 267, 283-86 (1981) (describing the genesis of the third legal method of allocating
interstate waters among the states-congressional apportionment). See also C. MEYERS & A.
TARLOCK, WATER REsouRCE MANAGEMENT 432-56 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MEYERS
& TARLocK]. Just as Arizona had succeeded in delaying the enactment of the Boulder Canyon
Act in Congress, Arizona fought the act in the courts by challenging its legality. MEYERS &
TARLOCK, supra, at 438-44. See also Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39-
42, 43 (1966). In 1963 the Supreme Court upheld the congressional apportionment of the water
among the lower basin states, stating that "[w]here Congress has so exercised its constitutional
power over waters, courts have no power to substitute their own notions of an 'equitable
apportionment' for the apportionment chosen by Congress." Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 579, decree entered 376 U.S. 340 (1964). For a thorough examination of the Court's
decision, see Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water to People, States, and Nation,
1963 Sup. CT. REv. 158. See also Clyde, The Colorado River Decision-1963, 8 UTAH L. REv.
299 (1964); Haber, Arizona v. California-A Brief Review, 4 NAT. RESOURCES J. 17 (1964);
Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. CoLo. L. REv. 49 (1964); Wilmer,
Arizona v. California, A Statutory Construction Case, 6 Aiuz. L. REv. 40 (1964). The 1963
decision was not the final chapter in the original action brought to determine rights to the
waters of the Colorado River. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); 439 U.S. 419
(1979).
153. The La Plata River Compact was signed by the commissioners on Nov. 27, 1922, three
days after the signing ceremony for the Colorado River Compact. The La Plata River Compact
was approved by the Congress on Jan. 25, 1925, and promulgated by the President on Jan.
29, 1925. Act of Jan. 29, 1925, ch. 110, 43 Stat. 796. For an abbreviated history of the La
Plata River Compact, see 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS, supra note 151,
at 1856-57. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decision upholding the validity and defining
the effect of the La Plata River Compact, see infra text accompanying notes 268-285.
154. Although the South Platte River Compact was signed by the commissioners on Apr.
27, 1923, it was not approved until 1926. See Act of Mar. 8, 1926, ch. 46, 44 Stat. 195. For
an abbreviated history of the compact, see 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS,
supra note 151, at 1856-57.
155. The problem of settling the respective claims of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas to
the interstate waters of the Rio Grande above Fort Quitman " 'hung like a pall' over the water
users of the upper Rio Grande basin in the three states for more than 40 yrs." 1939 ASCE
REP. ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBI.EMS, supra note 151, at 1857. A "temporary" compact,
"designed as a truce to maintain the status quo on the upper river," was signed on Feb. 12,
1929, and approved on June 17, 1930. Id. Negotiations on a permanent compact were conducted
without success during the five-year duration of the temporary compact. Id. at 1858. However,
final agreement was not reached until Mar. 18, 1938. Id. at 1859. The permanent compact
received federal approval the following year. Act of May 31, 1939, ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785.
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providing for the apportionment of water between the upper and lower bas-
ins of the river, was the first interstate compact to include a large number
of states as signatory parties.
56
Although legal authorities have disagreed over the necessity of obtaining
the consent of Congress before undertaking negotiations of a compact,
157
the practice established with compacts involving interstate waters in the West
was to secure congressional approval to begin negotiations and to include
in the negotiations a federal representative designated by the President of
the United States. 58 Typically the federal representative served as chairman
of the negotiating commission without voting power.
59
Congress reaffirmed the principle of a federal role in compact negotiations
with the passage of the Omnibus Flood Control Act of 1936.6o This act
authorized states to negotiate, subject to final approval by Congress,
compacts or agreements in connection with any project or op-
eration authorized by this Act for flood control or the prevention
of damage to life or property by reason of floods upon any stream
156. Under a compromise suggested by Herbert Hoover, the chairman of the negotiation
commission, the water of the Colorado River was divided between the upper basin states of
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming and the lower basin states of Arizona, California,
and Nevada because the states were unable to agree upon a state-by-state water allocation. See
Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. II(f), (g), 45 Stat. 1057, 1064. See also Ladd, supra
note 152, at 283 & n.85. The states within the upper basin later agreed upon a subdivision of
the waters allocated to them. See Upper Colorado River Compact of 1948, Act of Apr. 6,
1949, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31. As discussed in note 152 supra, the apportionment of water between
the lower basin states was accomplished, in effect, by Congress through the Boulder Canyon
Project Act of 1928. For additional background, see Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 102,
at 702. See also MEYERS & TARLOCK, supra note 152, at 433.
157. 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS, supra note 151, at 1853 ("There
appears to be a disagreement between the authorities concerning the necessity for the compacting
states first to obtain the consent of Congress before entering into negotiations.") The better
view is that congressional consent to negotiate a compact is not constitutionally necessary.
ZIMMERMAN & VENDELL, supra note 141, at 18; Muys, supra note 82, at 175.
158. See 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS, supra note 151, at 1853. See
also ZMI MstAN & WENDELL, supra note 141, at 18-19 (surmising that the practice of including
a federal representative in the negotiation of interstate water compacts was "undoubtedly a
result of the peculiar interest of the federal government in navigable waters' " and suggesting
that "water compacts negotiated without benefit of federal representation may have difficulty
[obtaining the requisite congressional approval] in the national capital" ) and Muys, supra note
82, at 175 (maintaining that the practice of securing congressional blessing to negotiate a com-
pact helps Congress "to implement the purpose of the compact clause" by placing Congress
in a position "to guide the states by specifying any conditions to its ultimate consent and by
providing any guidelines it may deem appropriate to facilitate negotiations" ). The experiences
of Louisiana and Texas in 1980 in their unsuccessful endeavors to secure congressional approval
of the Caddo Lake Compact suggests the obvious political advantages of including federal
representation from the outset. For background on the formulation of the Caddo Lake Compact
between Texas and Louisiana, which was negotiated without any direct federal involvement,
see infra notes 535-538 and accompanying text.
159. See 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS, supra note 151, at 1853.
160. Omnibus Flood Control Act of 1936, ch. 688, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 701a (1982)).
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or streams which lie in two or more such States, for the purpose
of providing, in such manner and such proportion as may be
agreed upon by such States and approved by the Secretary of
War, funds for construction and maintenance, for the payment
of damages, and for the purchase of rights-of-way, lands, and
easements in connection with such project or operation. 161
Several flood control and planning compacts were later negotiated as a result
of the federal flood control programs initiated in the 1930s . 62
The need for greater utilization of river basin compacts was suggested by
the Final Report of the Committee of the Irrigation Division on Interstate
Water Rights of the American Society of Civil Engineers in 1939.163 En-
deavoring to make their final report on interstate water problems as inclusive
as possible, the ASCE committee surveyed attorneys general and state water
engineers and other water officials of the forty-eight states concerning liti-
gation over the use of the waters of interstate streams. 16 The survey disclosed
that more than 80 percent of the states had been involved in litigation be-
tween one or more states over interstate waters.' 65
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act passed by the Congress in 1948
also sanctioned the interstate compact as a useful device for coordinating
and implementing programs for the improvement of the nation's waters. 66
This act reasserted the interest of Congress in a federal role in compact
negotiations. The 1948 act gave congressional consent to two or more states
to negotiate and enter into agreements or compacts for the prevention and
abatement of water pollution, including the enforcement of the compacting
states' respective water quality laws, and the establishment of joint agencies
to implement the states' cooperative program. 67 No water pollution control
compact or agreement would be legally binding upon any signatory state
"unless and until it had been approved by the Congress.' ' 6
The Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 vested federal authority relating
to water pollution in the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service and
in the Federal Works Administrator. 69 Although the thrust of the legislation
was one of cooperation with the states and interstate agencies, the act was
an important step toward federal intervention in environmental regulation. 70
Compacts addressing interstate water problems proliferated as the nation
reached the middle of the twentieth century. When the impetus began in
161. 49 Stat. at 1571-72 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701d (1982)).
162. See Muys, supra note 82, at 159 (citing compacts for the Red River of the North,
Connecticut River, Merrimack River, Thames River in New England, and Wheeling Creek as
examples of the handful of compacts that "emerged from the federal flood control program
in the 1930's" ).
163. See 1939 ASCE REP. oN INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS, supra note 151, at 1822-66.
164. Id. at 1822-23.
165. Id. at 1853-54.
166. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155.
167. Id. at § 2(c), 62 Stat. at 1156.
168. Id.
169. Id. at § 2(a), (b), 62 Stat. at 1155.
170. The policy of Congress, as declared by the 1948 Act, was "to recognize, preserve, and
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the late 1940s and early 1950s for the negotiation of a compact for the Red
River system, existing water compacts could be grouped into three basic
categories: water allocation compacts, pollution control compacts, and flood
control and planning compacts.' 7' In addition, the completion and approval
of the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact in 1948 had "sown the seeds"
for the development of the federal-interstate compact. 72 By the time congres-
sionally authorized ndgotiations began in the spring of 1956 on the Red River
Compact, fifteen water allocation compacts had been completed; five single-
purpose pollution control compacts had been approved; and three planning
and flood control compacts had been concluded.173 Negotiations were also
under way on several other water compacts.'
74
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States in controlling water pollution." Id.
(emphasis added). The Surgeon General was directed by Congress to encourage cooperative
activities by the states for the prevention and abatement of pollution, to promote the enactment
of uniform state laws relating to water pollution, and to foster the use of water pollution
control compacts between the states. Id. The role of the federal government under the 1948
act was limited to providing (1) federal technical services to state and interstate agencies and
industries and (2) financial aid to state, local, and interstate governmental entities. H.R. REP.
No. 1829, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2215, 2215.
171. See Muys, supra note 82, at 156-59.
172. Id. at 159-60.
173. The interstate water allocation compacts included: Arkansas River Compact of 1948,
Colorado-Kansas, Act of May 31, 1949, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145; Bear River Compact of 1955,
Act of Mar. 17, 1958, 72 Stat. 38; Belle Fourche River Compact of 1943, Act of Feb. 26,
1944, ch. 64, 58 Stat. 94; Canadian River Compact of 1950, Act of May 17, 1952, ch. 306,
66 Stat. 74; Colorado River Compact of 1922, Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057,
1064; Costilla Creek Compact of 1944, Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 328, 60 Stat. 246; La Plata
River Compact of 1922, Act of Jan. 29, 1925, ch. 110, 43 Stat. 796; Pecos River Compact
of 1948, Act of June 9, 1949, ch. 184, 63 Stat. 159; Republican River Compact of'1942, Act
of May 26, 1943, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86; Rio Grande Compact of 1938, Act of May 31, 1939,
ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785; Sabine River Compact of 1953, Act of Aug. 10, 1954, ch. 668, 68 Stat.
690, as amended, Act of Mar. 16, 1962, 76 Stat. 34; Snake River Compact of 1949, Act of
Mar. 21, 1950, ch. 73, 64 Stat. 29; South Platte River Compact of 1923, Act of Mar. 8, 1926,
ch. 46, 44 Stat. 195; Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948, Act of Apr. 6, 1949, ch.
48, 63 Stat. 31; Yellowstone River Compact of 1950, Act of Oct. 30, 1951, ch. 629, 65 Stat.
663. The five single-purpose pollution control compacts were: New England Interstate Water
Pollution Control Compact of 1947, Act of July 31, 1947, ch. 407, 61 Stat. 682; New York
Harbor (Tri-State) Interstate Sanitation Compact of 1935, Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 779, 49
Stat. 932; Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact of 1940, Act of July 11, 1940, ch.
581, 54 Stat. 752; Potomac River Basin Compact of 1939, Act of July 11, 1940, ch. 577, 54
Stat. 748, as amended, Act of Sept. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-407, 84 Stat. 856 (1970); Tennessee
River Basin Water Pollution Control Compact of 1955, Act of Aug. 23, 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-734, 72 Stat. 823. The flood control compacts were: Connecticut River Flood Control Com-
pact of 1951, Act of June 6, 1953, ch. 103, 67 Stat. 45; Great Lakes Basin Compact of 1955,
Act of July 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414; Red River of the North Compact of
1937, Act of Apr. 2, 1938, ch. 59, 52 Stat. 150. A compact between Massachusetts and New
Hampshire with respect to flood control on the Merrimack River was ratified by Massachusetts
and New Hampshire in 1937 but failed to receive the consent of Congress. See Massachusetts
Act of May 29, 1937, 1937 Mass. Acts 476; New Hampshire Act of June 20, 1937, 1937 N.H.
Laws 243; S.J. Res. 178, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R.J. Res. 494, 75th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1937); 81 CONG. REc. 8393, 9669 (1937).
174. Congressional consent to negotiate had been given for the following compacts, which
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III. The Supreme Court's Role in Interstate Water Problems
The Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment
There are two approaches for handling problems involving the use of the
water of an interstate stream such as the Red River: the "cooperative"
approach, illustrated by the interstate compact, and the "contentious" ap-
proach, exemplified by interstate litigation.1 5 Part II traced the compact
approach from its colonial antecedents through the evolution of interstate
water compacts. Part III focuses upon the "contentious" approach.
The "contentious" approach entails the settlement of controversies either
by an original action brought between the states in the Supreme Court or
through Supreme Court review of lower federal court and state supreme
court decisions in cases involving individuals or corporate entities.
176
Although the Supreme Court has long indicated that "original jurisdiction
should be invoked sparingly,"' 77 it was well established by the middle of
the twentieth century that one state could invoke the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in an action against another state to divide equitably
the water of an interstate stream, to curtail the pollution of common water-
ways, or to stop a neighboring state from constructing and maintaining an
artificial drainage system flooding valuable property in the other.
In most of the original jurisdiction actions involving water resources, the
basis of the standing of the complainant state is the doctrine of parens
patriae.7 1 Under this doctrine, a state can seek injunctive relief to protect
the general comfort, health, or property rights of its inhabitants threatened
by the proposed or continued action of another state. 79 That a state has
were later completed and approved: Arkansas River Basin Compact, Arkansas-Oklahoma, Act
of June 28, 1955, ch. 192, 69 Stat. 184 (consent to negotiate), approved by Act of Nov. 13,
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-152, 87 Stat. 569; Arkansas River Basin Compact, Kansas-Oklahoma,
Act of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 778, 69 Stat. 631 (consent to negotiate), approved by Act of Nov.
7, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-789, 80 Stat. 1409; Klamath River Basin Compact, Act of Aug. 9,
1955, ch. 676, 69 Stat. 613 (consent to negotiate), approved by Act of Aug. 30, 1957, Pub.
L. No. 85-222, 71 Stat. 497; Merrimack River Flood Control Compact, Pub. Res. of June 8,
1936, 49 Stat. 1490, and Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 688, § 4, 49 Stat. 1570, 1571-72 (consent
to negotiate), approved by Act of Apr. 23, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-23, 71 Stat. 18; Thames
River Flood Control Compact, Pub. Res. of June 8, 1936, 49 Stat. 1490, approved by Act of
July 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-526, 72 Stat. 364.
175. DOCUMINTS ON THE USE AND CONTROL OF THE WATERS OF INTERSTATE AND INTERNAT'L
STREAMS, H.R. Doc. No. 319, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. vi (T. Witmer ed., 2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as WITmER, H.R. Doc. No. 319]. As the history of the Boulder Canyon Project Act of
1928 suggests, a third method for settling interstate disputes over an interstate stream is by
congressional apportionment. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. The apportionment
effectuated by the Boulder Canyon Project Act is the only example of the use of the "congres-
sional apportionment" method to date. See MEYERS & TARLOCK, supra note 152, at 432. See
also Ladd, supra note 152, at 268-69.
176. See infra text accompanying notes 267-322.
177. Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969).
178. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1923). See also 3 HuTcn-
INs, NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, supra note 54, at 66-75; Ladd, supra note 152, at 269.
179. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1923).
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no pecuniary interest in the controversy does not defeat the original juris-
diction of the Court.°80 Though a state can sue to protect its quasi-sovereign
interests in the use of the natural resources within its jurisdiction, the elev-
enth amendment precludes a state from obtaining a decree for monetary
damages predicated upon the enforcement of individual claims of its citizens
against another state.' 8'
Winning a Supreme Court case involving an interstate water dispute is
far more difficult than taking the case to the Court. The standards imposed
by the Court for obtaining relief on the merits in an interstate water con-
troversy are very difficult to meet. Before the Court will exercise "its ex-
traordinary power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one
State" at the behest of another, the threatened invasion of rights or the
matter presented to the Court must be of "serious magnitude" and estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence. 82 In addition, "the principle to be
applied should be one which the Court is prepared deliberately to maintain
against all considerations on the other side."' 83
When compact negotiations over the apportionment of the water of the
North Fork of the Red River stalemated in 1970, the litigation alternative
was considered and rejected by the compact negotiators. 8 4 Though the rea-
sons for the decision to adhere to the cooperative approach are not reflected
in the agency files, a number of factors may be offered to justify rejection
of the litigious alternative.
The record of states in actions invoking the original jurisdiction of the
Court to hear an interstate water controversy offers little encouragement to
the pragmatist who seeks an expeditious, inexpensive, effective, and per-
manent solution to the interstate water problems of the state he represents.
For example, between 1789 and 1956, when compact negotiations formally
began on the Red River Compact, only three actions for the equitable ap-
portionment of interstate waterways brought before the Court actually re-
sulted in decrees dividing the waters. 85 During the same time period, original
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 522, 524 (1936); Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923); New York
v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906). Recently
Justice O'Connor elaborated on the standard by which the Supreme Court reviews the proof
in an action for equitable apportionment of an interstate stream. See Colorado v. New Mexico,
104 S.Ct. 2433, 2438-42, reh'g denied, 105 S.Ct. 19 (1984). Justice O'Connor said that a state
can carry its burden of proof "only with specific evidence about how existing uses might be
improved, or with clear evidence that a project is far less efficient than most other projects."
Id. at 2440 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens sharply disagreed with the majority opinion's
treatment of two questions of law in the case, as well as with its evaluation of the facts. 1d.
at 2443-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).
184. See infra notes 506-530 and accompanying text.
185. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336
(1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). See also Ladd, supra note 152, at 270 &
n.13.
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actions by one state to enjoin another state from polluting shared waters
were seldom brought. On the few occasions prior to 1956 when states had
pursued legal actions to enjoin an alleged public nuisance arising from the
degradation of water or the flooding of property, the complainant states'
efforts were devoid of success on the merits.
Second, when a state seeking relief by way of an original action against
another state is the lower downstream state on an interstate waterway, the
effect of the Court's denial of relief usually benefits the upstream state.
8 6
In addition to the expense of the litigation, the downstream state loses val-
uable time that could have been devoted to the negotiation of a cooperative
solution to the interstate problem. Finally, even if the complainant state
obtains the sought-after relief, frequently the decision by the Court is only
a prelude to future litigation seeking to clarify the application of the Court's
determinations to changing conditions on the river.
Before undertaking negotiations on the apportionment provisions of the
Red River Compact, the negotiating commissioners reviewed a summary of
the basic principles applicable to interstate water controversies enunciated
by the Supreme Court during the first half of the twentieth century. 7 Pri-
mary among these principles is the doctrine of "equitable apportionment,"'1
88
186. See MEYERs & TARLoCK, supra note 152, at 401. See also Texas v. New Mexico, 462
U.S. 554 (1983) (recognizing that the continued impasse between New Mexico and Texas over
the administration of the Pecos River Compact favored the upstream state).
187. See Progress Report of RRCNC Legal Advisory Comm., at 1 (Feb. 20-21, 1957) ap-
pended to Minutes of 5th Meeting of RRCNC (Feb. 20-21, 1957). At the fifth meeting, the
legal advisers presented a synopsis of Supreme Court decisions since 1939 addressing interstate
water problems and directed the attention of the negotiators to the 1939 ASCE Report on
Interstate Water Problems. Id.
188. See infra notes 189-215 and accompanying text. Equitable apportionmet was initially
defined by the Court as the doctrine of federal common law that governs disputes between
states concerning their rights to use the water of an interstate stream. See Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931). Accord, Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176,
183 (1982). However, the constitutional principle of the equal footing of the states does not
imply an equal division of the water between two competing states. Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46, 98 (1907). Accord, Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 191 (1982) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1923). Instead, the "measure of the
reciprocal rights and obligations of the States [is] declared to be an equitable apportionment
of the benefits of the river." Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 385 (1943). More recently,
the doctrine of equitable apportionment was recognized by the Court as "an appropriate mech-
anism for resolving allocative disputes" between states over the natural resource of an an-
adromous fish. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1024, 1027, 1029 (1983). The
Court said that "[m]uch as in a water dispute, a State that overfishes a run downstream deprives
an upstream State of the fish it otherwise would receive." Id. Since a dispute over the water
flowing through the Columbia-Snake River system would be resolved by applying the doctrine
of equitable apportionment, the Court saw no reason "to accord different treatment to a
controversy over a similar natural resource of that system." Id. In extending the doctrine of
equitable apportionment to a natural resource such as fish, the Court observed that the doctrine
is rooted in "the same principle that animates many of the Court's Commerce Clause cases:
a State may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants natural resources located within its
borders." Id. at 1025.
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which was first applied in the "federal general common law" in Kansas v.
Colorado. 89
In 1901 the state of Kansas filed an action in the Supreme Court against
Colorado over rights to the use of the water of the Arkansas River.1?9 Under
the riparian rights doctrine, Kansas asserted the right to the entire natural
flow of the river,19' while alleging that its citizens and institutions had been
injured by the depletion in the flow of the river because of extensive use
of its waters for irrigation in Colorado.' 9 Colorado, a prior appropriation
jurisdiction, claimed entitlement "as a sovereign and independent State" to
the consumptive use for beneficial purposes of all water arising within its
boundaries.193
The Court concluded that no state has the exclusive right to the use of
all the water of an interstate stream within its boundaries. 94 Even though
the diminution in flow was somewhat detrimental to southwestern Kansas,
"equality of right and equity between the two States forbids any interference
with the present withdrawal of water in Colorado for purposes of irriga-
tion.' ' 95 Nevertheless, the Court admonished that increased depletion in the
future by Colorado could result in Kansas "justly say[ing] there is no longer
an equitable division of benefits," thus permitting Kansas to "rightfully call
for relief."'' 9
189. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98, 104-05, 117 (1907). Accord Colorado v. New
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 186 (1982). See generally 2 CLARK, supra note 44, at § 132; Research
Project, Equitable Apportionment and the Supreme Court: What's So Equitable About Appor-
tionment?, 7 HAiuIN L. REv. 405, 410 (1984) (analyzing Kansas v. Colorado).
190. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 131 (1902) (overruling Colorado's demurrer to the
bill of complaint).
191. Id. See also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 57-59 (1907). The Court determined that
Kansas followed a modified version of the riparian rights doctrine, recognizing some elements
of prior appropriation such as the right of appropriating stream water for irrigation purposes.
206 U.S. at 104-05.
192. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 132-35, 142, 145-46 (1902); 206 U.S. 46, 49-52 (1907).
193. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 143 (1902).
194. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98, 117 (1907). Accord Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S.
383, 385 (1943); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466 (1923).
195. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 113-14 (1907). In declining to grant relief to Kansas,
the Court balanced the harms and the benefits to both states and concluded that the great
benefits to Colorado through the reclamation of thousands of acres of semiarid land into fertile
fields outweighed the detriment to Kansas. Id. at 117. The Court examined 8,559 typewritten
pages of testimony from 347 witnesses with 122 exhibits concerning, inter alia, the specific
relationship of the established economies in the two states to the use of water in the river. Id.
at 105-14. The Court has used a similar balancing process in other equitable apportionment
decisions. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 2437, 2442, reh'g denied, 105
S.Ct. 19 (1984); 459 U.S. 176, 186-88 (1982); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945);
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 522-24 (1936); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336,
343-45 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 673-74 (1931). However, the Court
has disagreed over the factors to be considered in the balancing of equities. Compare, e.g.,
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 188 (1982) (Marshall, J., speaking for the Court)
with 459 U.S. at 191-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Cf. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462
U.S. 1017, 1027-29 (1983).
196. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907). Thirty-six years later, Kansas unsuc-
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
34 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1
The principle of equitable apportionment of interstate waters was reaf-
firmed in Wyoming v. Colorado, 97 a controversy over the use of the water
of the Laramie River. Since the state constitutions of both Colorado and
Wyoming recognized the doctrine of prior appropriation, the Court used
this doctrine as the basis of equitable apportionment. 98 Watershed transbasin
diversions were also determined by the Court to be permissible when the
practice is recognized by the law of both states. 99 However, each of the
competing states has a duty to exercise water rights reasonably and "in a
manner calculated to conserve the common supply.''200
The Court decided in 1945 that a literal application of the priority rule
was not required in resolving a dispute over the allocation of the water of
the North Platte River among the states of Colorado, Wyoming, and Ne-
braska and the United States. 20' All three states involved in this litigation
cessfully attempted to show that Colorado had increased its consumptive use of the water of
the Arkansas River by an annual average of between 300,000 and 400,000 acre-feet since the
1907 Supreme Court decision and that the alleged increase had "worked a serious detriment
to the substantial interests of Kansas." Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 395, 400 (1943)
(holding that Kansas' allegations in this connection were not sustained by the evidence). As
part of the balancing process, Kansas asked the Court to speculate on how much land would
have been irrigated under a decision favorable to Kansas. Id. However, the Court was not
persuaded by Kansas' efforts to demonstrate as part of its "damages" that 414,000 acres of
land that were "susceptible of successful irrigation" would have been irrigated had Colorado
not deprived Kansas of the water. Id. at 399.
197. 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (legal action by Wyoming seeking to prevent a proposed diversion
by Colorado from the Laramie River).
198. Id. at 470. Priority of appropriation was also adopted by the Court in 1936 as the
basis of division of water in a controversy between Washington and Oregon over the waters
of the Walla Walla River and its tributaries. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 526 (1936).
However, in Washington v. Oregon, both states stipulated that "for purposes of this case the in-
dividual rights of the respective landowners and water owners concerned in both states are
governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation." 297 U.S. at 521 (citing Wyoming v. Colorado,
259 U.S. 419, 471 (1922)).
199. Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573, 584 (1936); 259 U.S. 419, 466 (1922).
200. 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922) (noting that both Wyoming and Colorado recognize that
"conservation within practicable limits is essential" to prevent needless waste and to secure
the maximum feasible use of water). Accord, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945);
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 527 (1936). In Colorado v. New Mexico, the Court again
concluded that it was entirely appropriate to consider the extent to which reasonable conser-
vation measures by existing water users in the downstream state might offset the diversion
proposed by the complainant upstream state and thereby minimize any injury to downstream
users. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 186 (1982) (remanding the case to the Special
Master for additional findings).
Two years later, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in the same case, said that the
extent to which reasonable conservation measures can adequately compensate for the reduction
in water supply due to the proposed diversion and the extent to which the benefits from the
diversion will outweigh the harms to existing users are relevant factors, the existence of which
the complainant must show by clear and convincing evidence. Colorado v. New Mexico, 104
S.Ct. 2433, 2442 (1984). However, Justice O'Connor stressed that the evidentiary burden of
the complainant "cannot be met with generalizations about unidentified conservation measures
and unstudied speculation about future uses." Id. (dismissing Colorado's case for failure to
carry its burden of proof on these factors). Justice Stevens sharply disagreed with the Court's
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss1/9
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followed similar doctrines of prior appropriation. 2 2 In the view of the Court,
superiority of right based upon priority of appropriation served as "a guid-
ing principle" that might have to be tempered if its application would cause
undue hardship. 203 In apportioning the water of the North Platte River, the
Court sought to protect the existing economies of the region by examining
several factors, including
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water
in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage
water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas,
[and] the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits
to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the for-
mer .... 204
evaluation of the record in the case, maintaining that New Mexico should not be permitted
to use its own "manifestly lax, indeed, virtually non-existent" records to establish its claim
that "no water can be conserved." Id. at 2447-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945). The dependable natural flow of the
North Platte River during the irrigation season had long been overappropriated. Id. at 610.
Nebraska initiated legal action against Wyoming in 1934 over the use of water of the river.
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 293 U.S. 523 (1934). Colorado was impleaded as a defendant. 296 U.S.
553 (1935). Finally, the United States was granted leave to intervene. 304 U.S. 545 (1937).
202. Colorado and Wyoming had adopted the rule of prior appropriation in their respective
state constitutions. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 599 (1945). On the other hand, Ne-
braska originally adhered to the common law doctrine of riparian rights. Id. In response to
the demands for water for irrigation in the settlement of the arid portions of Nebraska, the
state legislature later adopted the appropriation doctrine while continuing to recognize riparian
rights that had previously vested. Id. The appropriation principle was later recognized in the
Nebraska constitution of 1920. Id. Water rights based upon priority of use dominated in the
regions of Nebraska concerned with the utilization of the water of the North Platte River. Id.
at 600.
203. Id. at 618.
204. Id. The Court considered these factors as merely illustrative of "the nature of the
problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests" which must be considered
in making an informed judgment. Id. Accord, Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183
(1982). In a more contemporary controversy involving the apportionment of water of an in-
terstate river between a state seeking to make a future use of the water and a state in which
present water users had developed an existing economy dependent upon the river system, the
Court concluded that one factor that should be weighed is the extent to which reasonable
conservation measures by existing appropriators in one state might offset any injury to them-
selves from a proposed diversion in the other state. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176,
186, 188, 190 (1982). Although concurring in the decision to remand the case to the Special
Master, Justice O'Connor criticized Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court, 459 U.S. at 193.
Justice O'Connor warned that the Court has "gone dangerously far toward accepting [the]
suggestion" proffered by Colorado that the Court assess " 'waste' and 'inefficiency' by a new
yardstick-i.e., not by comparing the economic gain to [an existing water user] with the costs
of achieving greater efficiency, but by comparing the 'inefficiency' of New Mexico's uses with
the relative benefits to Colorado of a new use." Id. at 192-93. Both Justice Marshall and
Justice O'Connor recognized the speculative and remote nature of the potential benefits from
a proposed diversion. Id. at 187, 193. However, Justice O'Connor asserted that the Court, in
a controversy between two prior appropriation states involving waters of a fully appropriated
river, had "never undertaken [the] balancing task outside the concrete context of either two
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Although the Court used the appropriation doctrine as a "guiding prin-
ciple" in dividing the waters of an interstate stream in litigation between
states that applied similar appropriation doctrines, the Court refused to use
the riparian doctrine as a "dependable guide or just basis for the decision
of controversies" between states that had mutually adopted the common
law of riparian rights.2 5 In an action brought by Connecticut to enjoin
Massachusetts from diverting water from the watershed of the Connecticut
River to the Boston metropolitan area for municipal water supply, the Court
said that disputes involving interstate waterways are to be settled on the
basis of "equality of right. ' ' 206 This does not require an equal division of
the water of an interstate stream among the states through which it flows.207
Instead, the Court will determine what is an equitable apportionment of the
use of the water based upon "the principles of right and equity" and "a
consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending States and all other
relevant facts. ' 20 8 The burden on the state seeking injunctive relief is much
greater than that generally placed upon private parties when similar equitable
relief is sought. 209 Connecticut's task was particularly difficult because the
proposed diversion was to satisfy a demonstrable need for potable water-
the highest use of water. 210
The Supreme Court again refused to apply the common law rules of ri-
parian rights in an action brought by New Jersey to enjoin New York from
diverting water from certain tributaries and the watershed of the Delaware
River to increase New York City's water supply.21' Instead, the Court applied
the clearly established doctrine of equitable apportionment. 2 2 The Court
reaffirmed that "[t]he removal of water to a different watershed obviously
must be allowed at times unless states are to be deprived of the most bene-
established economies in the competing States dependent upon the water to be apportioned or
of a proposed diversion in one State to satisfy a demonstrable need for a potable supply of
drinking water." Id. at 193 (footnotes deleted). Justice O'Connor maintained that although
the Court must not "blind itself to compelling evidence of waste by one State, . . . the Court
should be moved to exercise its original jurisdiction to alter the status quo between States only
where there is clear and convincing evidence. . . that one State's use is unreasonably wasteful."
Id. at 195 (emphasis in original; citation deleted).
205. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 U.S. 660, 669-70 (1931).
206. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 670-71.
209. Id. at 669; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923). The Court was reticent
to exert its power in this context "unless the threatened invasion of rights is of serious magnitude
and established by clear and convincing evidence." id. Accord, Washington v. Oregon, 297
U.S. 517, 524 (1936).
210. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 673 (1931).
211. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931). When this decision was rendered,
the doctrine of equitable apportionment had been consistently applied by the Court for more
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ficial use on formal grounds. ' 21 3 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., also
wrote:
A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a
necessity of life that must be rationed among those who have
power over it. New York has the physical power to cut off all
the water within its jurisdiction. But clearly the exercise of such
a power to the destruction of the interest of the lower States could
not be tolerated. And on the other hand equally little could New
Jersey be permitted to require New York to give up its power
altogether in order that the River might come down to it undi-
minished. Both States have real and substantial interests in the
River that must be reconciled as best they may be. The different
traditions and practices in different parts of the country may lead
to varying results, but the effort always is to secure an equitable
apportionment without quibbling over formulas. 21 4
In the final analysis, the development by the Court of the doctrine of
equitable apportionment enabled the Court to transcend some of the inherent
problems of traditional state water laws, such as the inability of the ap-
propriation system to be responsive to the changing balances among uses
and users in a river basin and the assumption by the riparian approach that
water surplus is the normal condition. 21
5
The Federal Common Law of Public Nuisance:
Interstate Water Pollution
The decisions rendered by the Supreme Court during the years preceding
the commencement of negotiations on the Red River Compact spoke in terms
213. Id. The 1931 decision did not settle the dispute among the basin states over the use
of the water of the Delaware River system. See New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954);
345 U.S. 369 (1953); 283 U.S. 805 (1931). Ultimately, the basin states and the federal gov-
ernment negotiated and approved the Delaware River Basin Compact, an innovative federal-
interstate compact to which the United States was bound as a signatory party. See Muys, supra
note 82, at 160-63. See generally R. MARTIN, RIVER BASIN ADMnIsRATION AND THE DELAWA
(1960). The Delaware River Basin Commission later undertook a massive pollution control
program for the highly polluted Delaware estuary; this pollution abatement program was the
focus of a scholarly interdisciplinary analysis of the legal, economic, political, and scientific
bases of environmental policy in America. See B. AcIc pAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER,
JR., & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974).
214. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931).
215. WENDELL & SCHWAN, NATIONAL VATER COMlISSION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
IN WATER RESOURCES AcTIviTIEs 515 (NTIS No. PB 210 358, 1972). The chronological approach
of the appropriation system precludes its adaptation to the changing needs in a river basin.
Id. The riparian system, in turn, has been criticized for inefficiency, lack of meaningful en-
forcement, and hostility to development. See C. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANAL-
YStS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYsTEM 38-39 (1971). Uncertainty is inherent under the reasonable
use doctrine of riparian rights since the reasonableness of a particular use is subject to reex-
amination in view of new uses later initiated by other riparian landowners along the waterway.
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of a federal common law of public nuisance when one state sought to enjoin
another from polluting shared waters or from inundating the property of
the other through the operation of an artificial drainage system. The federal
common law enunciated by the Court during this period theoretically assured
each state the right to be free from unreasonable interferences emanating
from another state or its citizens.
216
The first significant legal action involving interstate water pollution was
filed in the Supreme Court shortly after the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury.217 In January of 1900, Missouri filed a bill in the Court to enjoin
Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago, an Illinois corporation, from
discharging sewage through an artificial channel connecting Lake Michigan
with the Desplaines River, a tributary of the Illinois River, which in turn
empties into the Mississippi River above Saint Louis.2 1 1 Missouri claimed
that sewage from the Chicago area polluted the water of the Mississippi
River, rendering it unfit to drink and causing a higher incidence of typhoid
fever and contagious diseases. 21 9 Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago
countered by arguing that if such conditions existed in the Saint Louis area,
they were caused by the discharge of sewage into the Mississippi by municipal
subdivisions of Missouri and by other sources for which Illinois was not
responsible. 220
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Holmes, determined that it
had jurisdiction and authority to deal with a question of this nature between
two states, which, if it arose between two independent sovereignties, might
lead to war.2 1 The Court observed that "a nuisance might be created by
a State upon a navigable river like the Danube, which would amount to a
casus belli for a [downstream] State, unless removed. ' 2 2 2 In the United
States, when the states by their Union foreclosed the use of force to abate
nuisances emanating from other states, they did not thereby agree to submit
to whatever environmental harms might be inflicted upon them by neighbor-
ing states. 2 3 Instead, they retained the right to make reasonable demands on
the basis of their quasi-sovereign interests by an original action in the
Supreme Court.
2 4
Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 Wm. & MARY L.
REV. 547, 550 (1983).
216. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1923); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301-02, 313 (1921); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
237-38 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 518, 520-21 (1906).
217. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1900).
218. Id.
219. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 517, 522-24 (1906).
220. Id. at 525-26.
221. Id. at 518.
222. Id. at 520-21.
223. Id. Accord, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-39 (1907) (original
action filed by Georgia against corporation emitting noxious gases that were destroying forests,
orchards, and crops in Georgia).
224. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520-21 (1906). Accord, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-39 (1907).
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The Court approached the case of Missouri v. Illinois with great caution.
Missouri was required to "clearly and fully" prove its allegations.2 25 The
Court said that adjudication of the conflicting interests of Missouri and
Illinois did not rest upon the law of a particular state. Instead, the Court
would decide controversies of this nature according to "principles it must
have power to declare.' 2 6 Although Missouri proved an increase in deaths
from typhoid fever in Saint Louis, the data demonstrating the increase did
not necessarily support Missouri's case.227 Illinois and the Sanitary District
maintained that the water of the Missouri River, which also entered the
Mississippi River above Saint Louis, was worse than that of the Illinois River
and contributed a much larger proportion of the intake. 228 In addition, con-
tradictory evidence was introduced concerning the distance along a waterway
that typhoid bacilli could survive. Ultimately, the Court decided that Mis-
souri's case against Illinois and the Sanitary District fell far below the al-
legations, and the bill was dismissed without prejudice.
229
Two years after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Missouri v.
Illinois, the state of New York brought an original action against New Jersey
and the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners to enjoin the execution of
a project to convey the sewage of Passaic Valley through a sewage system
which, in turn, discharged into New York Harbor. 20 New York alleged that
the sewage would be carried by the currents and tides into the Hudson and
East rivers and would be deposited on the wharves and docks of New York
City and on the bottom and shores of Upper New York Bay.23' In addition,
New York alleged that even though treated, the sewage would poison the
fish and oysters in the waters, would damage vessels using the harbor, and
would offend and injure persons living near the bay or using it for bathing
or other purposes.
23 2
Applying the standards enunciated in Missouri v. Illinois, the Court con-
cluded that the evidence failed to show with requisite certainty that the
additional sewage would create a public nuisance by creating offensive odors
or unsightly surface deposits or by seriously contributing to existing pollution
in the bay. 233 Accordingly, the Court denied the request for injunctive relief
and dismissed the complaint.
In resolving interstate water pollution questions according to the "prin-
ciples it must have power to declare," the Court never articulated a doctrine
comparable to the flexible, yet somewhat amorphous, doctrine of equitable
apportionment fashioned by the Court in the interstate water allocation dis-
225. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).
226. Id. at 519.
227. Id. at 522-23.
228. Id. at 525-26.
229. Id. at 526.
230. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 296-98, 302-03 (1921).
231. Id. at 302-03.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 309-14.
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putes.2 4 Because of the correlation between water quality and water quantity
in the uses to which contaminated water may be applied,23" the Court's denial
of relief in Missouri v. Illinois and New York v. New Jersey allowed the
degradation of interstate waters to continue and, in effect, was a water
allocation decision. Even though some state supreme courts had long utilized
conventional state water law doctrines to limit water pollution,23 6 the Court
never considered expanding the equitable apportionment doctrine to address
interstate water quality problems.
234. A number of scholars have criticized the doctrine of equitable apportionment. See, e.g.,
MEYERS & TARLoCK, supra note 152, at 400 (commenting that the doctrine consists of a "vague
set of standards that are impossible to quantify"); R. HARRIS, W. JEFFERY & B. STEWART,
JR., STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SocIETY, INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: A GUIDE
TO WATER POLLUTION AND WATER SCARCITY 111 (1974) [hereinafter cited as INTERSTATE EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS] (criticizing the doctrine as "a grandiose term which means very little"
since the Supreme Court "has no real standards for decision in this important area").
235. Legal scholars, ecologists, and environmental scientists have recognized that "more than
occasionally" water quality and water quantity controversies "are one and the same." See,
e.g., RODGERS, supra note 38, at 164-65 & n.10 (pointing out that "many pollution control
technologies are consumptive-e.g., evaporation by a senior irrigation appropriator in order
to reduce salinity"). More recently, the relationship between toxic chemicals and industrial
wastes to the utilization of water has been explored by a number of authors. See, e.g., L.
REGENSTEIN, AMERICA Tr POISONED 168 (1982) [hereinafter cited as REGENSTEIN] quoting a
1980 Library of Congress report, which concludes that "damage to natural resources in the
United States by toxic chemicals is substantial and enduring"). See also J. FALLOWS, THE WATER
LoaDs 20-21 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FALLowsl (discussing industrial pollution and envi-
ronmental problems in the South as part of a study conducted for the Center for the Study
of Responsive Law).
236. For pollution cases alleging an interference with riparian rights, see, e.g., Sandusky
Portland Cement Co. v. Dixon Pure Ice Co., 221 F. 200, 204 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 238
U.S. 630 (1915) (thermal pollution); Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co. v. Arkansas ex rel. Att'y
Gen., 181 Ark. 216, 225-27, 26 S.W.2d 57, 61 (1930); Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home
Builders, Inc., 40 N.J. Super. 62, 79-83, 122 A.2d 233, 242-43, 245 (1956). For cases discussing
the application of appropriation principles in addressing water quality problems, see, e.g., Town
of Antioch v. Williams Irrig. Dist., 188 Cal. 451, 456-58, 205 P. 688, 691 (1922); Phoenix
Water Co. v. Fletcher, 23 Cal. 481, 486 (1863); Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San
Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 9 Colo. App. 407, 418-20, 48 P. 828, 832-33 (1897),
app. dismissed 24 Colo. 468, 471, 52 P. 1027, 1028 (1898). Theoretically, when a senior ap-
propriator impairs water quality to the detriment of a junior appropriator, the junior appro-
priator has no remedy against the polluter since the senior appropriator could have taken all
the water. RODGERS, supra note 38, at 170. However, a Colorado court has suggested that a
senior appropriator who acquired title to only part (less than one-thirtieth) of the water of the
stream has a duty to preserve water quality if he can do so by reasonable means. Suffolk Gold
Mining and Milling Co., 9 Colo. App. at 418-20, 48 P. at 832-33, app. dismissed, 24 Colo. 468,
52 P. 1027 (1898). The Kansas Supreme Court has fashioned a "new tort" of "pollution,"
which is "indistinguishable from nuisance." See RODGERS, supra, at 165 (citing Rusch v. Phillips
Pet. Co., 163 Kan. 11, 180 P.2d 270 (1947)). The Restatement (Second) of Torts, drafted under
the guidance of Frank J. Trelease, a renowned water law expert, separates water pollution cases
from the common law of riparian rights. RODGERS, supra, at 164. It provides that the "pollution
of water by a riparian proprietor which creates a nuisance by causing harm to another person's
interest in land or water is not the exercise of a riparian right." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 849(2) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971). Therefore, the doctrine of riparian rights may not be
utilized in analyzing water pollution controversies between riparian owners. RODGERS, supra,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss1/9
1985] WHERE EAST MEETS WEST IN WATER LAW 41
Perhaps the inherent conflicts between the appropriation and riparian ap-
proaches of the states left the Court with little choice but to develop the
equitable apportionment doctrine in water quantity disputes between riparian
and appropriation jurisdictions. The widespread acceptance of th public
nuisance theory in the American legal system made it easy for the Court to
use traditional tort ideas,2 7 rather than to chart a new course in interstate
water quality controversies. Since the litigants in the Mississippi River system
and New York Harbor cases were all riparian rights jurisdictions, the Court
could as easily have applied the reasonableness-of-use concept in the context
of riparian rights, i.e., pollution of water is an unreasonable use of water
that interferes with riparian rights. 28 However, the interstate water pollution
decisions during the first half of the twentieth century suggest the reticence
of the Court "to become arbiter of environmental claims under its original
jurisdiction."2 9
Unfortunately, the Court's excessive reliance upon traditional tort con-
cepts in addressing interstate water pollution problems did little to discourage
the use of "the great rivers" as the "sewers" of America. Even though
state and local boards of health had been established since the 1870s and
1880s to enforce water purification requirements and to abate pollution,
typhoid fever and other waterborne diseases were common in the United
States.240 State and local health laws were enforced unevenly and water sup-
ply purification bond issues were defeated by voters, sometimes even during
outbreaks of typhoid fever. 24' Except during the Great Depression of the
1930s, efforts to install sewage treatment facilities at the state and local levels
never approached the need to protect water supplies and control pollution,
even after the link between water contamination and contagious diseases was
better understood.
242
The inability of the states under the public nuisance doctrine to obtain
relief from the degradation of interstate waters paralleled the limited success
in state courts of efforts to utilize traditional tort theories of recovery to
protect injured individuals and the public from "the damages of a society
with a complex technology which has the propensity for a wide variety of
at 164. Instead, "the familiar doctrines of nuisance, trespass, or strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities" must be applied to water quality disputes. Id.
237. Modern environmental law is rooted doctrinally in the principles of nuisance. See ROD-
GERS, supra note 38, at 100. "[N]o common law doctrine . . .approaches nuisance in com-
prehensiveness or detail as a regulator of land use and of technological abuse." Id. Nuisance
theory and case law is "the common law backbone of modern environmental and energy law."
Id.
238. See CRaBBET, supra note 44, at 387 (discussing the problems encountered in applying
the riparian "reasonableness" standard to activities which degrade water quality). See also
RrrrzE, supra note 38, at five-31.
239. RODGERS, supra note 38, at 153 (commenting upon the traditional role of the Supreme
Court in interstate pollution controversies).
240. See RErrzE, supra note 38, at four-l.
241. Id. at four-1.
242. Id.
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injuries. ' 243 Environmental problems, of course, were a "natural target for
control" under nuisance law because pollution interferes with the use and
enjoyment of property.2" However, nuisance litigation frequently involved
complex scientific issues involving causation, effect, and remedy, in addition
to being cumbersome and expensive for the plaintiffs to pursue. 245 "Judges
[were] poorly equipped to deal in a competent fashion with issues .. .
demand[ing] considerable scientific expertise and [were] probably even less
able to devise and oversee an ongoing program of technological controls.
' 246
Thus, environmentalists viewed the federal common law of public nuisance
as a mixed blessing. 247 Ultimately, the amelioration of pollution came to
depend upon in-depth technical research, large public expenditures, and a
balanced assessment of the economic impact and actual effect on public
health of environmental regulation.' 8
The lack of success with traditional tort theories in addressing environ-
mental problems eventually gave way to increased legislative activity in water
quality at the federal level. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,249 which
provides the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with surveillance authority over
certain pollutants of navigable waters, was strengthened through judicial
interpretation to become the most effective weapon in the federal govern-
ment's arsenal for combatting serious water quality problems involving in-
dustrial pollution.2'0 The 1899 act was eventually buttressed by the enactment
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 and its subsequent
amendments, 251 even though for years congressmen from the Red River basin
243. Id. at five-30.
244. See J. DUKENtNEER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 955 (1981) [hereinafter cited as DUKEMINIER
& KRIER].
245. Id. at 955-56. See also RarTzE, supra note 38, at five-30.
246. DUKEWNIER & KRIER, supra note 244, at 955-56.
247. See RODGERS, supra note 38, at 153.
248. Cf. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 223, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (1970) (suggesting the need for the enormous powers of state and federal
governments to control air pollution).
249. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-
14 (1982)).
250. See REITzE, supra note 38, at four-34. See also Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution
and the Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 761, 767-82,
792-819 (1971). Most of the judicial decisions that strengthened the act were rendered in the
1960s and early 1970s. See, e.g., United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Co., 411 U.S.
655 (1973); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960), reh'g denied, 363 U.S. 858 (1961).
251. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948
has been amended a number of times since its enactment. See Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat. 498; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204; Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234,
79 Stat. 903; Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246; Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91; Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (major revisions); Act
of Mar. 7, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-251, 88 Stat. 20; Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-592,
88 Stat. 1925; Act of Dec. 27, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566; Act of Oct. 21, 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-483, 94 Stat. 2360; Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1626.
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states of Oklahoma and Louisiana blocked legislative efforts to strengthen
the federal water quality laws.Y2
The Federal Common Law of Public Nuisance: Interstate Flooding
A decision by the Supreme Court in 1923 applied the federal common
law of public nuisance in the context of flooding. 253 North Dakota in an
original action sought to enjoin Minnesota from continuing to use a system
of drainage ditches in a manner that was detrimental to North Dakota resi-
dents.5 4 The bill alleged that Minnesota, by constructing cutoff ditches and
straightening the Mustinka River, had increased the speed and volume of
water flow into Lake Traverse. 25 This in turn allegedly raised the level of
the lake, causing its outlet, the Bois de Sioux River, to overflow and sub-
stantially damage a valuable farming area lying on the west bank of that
stream in North Dakota.256 North Dakota also sought a decree against Min-
nesota for damages of $5,000 for itself and a million dollars for its inhab-
itants whose farms were damaged and whose crops were lost.
2 7
Applying the eleventh amendment, the Court denied on jurisdictional
grounds the prayer for money damages for the injuries incurred by the farm-
ers of the Bois de Sioux River valley during the floods of 1915 and 1916.28
With regard to North Dakota's request for injunctive relief, Minnesota as-
serted that the damages sustained by the complainant state and its farmers
were due to the unusually high rainfall in the successive years of 1914, 1915,
and 1916, which caused the flooding. 25
9
On the main issue of fact, the Court in North Dakota v. Minnesota found
that Minnesota was not responsible for the floods, thereby making it un-
necessary for the Court to consider evidence as to a practical remedy for
a very real problem for the citizens of North Dakota.260 The Court noted
that "the opinions and suggestions of the expert engineers [would thereby
be left] for the consideration of the two States in a possible effort by either
or both to remedy existing conditions in this basin. ' 26 The Bois de Sioux
River litigation later became a contributing factor in the negotiation of the
252. See REiTzE, supra note 38, at four-34 to 35. Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma initially
blocked passage of proposed water-quality legislation that was later enacted as the Water Pol-
lution Control Act Amendments of 1956. Id. at four-34. Federal legislation designed to strengthen
the basic water-pollution control act was passed by the United States Senate in 1963; however,
in the House of Representatives, congressmen from Louisiana and Florida allegedly succumbed
to pressure from the oil industry and kept a comparable bill in committee for two years. Id.
at four-35. A serious federal effort to abate pollution finally came with the passage of the
Water Quality Act of 1965. Id.
253. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 373 (1923).
254. Id. at 366.
255. Id. at 371.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 371-72.
258. Id. at 375-76.
259. Id. at 379-85.
260. Id. at 386, 388.
261. Id. at 388.
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Red River of the North Compact, which was completed in 1937 and ap-
proved by Congress in 193-8.262
In sum, the recurring tone sounded by the Court in the equitable ap-
portionment cases and the public nuisance decisions was one of judicial
caution. Justice Roberts, writing for the Court in 1943 in the case of Col-
orado v. Kansas, echoed the sentiments of the Court two decades earlier,
when he offered this explanation for the Court's restraint:
[W]hile we have jurisdiction of such disputes, they involve the
interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and delicate
questions, and, due to the possibility of future change of con-
ditions, necessitate expert administration rather than judicial im-
position of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may
appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pur-
suant to the compact clause of the federal Constitution. We say
of this case, as the court has said of interstate differences of like
nature, that such mutual accommodation and agreement should,
if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of invocation
of our adjudicatory power. 23
The Court seemed to recognize that disputes involving the allocation, pol-
lution, and control of interstate waters could not be effectively resolved by
litigation. 264 The Court apparently was neither able nor inclined to articulate
and implement an effective policy to address interstate water controversies,
particularly those involving efforts to ameliorate water pollution or to abate
flooding conditions. 26 The option of appointing a panel of scientific or
technical advisers to compensate for the Court's lack of expertise in many
interstate water disputes was shunned in favor of encouraging the cooper-
ative resolution by the states of their interstate water problems.
266
The Validity and Effect of an Interstate River Compact:
Hinderlider and Beyond
Legal actions between individuals or private entities over water in an in-
terstate stream "merely settle individual controversies and afford little, if
anything, in the solution of the larger interstate problems. ' 267 However, the
Supreme Court's review on certiorari of the decision by the Colorado Su-
262. See WITMER, H.R. Doc. No. 319, supra note 175, at 530.
263. 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943) (footnotes deleted).
264. Cf. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 223, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (1970) (explaining the inadequacy of nuisance actions to ameliorate air
pollution).
265. Cf. id., 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
266. Cf. INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, supra note 234, at Ill (criticizing the Court
for shunning the advice of experts in water apportionment cases). The rationale of the Court
in the public nuisance decisions involving interstate waters paralleled its reasoning in the equit-
able apportionment cases.
267. 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSrATE WATER PROBLEMS, supra note 151, at 1832.
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preme Court in the case of Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co.26s was vital to the continued utilization of interstate water com-
pacts. 2 9 The Hinderlider case raised the question of the validity of an in-
terstate compact and its effect upon the citizens and officials of the states
involved.270 The fact that the signatory states to the compact were not parties
to the action, and apparently could not be so joined, did not deprive the
Court of jurisdiction to determine the validity and effect of the compact. 27'
The Hinderlider case involved an action brought by the Ditch Company,
a Colorado corporation, to restrain M. C. Hinderlider, the State Engineer
of Colorado, and his staff from closing the head-g~te of the La Plata River,
the Cherry Creek Ditch, and other ditches in Colorado to permit New Mex-
ico and Colorado to enjoy the entire flow of the La Plata River for alter-
nating periods during a severe water shortage that occurred in the spring
of 1928.272 The actions taken by the State Engineer and his staff were au-
thorized by the La Plata River Compact, which provided that the state en-
gineers may rotate the use of the water whenever the flow of the river is
so low that in their judgment "the greatest beneficial use of its waters may
be secured by distributing all of its water successively to the lands in each
State in alternating periods" in lieu of delivery of water in accordance with
other provisions of the compact.273
The Ditch Company claimed that by reason of a 1898 Colorado court
decree adjudicating the relative rights of all Colorado claimants to divert
water from the La Plata River, the Ditch Company was entitled to all the
water in the stream, except that necessary to fulfill higher priorities under
the decree. 274 If the Ditch Company were allowed to use all the water al-
located to it by the decree, none would be available to New Mexico citizens
who had claimed a portion of the water under New Mexico's appropriation
laws.
271
The Ditch Company objected to the admission of the La Plata River
Compact into evidence at the trial, asserting that the compact was uncon-
stitutional and void because it allegedly destroyed vested property rights of
Colorado citizens in the water of the river in violation of the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Con-
stitution and of the Colorado constitution.27 6 The second judgment of the
trial court concluded that the La Plata River Compact did not constitute
268. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
269. See 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS, supra note 151, at 1852.
270. 304 U.S. 92, 99-100 (1938).
271. Id. at 110-11.
272. Id. at 95-97. See also 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS, supra note
151, at 1849-50.
273. 304 U.S. 92, 97 (1938) (quoting from a provision in the compact which is found at 43
Stat. 796).
274. Id. at 98.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 99.
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a defense to the actions of the Colorado water officials.217 The Supreme
Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment.278
However, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a landmark decision,
reversed the Colorado Supreme Court. 79 The Supreme Court said:
Whether the apportionment of the water of an interstate stream
be made by compact between the upper and lower States with
the consent of Congress or by a decree of this Court, the ap-
portionment is binding upon the citizens of each State and all
water claimants, even where the State had granted the water rights
before it entered into the compact.
2 0
The Court held that the decree of January 12, 1898, in the state water
proceeding did not award to the Ditch Company any right greater than
Colorado's right to an equitable share of the water of the stream. 28' There-
fore, the apportionment made by the compact simply could not have taken
from the Ditch Company any vested right, in the absence of any vitiating
infirmity or illegality in the negotiation and approval of the compact or in
its application. 282 The Court acknowledged the latitude the duly authorized
representatives of a state have in apportioning interstate waters by compact:
As the States had power to bind by compact their respective ap-
propriators by division of the flow of the stream, they had power
to reach that end either by providing for a continuous equal di-
vision of the water from time to time in the stream, or by pro-
viding for alternate periods of flow to the one State and to the
other of all the water in the stream.
28 3
The Court's decision in Hinderlider, coupled with the earlier completion
and approval of the Colorado River Compact, set the stage for widespread
utilization of compacts to address interstate water problems. The Colorado
River Compact had generated widespread public discussion, which contri-
buted to the education of water officials in the western states of the pos-
sibilities of the compact idea. 2" Hinderlider judicially confirmed that the
states, represented by individuals with expertise and knowledge of the water
problems in their region, may divide the-waters of interstate streams and
possibly avoid protracted litigation.
285
277. Id. at 100.
278. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 101 Colo. 73, 74, 70 P.2d
849, 849-50 (1937) (citing La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 93 Colo.
128, 25 P.2d 187, 188-89 (1933)).
279. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
280. Id. at 106.
281. Id. at 108-09.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 108.
284. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 102, at 702.
285. See 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS, supra note 151, at 1852.
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A little over a decade after Hinderlider, the Supreme Court in West Vir-
ginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims reinforced the binding effect of the interstate
compact. 286 Dyer v. Sims reaffirmed the power of the Court to interpret
interstate compacts and responded to two important and previously unan-
swered questions about compacts: (1) Can a state delegate its police powers
to an interstate administrative agency established by compact? (2) Can a
state agree to appropriate monies from state revenues for the ongoing sup-
port of such bodies?
287
The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, a water pollution abate-
ment and control compact approved by Congress in 1940, was at the center
of the controversy in Dyer v. Sims. 2ss The Governor of West Virginia had
executed this compact on June 30, 1948, following the ratification and ap-
proval of it by all eight signatory states and the Congress. 289 The next year,
the West Virginia legislature appropriated $12,250 as the state's contribution
to the annual budget of the interstate agency charged with administering the
compact. 29 However, Sims, the State Auditor of West Virginia, refused to
issue a warrant upon the state treasury to pay West Virginia's share of the
compact budget. 291 As a result, the West Virginia compact commissioners
and certain state water officials brought a mandamus proceeding to compel
the State Auditor to pay the monies appropriated by the West Virginia leg-
islature for its annual share of compact administrative expenses. 292
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (the state's highest court)
in a three to two decision, denied relief.293 In effect, the court ruled that
the state had not legally entered into the compact because the state con-
stitution made it impossible for West Virginia to assume the obligations
placed upon the states by the agreement.2 9 4
In a technical sense, this opinion had limited significance since it directly
affected only the parties before the court and the West Virginia state laws
286. 341 U.S. 22 (1951). For an excellent analysis of the decision and its impact on the
utilization of interstate compacts, see Zimmerman & Wendell, The Interstate Compact and
Dyer v. Sims, 51 COLUm. L. Rav. 931-50 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Zimmerman & Wendell,
The Interstate Compact, to distinguish the article from their book on interstate compacts, supra
note 141].
287. 341 U.S. 22, 26 (1951).
288. Id. at 24.




293. Id. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adjudged that the state legislation
authorizing West Virginia's participation in the compact was invalid as an improper delegation
of police power to other states and the federal government; the court also said the legislation
violated the debt limitation set forth in the West Virginia constitution by binding future leg-
islatures to make appropriations for the continued activities of the compact administrative
agency. Id. at 26. See also Zimmerman & Wendell, The Interstate Compact, supra note 286,
at 933.
294. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 298 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as NowAK].
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at issue. 295 However, the practical effect of the decision was to jeopardize
a major undertaking to improve the quality of water in the Ohio River. The
interests of all eight signatory states to the compact were affected. 296 Because
some of the signatory states had conditioned their ratification of the compact
upon that of West Virginia, the nonparticipation of West Virginia as a result
of the state court's decision threatened to unravel the entire compact.
297
The significance of the West Virginia court's decision transcended the
Ohio River valley. The obligations assumed by West Virginia under the com-
pact were similar to those already assumed or contemplated by signatory
states to other compacts. 298 The reasoning employed by the West Virginia
court arguably would be equally applicable to similar state legislative action
in other jurisdictions. 299 For example, briefs filed as amici curiae by six of
the other Ohio River valley compacting states noted that of the thirty-eight
states that had entered into congressionally approved compacts between 1934
and 1938, the state constitutions of twenty-one contained comparable lan-
guage to West Virginia's debt limitation clause and provisions restricting or
prohibiting the pledging of the credit of the state. 3°°
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the West
Virginia court.30' Although the justices were unanimous in the judgment to
reverse the state court, they were not quite so consentient in their reasoning.
Departing at least in spirit from Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, Justice Frank-
furter in his opinion for the Court said that though the highest state court
is the ultimate tribunal in construing the meaning of its state constitution
for exclusively state purposes, the Supreme Court is free to examine deter-
minations of law by state courts when a compact places in issue the rights
of other states and the federal government. 0 2 Just as the Supreme Court
295. See Zimmerman & Wendell, The Interstate Compact, supra note 286, at 934.
296. Id. at 932.
297. Id. at 932, 946-47.
298. Id. at 932.
299. Id. at 934.
300. Id. at 936.
301. 341 U.S. 22, 32 (1951).
302. Id. at 28-29. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court declared:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law
of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.
304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (emphasis added). In Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938), decided the same day as Erie, the Court concluded that
the apportionment of the water of an interstate stream between two states "is a question of
'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive" (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter relied upon Hinderlider in Dyer v. Sims, in
asserting the power of the Court to examine the determination of the invalidity of the compact
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has power to settle disputes between states when there is no compact, it has
final authority to interpret the meaning and decide the validity of com-
pacts. 303 A state cannot be its own ultimate judge in a legal dispute with a
sister state.3°4 The duty of the Supreme Court of the United States is to
decide the nature and scope of obligations between states, whether they arise
legislatively by means of compact or through the "federal common law"
governing interstate controversies. 30 5 Finally, when the states themselves are
before the Supreme Court, the Court must analyze and decide every question
essential to a determination of the controversy between them.3 6 This is true
even though local legislation and questions of state authorization may be
presented.
30 7
Justice Frankfurter framed the issue in Dyer v. Sims as "whether the West
Virginia Legislature had authority, under her Constitution, to enter into a
compact which involves delegation of power to an interstate agency and an
agreement to appropriate funds for the administrative expenses of the
agency." 303 With regard to the alleged improper delegation, Frankfurter said
"[t]hat a legislature may delegate to an administrative body the power to
make rules and decide particular cases is one of the axioms of modern
government." 3°9 West Virginia could point to no specific language in its state
constitution that precluded a "reasonable and carefully limited delegation
of power to an interstate agency" such as the Ohio River Valley Sanitation
Compact Commission 10
Turning to the question involving the appropriation of monies for the
compact administrative agency, Frankfurter said that the compact was evi-
dently drafted with great care to comply with the state debt limitation in
view of the fact that the constitutions of many of the other compacting
states also contained this section or similar restrictions., He also noted that
although the states agreed to appropriate funds for administrative expenses,
the annual budget of the compact commission must be approved by the
made by the highest court of West Virginia. 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951). Although Justice Frank-
furter made no attempt to reconcile either Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co. or the decision he wrote for the Court in Dyer v. Sims witl Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, he
apparently relied upon the exception in Erie for "matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by acts of Congress" for the authority the Court exercised in Dyer v. Sims in reversing the
West Virginia decision. Interestingly, Justice Reed also made no mention of Erie in his con-
curring opinion in Dyer v. Sims, yet his reasoning seems to be built upon the doctrinal foun-
dation laid by the Court in Erie. See Zimmerman & Wendell, The Interstate Compact, supra
note 286, at 942. For a scholarly exposition and analysis of the Erie doctrine, see generally
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 55-60 (4th ed. 1983).
303. 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 29.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 30.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 31.
311. Id. at 32.
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governors of the signatory states.312 Finally, the compact contained language
restricting the compact commission from incurring obligations in excess of
appropriations adequate to meet the same and from pledging the credit of
any signatory states except pursuant to the authority of the legislature
thereof.
313
Justice Reed, in a separate concurring opinion, took issue with the as-
sertion of power by the Court to interpret the meaning of the state con-
stitution of West Virginia. 31 4 He maintained that the Court "must accept
the State court's interpretation of its own Constitution unless it is prepared
to say that the interpretation is a palpable evasion to avoid a federal rule." ' ,5
Justice Reed said that under the compact clause of the Constitution of the
United States, the execution, validity, and meaning of federally approved
interstate compacts present federal questions. 31 6 The Court's "interpretation
of the meaning of the compact controls over a state's application of its own
law through the Supremacy Clause and not by any implied federal power
to construe state law. 31 7 Even though West Virginia adjudged the execution
of the compact to be invalid, Justice Reed contended that the compact "may
be enforced despite otherwise valid state restrictions on state action" because
the United States Constitution provides the compact device for adjusting
interstate relations.
3 1 8
Justice Jackson, also separately concurring, relied upon an estoppel the-
ory. West Virginia had "induced" its sister states to enter into the compact
with it and the Congress to consent to the compact. 3 9 If interstate compacts
in the United States are to have "vitality and integrity," West Virginia "may
not raise an issue of ultra vires, decide it, and release [itself] .. .from an
interstate obligation." 32 In the final analysis, Justice Jackson said that "[t]he
legal consequences which flow from the formal participation in a compact
consented to by Congress is a federal question for this Court." 32 Since West
Virginia could not point to any provision in its state constitution clearly
warning or putting on notice the Congress or the other states of any defect in
the authority of West Virginia to enter into the compact, "West Virginia
should be estopped from repudiating her act. ' 322
West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims strengthened the compact device. As




314. Id. See also Zimmerman & Wendell, The Interstate Compact, supra note 286, at 942.
315. 341 U.S. 22, 33 (1951).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 34.
319. Id. at 35.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 36.
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The binding quality of the compact is strengthened, the flexibility
of the device is broadened, yet the Court avoided both Scylla and
Charybdis by refusing on the one hand to forge it into contractual
chains or on the other hand to permit the ties to be lightly dis-
sipated by the judicial wand using the magic formula of general
reasoning.
323
The cumulative effect of Dyer v. Sims, Hinderlider, and the Supreme
Court decisions involving the allocation, pollution, and control of interstate
waters was the elevation of the compact device as the preferred mode of
adjusting interstate water disputes. The Supreme Court's decisions in the
equitable apportionment and federal common law of nuisance cases en-
couraged the use of compacts to address cooperatively interstate water prob-
lems. The Hinderlider decision declared the binding effect of a water allocation
compact upon a signatory state's citizens, including water claimants whose
water rights antedated the negotiation and approval of the compact, and
recognized the freedom of compact negotiators in allocating the flow of a
stream. Dyer v. Sims confirmed the ability of the states to create an interstate
agency to administer a water resources compact, delegate police powers to
it, and devise a means of financing the activities contemplated by it. Con-
sequently, when the impetus developed to negotiate a compact for the Red
River basin, the utility of the compact device had been clearly established
by both scholars and the Court; the validity, flexibility, and binding effect
of the compact had been judicially confirmed; and the creation of a mech-
anism to implement the compact and financially support its programs had
been upheld by the highest court in the land.
IV. Expansion of Federal Authority Over Water
Federal Regulatory Power Under the Commerce Clause
As explained earlier, the Final Report on Interstate Water Problems in
1939 of the American Society of Civil Engineers suggested the advantages
of the compact in dealing with interstate water problems. 324 The report also
identified a major concern among advocates of the compact method: the
lack of a line clearly demarcating the "ultimate application of Federal au-
thority over navigable streams, or the regulation of the source of supply of
such streams.
' 325
There are many sources of federal power over water, the most important
of which is the commerce clause. This clause is the basis of two facets of
federal authority over water: the federal regulatory power and the navi-
gational servitude. 326
323. Zimmerman & Wendell, The Interstate Compact, supra note 286, at 950.
324. See 1939 ASCE REP. ON INTERSTATE WATER PROBLEMS, supra note 151, at 1854.
325. See generally Hillhouse, The Federal Law of Water Resources Development, in FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 38, at 844-926.
326. Id. at 852-57.
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The Supreme Court held in the early part of the nineteenth century that
navigation is encompassed within the commerce clause of the Constitution
of the United States. 27 Moreover, "[f]lood protection, watershed develop-
ment, [and] recovery of the cost of improvements through utilization of
power are ... parts of commerce control. ' 328 National planning and control
of navigable waters is also within the ambit of federal power.329 The re-
sponsibility of the federal government to prevent obstructions of navigation
allows the licensing by the federal government of nonfederal development. 3 0
Federal authority to regulate commerce by protecting or improving navi-
gation not only applies to rivers currently navigable, 33' but also extends to
rivers that historically have been navigable, 3 2 or which are capable of nav-
igation with reasonable improvements. 3 a3
A Supreme Court decision upholding the power of the federal government
to construct Denison Dam on the main stem of the Red River reinforced
the idea introduced by the Court in 1849 that the power of the federal
government to control floods along navigable rivers extends to their non-
navigable tributaries as well.334 The Court acknowledged that "no part of
327. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824), in which Chief Justice Marshall
declared that "[alll America understands and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce'
to comprehend navigation."
328. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940).
329. Id.
330. See Hillhouse, supra note 325, at 853.
331. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563, 1000-01 (1870) (stating that: "Those rivers
must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact; [a]nd they are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition
as highways of commerce.").
332. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123 (1921) (noting that
the Desplaines River, which was the focus of this controversy, had not been used for more
than a hundred years). Accord, Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 453-54 (1931); Montana
Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 185 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
947 (1951).
333. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940). In the final analysis,
navigability is primarily a matter for Congress to determine, but its decision is subject to judicial
review. Id. at 407-08.
334. Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508, 525-26 (1941). The Court in Oklahoma v. At-
kinson said:
There is no constitutional reason why Congress cannot, under the commerce power,
treat the watersheds as a key to flood control on navigable streams and their
tributaries. Nor is there a constitutional necessity for viewing each reservoir project
in isolation from a comprehensive plan covering the entire basin of a particular
river. We need no survey to know that the Mississippi is a navigable river. We
need no survey to know that the tributaries are generous contributors to the floods
of the Mississippi. . . . We have recently recognized that "Flood protection,
watershed development, recovery of the cost of improvements through utilization
of power are ... parts of commerce control." And we now add that the power
of flood control extends to the tributaries of navigable streams.
Id. at 525 (emphasis added and citations omitted). The quoted language from Oklahoma v.
Atkinson arguably is dictum since the Court recognized that "part of the local benefits of
flood control is frequently protection of navigation in the tributary itself' and that "in years
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the [Red] River within Oklahoma is navigable." 335 However, the Court viewed
the Denison project as an integral part of a comprehensive flood-control
program for the Mississippi River basin. 336 As an alternative basis for its
decision, the Court noted that the Denison project would "have at least an
incidental effect in protecting or improving the navigability of portions of
the Red River.
337
By mid-twentieth century, federal authority over the waters of this nation
was no longer dependent upon a waterway's "navigability." 33 Instead, fed-
eral authority over water was as broad as the needs of commerce. Reference
to the navigability of a stream added little, if anything, to the scope of
federal regulatory power.339 Under traditional commerce clause analysis, a
wide range of economic activities "affected" interstate commerce and thus
were subject to congressional regulation irrespective of whether navigation
was involved. 3
40
The Federal Navigational Servitude
Closely related to the regulatory power that Congress, under the commerce
clause, exercises over water is the federal navigational servitude. The nav-
igational servitude, which has also been characterized as the "superior nav-
igation easement" or the "dominant servitude, ' 34' appears to be rooted in
the English common law right of the general public to use the kingdom's
navigable waters for navigation and fishing.342 In the United States, the pro-
tection of the public right of free passage in navigable waters became a
past 'the usual head of navigation' [of the Red River] was Lanesport, Arkansas, near the
Oklahoma boundary." Id. at 522-23. The Supreme Court in 1899 had upheld the exercise of
national control over nonnavigable stretches of navigable streams in order to protect the na-
vigable capacity downstream. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690,
703, 706, 708 (1899).
335. Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508, 523 (1941).
336. Id. at 525. The extension of federal power under the commerce clause to the nonna-
vigable tributaries of navigable streams was upheld again by the Court in 1960. See United
States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 232 (1960).
337. Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508, 523 (1941). For a narrow reading of this case,
see Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No
Compensation, 3 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 1, 6-8 (1963) (treating the decision as involving a "once
navigable stream").
338. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979).
339. Id.
340. Id. See also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (concluding
that groundwater is an article of commerce). See generally, NowAK, supra note 294, at 138-
81, 266-306 (summarizing the history and development of the commerce clause and discussing,
albeit limitedly, the significant role the interpretation of the commerce clause by the Supreme
Court has played in shaping the concepts of federalism and the permissible uses of federal
power throughout American history).
341. See Morreale, supra note 337, at 2 & nn.6, 7 & n.33, 19-31 (examining the bases for
the exercise of federal authority over western waters and demonstrating that the navigation
power is not necessarily coextensive with the navigation servitude).
342. Id. at 26-27 (examining in depth the right of the public under the law of England to
free and unhindered passage in navigable waters and the power of the King, "as conservator
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matter of national concern with the establishment of the federal govern-
ment.143 Under the Constitution, the federal government, as guardian of the
public right of access to navigable waters, has paramount responsibility to
assure that these waters will remain "highways" for the purpose of navi-
gation in interstate commerce.44 Because the flowing water of interstate
streams is indispensable for public navigation, the Supreme Court has de-
termined that interstate waterways are not to be privately owned.3 4 Con-
sequently, in determining whether private property has been taken for public
use without just compensation under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
has held in many cases that compensation may not be required when the
"taking" question involves the exercise of the public right of navigation
over interstate waterways for commerce.
46
The navigational servitude does not create a blanket exception to the
"takings clause" of the fifth amendment.3 47 Instead, the navigational ser-
vitude is an expression of the rule that "certain private property may be
taken in the exercise of the navigation power without the payment of com-
pensation. 3 4 More specifically, if the federal government, "acting in the
interests of navigation, displaces private rights which depend upon the na-
vigable water for their value, the holder of the subordinate right has no loss
of which he can complain. ' 349 The navigational servitude has evolved in the
United States as a subarea of the law of eminent domain.
Statutory Limitations on Federal Authority in the Red River Basin
In the Oklahoma and Texas portions of the Red River basin, the threat
of complete federal domination over the water of the river and its tributaries
is not quite so ominous. Two separate pieces of legislation passed by Con-
gress during the first half of the twentieth century diminish the authority
of the federal government over part of the water of the Red River system.
First, the Act of June 28, 1938, did more than simply authorize the con-
and protector of navigation," to "reform and punish ... nuisances" created by an interference
with this paramount right of the public).
343. See Hillhouse, supra note 325, at 855; Morreale, supra note 337, at 30-31.
344. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239,
249 (1954); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913).
345. FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954).
346. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1912).
347. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177-79 (1979) (describing the navigational
servitude as "an expression of the notion that the determination whether a taking has occurred
must take into consideration the important public interest in the flow of interstate waters that
in their natural condition are in fact capable of supporting public navigation" and citing United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1913), as support for that definition of the navigational servitude).
There is considerable disagreement over whether the navigational servitude extends to all "na-
vigable waters of the United States." Compare Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in
Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 177-79, with Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined, id. at 182.
348. See Morreale, supra note 337, at 2 & n.6.
349. See Hillhouse, supra note 325, at 856.
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struction of Denison Dam and Reservoir on the Red River and the Lugert-
Altus Flood Control and Reclamation Reservoir on the North Fork in Okla-
homa.50 Under this act, Congress also acknowledged the right of Oklahoma
and Texas "to continue to exercise all existing proprietary or other super-
visory rights and jurisdiction over the waters of all tributaries of the Red
River within their respective borders above Denison Dam site ... in the
same manner and to the same extent" as provided by current or future laws
of the respective states. 35' Further, all such laws of Oklahoma and Texas
and all rights created or recognized thereunder, including the right to im-
pound or authorize the retardation or impoundment of water for flood con-
trol above Denison Dam and to divert the water for municipal purposes,
domestic uses, irrigation, power generation, and other beneficial uses, re-
mained unaffected by the Denison Dam authorizing legislation. 3 2 All of
these rights were expressly reserved to Oklahoma and Texas and their citizens
and municipalities. 313 Finally, the act expressly assured Oklahoma and Texas
of their freedom to continue to use any water of the tributaries of the Red
River within their borders above Denison Dam for any and all beneficial
uses as was done by the states prior to the enactment of the authorizing
legislation s.3 4 During the negotiations of the Red River Compact, the above-
described language of the Act of June 28, 1938, was interpreted by one
Oklahoma water official as assuring Oklahoma and Texas "full use of the
waters in the Red River and its tributaries above Lake Texoma, even if the
two states dried up the river. '35
5
The second statutory provision that partially diminishes the authority of
the federal government in the Oklahoma and Texas portions of the Red
River basin is the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment to the Flood Control
Act of 1944.356 The Senator who sponsored this amendment reportedly was
350. Ch. 795, 52 Stat. 1215 (1938).
351. Id. § 4, Red River Basin, 52 Stat. 1219-20.
352. Id., 52 Stat. 1220.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. See Letter from Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to Richard Huff, Chairman,
RRCNC Legal Advisory Comm., at 1 (Sept. 23, 1957).
356. Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 664, § l(b), 58 Stat. 887, 889 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701-
l(b) (1982)). Although the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment has been codified in the United
States Code, it is not a law of general application. Instead, it only applies to navigation and
flood-control projects constructed in whole or in part pursuant to authorizations by Congress
to which the amendment has been attached. Since section 1 of the Act of Dec. 22, 1944, has
been incorporated in a number of subsequent flood-control acts, the amendment arguably has
the practical effect of a law of general application. Moreover, the application of the amendment
to projects authorized by these federal flood-control acts may be viewed as a strong policy
statement by the Congress. Interview with James G. Dwen, Jr., attorney, Tulsa, Okla. (Sept.
14, 1984). [Mr. Dwen, who is now retired from service with the federal government, was for
more than two decades legal counsel to the Tulsa District, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army.
The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the position of the Corps of Engineers
with regard to this subject.] The O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment actually has greater legal
impact on the Arkansas River system and the operation of the McClellan-Kerr Navigation
System than on projects in the Red River basin. Id. Of course, the Act of June 28, 1938,
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concerned with the scope of federal power over navigable rivers and their
tributaries and the manner in which this authority might be exercised in
relation to irrigation. He wanted Congress to express a policy that the con-
stitutional power of the federal government over navigation would not be
exercised to its fullest extent.357 Thus, the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment
was offered to allay the fears of reclamationists in the western states that
the authorization and development of certain navigation projects might pre-
clude future development of irrigation on the affected streams and their
tributaries. 358 The O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment, as enacted by section
1 of the Flood Control Act of 1944, provides that:
The use for navigation, in connection with the operation and
maintenance of ... works [of improvement for navigation or
flood control] herein authorized for construction, of waters aris-
ing in States lying wholly or partly west of the ninety-eighth me-
ridian shall be only such use as does not conflict with any beneficial
consumptive use, present or future, in States lying wholly or partly
west of the ninety-eighth meridian, of such waters for domestic,
municipal, stock water, irrigation, mining, or industrial pur-
poses.359
The amendment, which has spawned questions regarding the definition of
"beneficial consumptive use," applies to certain navigation projects that
have been built or modified pursuant to authorizations of Congress to which
the amendment has been attached and which control or affect waters arising
in the seventeen states located in whole or in part west of the ninety-eighth
meridian.60 Since the ninety-eighth meridian bisects the states of Oklahoma
and Texas, some of the navigation projects constructed in the river basins
of these two states fall within the ambit of the amendment. 6 Language
similar to section 1 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 has been applied to
projects authorized by the flood control acts of 1950, 1954, 1965, 1966, and
1968.362 However, there do not appear to be any restrictions comparable to
authorizing the construction of Dension Dam, contains language that seems to accomplish the
same objective as the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment, i.e., a limited and partial waiver of
federal supremacy for certain navigation and flood-control projects located in states lying in
whole or in part west of the ninety-eighth meridian. Id.
357. See Gage, Legislative History and Purposes of O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment to the
Flood Control Act of 1944 and Other Public Laws, at C-9.
358. Id. at C-6.
359. Ch. 664, 58 Stat. 889 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701-1(b) (1982)).
360. See Gage, supra note 357, at C-1, C-4, C-6, & C-8.
361. See note 356 supra; Scoggins, "Water Rights for Navigation-Verdigris River on
McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System," Presentation on behalf of U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, Tulsa Dist., to the [Oklahoma] Governor's Waterway Advisory Team Meeting,
at 1 (June 13, 1984).
362. See Act of Aug. 13, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-483, tit. II, § 202, 82 Stat. 739; Act of
Nov. 7, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-789, tit. II, § 202, 80 Stat. 1418; Act of Oct. 27, 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-298, tit. II, § 203, 79 Stat. 1074; Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1264, tit. II, § 202, 68
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the Act of June 28, 1938 or the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment affecting
the development by the federal government of the water of the Red River
system lying downstream from Denison Dam and Reservoir in Arkansas and
Louisiana.1
63
Other Sources of Federal Authority
Federal power to regulate water pursuant to the commerce clause and to
protect and preserve the navigational servitude is buttressed by the authority
of the United States in connection with the property power, the war powers,
the power to tax and spend for the general welfare, treaty obligations, and
the mandate to protect Indians.36 In addition to the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, a number of federal agencies have extensive interests in the Red
River basin. For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department
of Interior is interested in several wildlife refuges and fish cultural stations,
including the Hagerman National Wildlife Refuge in Grayson County, Texas;
the Tishomingo National Wildlife Refuge in Johnston County, Oklahoma;
and the Natchitoches Fish Cultural Station in Louisiana. 65 The Bureau of
Reclamation has also constructed a number of projects in Oklahoma and
Texas. 66 Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs has no land under its ju-
risdiction in Arkansas, Louisiana, or Texas situated within the drainage basin
of the Red River, the BIA has reported that its jurisdiction in Oklahoma
extends over about 2.2 million acres of Indian land in various ownership
categories in the basins of both the Red and Arkansas rivers. 67 Neither the
Denison Dam authorizing legislation of 1938 nor the O'Mahoney-Milliken
Amendment of 1944 appears to affect the interests in the Red River basin
of federal agencies such as the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of
Reclamation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Soil Convervation Ser-
vice.368
Stat. 1256; Act of May 17, 1950, ch. 188, tit. II, § 202, 64 Stat. 170. The language that
incorporates the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment typically stipulates:
The provisions of section 1 of the Act of December 22, 1944, (Public Law Num-
bered 534, Seventy-eighth Congress second session), shall govern with respect to
projects authorized in this Act, and the procedures therein set forth with respect
to plans, proposals, or reports for works of improvement for navigation or flood
control and for irrigation and purposes incidental thereto shall apply as if herein
set forth in full.
82 Stat. 739.
363. Since Arkansas and Louisiana are east of the ninety-eighth meridian, the O'Mahoney-
Milliken Amendment expressly is not applicable to navigation and flood-control projects built
in that part of the Red River basin. The language of the Act of June 28, 1938, expressly applies
to activities upstream from the site of the Denison Dam.
364. See Hillhouse, supra note 325, at 857-61.
365. See Statements of Interests of Dep't of Interior, supra note 11, at 6-7.
366. Id. at 1-3.
367. Id. at 8.
368. The O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment is expressly addressed to navigation and flood-
control projects, and the 1938 Denison Dam authorizing legislation seems to operate in a
comparable manner.
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The exercise of federal authority pursuant to the commerce clause or other
sources of power, coupled with the supremacy clause, preempts conflicting
state water laws and overrides compacts to which the federal government
is not bound as a signatory party.369 Consequently, the federal government
has no legal obligation to ensure that federal programs in a river basin are
coordinated to the maximum extent feasible with the states that are signatory
parties to a conventional interstate river compact.370 As Jerome Muys ob-
served in his comprehensive study of interstate water compacts for the Na-
tional Water Commission: "The broad constitutional powers of the Federal
Government over the development, use, and management of the nation's
water resources inevitably make it the controlling force in the success or
failure of cooperative state efforts to deal with regional water problems
through interstate compact."
'3 7'
The exercise of federal authority in the Oklahoma and Texas portions of
the Red River basin, of course, is limited in part by the Denison Dam
authorizing legislation of 1938 and the policy expressed by the O'Mahoney-
Milliken Amendment to the Flood Control Act of 1944 and subsequent acts.
The congressional policies embodied in this legislation and the partial pro-
tection afforded by these two laws are subject to change, within constitu-
tional limits, by future congressional action.37 2 Given the success historically
with which the Red River basin states have influenced federal legislation in
the water resources area (discussed supra and infra), any modification of
either law to the detriment of states' rights would, in all likelihood, be
accomplished with great difficulty.
V. The Negotiation and Approval of the Red River Compact
The Impetus to Negotiate a Compact
Multistate interest in coordinating the use of the Red River system dates
to the late 1940s. The Four-State Planning Board, composed of represen-
tatives of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, drafted a tentative
program for the development of the Red River basin as early as 1945 .1
369. See Muys, supra note 82, at 107-09 (noting that the states for many years sought a
legal mechanism "to make the United States a full partner in [interstate water] compact[s] in
order to restrict its authority and general inclination to 'go it alone' in a Basin"). The Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948 tried to change the pattern of federal involvement in
compact negotiations. Id. at 159. The federal representative was accorded rights equivalent to
those of the state commissioners. Id. at 160. However, the federal government was not legally
bound as a signatory party to comply with the compact. Id.
370. Id. at 159. Muys also concluded that "[t]he utility of a water apportionment compact
is illusory unless federal and Indian rights are made subject to the compact allocations." Id.
at 179.
371. Id. at 159.
372. See Gage, supra note 357, at C-15. See also infra note 564.
373. See Minutes of Meeting of Representatives of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and
Texas on Interstate Compact, at 1-2 (Mar. 3, 1950) [hereinafter cited as Minutes of 1950
Meeting].
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Water conservation and development officials representing Arkansas, Loui-
siana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas "more or less agreed" at a meet-
ing held in Oklahoma City in May, 1948 on the interstate river basin compact
as a method of planning and developing river basins in the region. 74 During
approximately the same time period, a committee of the Oklahoma Society
of Professional Engineers, working under the direction of Colonel Francis
J. Wilson, former Tulsa District Engineer with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, conducted a study of interstate water allocation problems. 75 The
engineers' study recommended the utilization of a compact to allocate water
and settle pollution problems in interstate river basins.
3 76
Prompted by the engineers' study, Governor Roy J. Turner of Oklahoma
took the initiative and invited the governors of Arkansas, Louisiana, New
Mexico, and Texas to send representatives to meet with Oklahoma officials
to discuss the negotiation of an interstate river basin compact for the Red
River.37 7 Based upon his familiarity with the successful operation of the
Interstate Oil Compact Commission, Governor Turner expressed his "utmost
confidence in the compact method as a most useful tool in settling interstate
matters. 3
78
In response to Governor Turner's invitation, leading water officials rep-
resenting Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas met on March 3, 1950,
in Oklahoma City to discuss the feasibility of negotiating a compact for the
374. See Transcript of Meeting of Representatives of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and
Texas on Interstate Compact, at I (Mar. 3, 1950) [hereinafter cited as Transcript of 1950
Meeting]. See also Minutes of 1950 Meeting, app. 1, supra note 373. In 1948, E.V. Spence,
an Interstate Compact Commissioner for the state of Texas, called the attention of the governor
of Texas to the necessity of negotiating compacts for the Canadian, Red, and Sabine rivers.
See Transcript of 1950 Meeting, supra, at 5. An internal legal memorandum apparently prepared
at the behest of Oklahoma water officials in August, 1948 concluded that the Oklahoma Plan-
ning and Resources Board was authorized to negotiate and enter into river basin compacts with
other states. See Oklahoma Planning and Resources Bd. Internal Memorandum, at 4 (Aug. 6,
1948).
375. See Minutes of 1950 Meeting, supra note 373, at 2.
376. See Letter from Oklahoma Governor Roy J. Turner to the Governors of Arkansas,
Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas, at I (Feb. 18, 1950).
377. See Transcript of 1950 Meeting, supra note 374, at 1. See also Letter dated Feb. 18,
1950, supra note 376, at 1.
378. See Letter dated Feb. 18, 1950, supra note 376, at 1. The plummeting price of oil due
to the glut in oil production, which occurred during the late 1920s following the discovery and
development of extensive oil fields in Oklahoma and Texas, was the impetus for the negotiation
of the Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas. See Leach, The Interstate Oil Compact:
A Study in Success, 10 OKLA. L. Rav. 274, 274-75 (1957). Another Oklahoma governor, E.W.
Marland, took the initiative and convened a meeting of oil-producing states that eventually led
to the completion of a draft compact in 1935. Id. at 275. The states of New Mexico, Kansas,
Oklahoma, Illinois, Colorado, and Texas approved the compact that year. See Interstate Com-
pact to Conserve Oil and Gas, Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 781, 49 Stat. 939. The compact was
approved by the Congress on Aug 27, 1935. Id. Initially, the compact was effective for only
a two-year period. Id. at art. VIII, 49 Stat. at 941. However, in the two decades following
initial approval of the compact, twenty additional oil-producing states joined the compact; four
nonproducing states joined the compact as associate members; and Congress repeatedly renewed
its approval of the agreement. See Leach, supra at 275.
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Red River basin.379 Many facets of compact negotiation, ratification, and
implementation were discussed at this meeting, and some attention was de-
voted to comprehensive water resources planning in the region.380 Colonel
Wilson, under whose guidance the engineers' study had been undertaken,
related to the group the history of interstate compacts.""' Although west-
erners thought of compacts as means of allocating water, Colonel Wilson
pointed out that interstate agreements have also been utilized as a means
of settling pollution problems.382 In Colonel Wilson's view, all relevant data
pertaining to the Red River suggested the need for "a compact a little dif-
ferent than what has ever been written before." '383 Noting that the Red River
system encompasses literally thousands of square miles, Colonel Wilson urged
the states to negotiate a compact that would address the overall conservation
and development of water and soil resources in the basin, i.e., not only
water supply but also flood control, reclamation study, and agricultural and
other uses. 384
Much of the discussion among the state water officials attending the March
3, 1950 meeting centered upon the interstate nature of the management of
water resources in the Red River basin. Fort Supply and Lugert-Altus were
cited as examples of two reservoirs which, though located in Oklahoma,
have portions of their watersheds in Texas.385 The state in which the wa-
tershed is situated has little interest in promoting sound watershed man-
agement when the reservoir controlling the watershed is located in another
state.386 In the opinion of several water officials, a compact comprehensively
addressing the utilization of water in the river basin could alter this parochial
attitude and could expedite the development of a definitive reservoir utili-
zation policy.3a
The Arkansas representative who attended the March, 1950 meeting in-
dicated that some towns in Arkansas were experiencing a shortfall of in-
dustrial water. 8 Although Arkansas previously had adhered to a policy of
allowing Oklahoma and Kansas to retain all of the water that flowed through
interstate rivers and tributaries in those states, Arkansas' policy was being
reconsidered in view of (1) the clearly emerging national problem associated
with the huge consumption of water and (2) the necessity of water for the
379. See Minutes of 1950 Meeting, supra note 373, at 1; Transcript of 1950 Meeting, supra
note 374, at 1. Although the Red River originates in New Mexico, that state elected not to
send a representative to the Mar. 3, 1950, meeting.
380. Minutes of 1950 Meeting, supra note 373, at 1; Transcript of 1950 Meeting, supra note
374, at 1.
381. See Minutes of 1950 Meeting, supra note 373, at 2; Transcript of 1950 Meeting, supra
note 374, at 1-3.
382. See Minutes of 1950 Meeting, supra note 373, at 2; Transcript of 1950 Meeting, supra
note 374, at 1-3.
383. See Transcript of 1950 Meeting, supra note 374, at 3.
384. Id.
385. See Minutes of 1950 Meeting, supra note 373, at 3.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 5.
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support and expansion of Arkansas' economy.3 9 Louisiana's representative
was primarily interested in the flood control problems on the Red River and
wanted nothing done to alter the currently authorized flood control program
for it.39 Most of the officials attending the meeting thought the negotiation
and approval of an interstate compact apportioning the water of the Red
River would enable each state to proceed more reliably with the development
of its water resources. 39' The meeting concluded with Oklahoma requesting
that each representative draft provisions desired by his state for inclusion
in a compact.
392
A draft of a proposed bill to grant the consent of Congress to the com-
mencement of negotiations of a compact for the Red River was prepared
by May of 1950.193 However, disagreement arose over the language pertaining
to the appointment of a federal representative, 394 and little progress was made
during the remainder of the year toward securing congressional consent to
negotiate.
Oklahoma's interest in negotiating a compact for the Red River was re-
newed when Johnston Murray became governor of Oklahoma in 1951.1
95
Governor Murray, like former Governor Turner, was familiar with the In-
terstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas. In the area of oil and gas pro-
duction, Governor Murray perceived the compact as "an effective block
against federal encroachment on state Sovereignty ... [and] an inspiration
to many who are tired of federal intervention in every field imaginable. ' 39 6
On July 1, 1951, Governor Murray officially appointed an Oklahoma com-
pact commissioner for the Arkansas and Red rivers, 397 and he reaffirmed
the appointment in 1952.
398
389. Id.
390. Id. at 4.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 5. Apparently drafts of proposed compact provisions were prepared either im-
mediately preceding or following the Mar. 3, 1950, meeting. See Draft of a Proposed Red
River Compact, in files of Okla. Water Resources Bd., at 1-9 (undated).
393. See Letter from L.R. Matthias, Executive Secretary, Red River Valley Ass'n, to Clarence
Burch, Okla. Planning & Resources Bd. (OPRB) Chairman, and attachments (May 17, 1950).
394. Id. The Executive Secretary of the Red River Valley Association wanted the "consent
to negotiate" bill to specify that the President of the United States shall appoint as federal
representative and chairman of the negotiation commission a member of the Corps of Engineers
recommended by the Chief of Engineers. Id. The Chairman of the OPRB objected to this
language, arguing that such language (1) ignored other federal agencies with jurisdiction over
soil and water development and conservation, (2) failed to recognize that the Corps of Engineers
does not have complete control over the river basin, and (3) would encourage "selfish ma-
neuvering" by other federal agencies with interests in the Red River basin. See Letter from
Clarence Burch, OPRB Chairman, to L.R. Matthias, Executive Secretary, Red River Valley
Ass'n 1 (May 19, 1950).
395. Johnston Murray was Governor of Oklahoma from January 8, 1951, to January 1955.
See OKLA. DEP'T oF LiaRAms, 1983 DIRcCoRY oF OKAH~omA 564 (P. Lester ed.)
396. See Leach, supra note 378, at 276.
397. See Oklahoma Governor's Certificate of Appointment of Ira C. Husky [Director of
the OPRB Div. of Water Resources] as Compact Comm'r of Oklahoma for Arkansas and Red
Rivers (July 11, 1951).
398. See Letter from Governor of Oklahoma to Carl Albert, Member, U.S. House of Rep-
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Efforts to obtain congressional consent to negotiate a compact for the
Red River dragged until September, 1952, when the Oklahoma compact com-
missioner noticed an advertisement by the Saint Louis and San Francisco
Railway Company in a popular national business magazine29 The railway
company offered to deliver fifty million gallons of water per day, presumably
from the Red River at a site four miles below Denison, Texas, to industry
that was willing to locate in the vicinity of Lake Texoma. 400 A withdrawal
of this magnitude would take most, if not all, of the flow of the Red River
at this point during extreme low-water periods. 40' Consequently, the Okla-
homa compact commissioner wrote to the railway company, objecting to
the offer and asserting Oklahoma's claim to a share of the water. 40 2 The
railway company was also put on notice of the efforts to reach an agreement
apportioning the water of the river among the states through which it flows. 40
The railway advertisement and the concomitant threat of withdrawal of
water to serve industries locating in Texas spurred Oklahoma officials to
redouble their efforts to secure a compact dividing the water of the river. 414
In reaction to the Frisco advertisement, Governor Murray wrote to the gov-
ernors of the other states in the basin, reiterating the strong interest of
Oklahoma in negotiating a compact for the Red River. 405 Then Oklahoma
officials began to find still other advertisements, published mostly in eastern
papers and magazines, offering to deliver approximately all the low-water
flow of the Red River below Denison Dam to industrial sites in Texas. 406
State water officials throughout the Red River basin were particularly sen-
sitive to water use at this time because of a severe drought.4 7 Louisiana
was so badly stricken that New Orleans' municipal water intake was threat-
resentatives, at 1 (Jan. 24, 1952).
399. See Letter from Ira C. Husky to J.E. Gilliland, Assistant to the President, St. L. &
San Francisco Ry., 1 (Sept. 12, 1952). The advertisement apparently was placed by the railroad
in the Aug. 3, 1952, issue of Business Week. Id.
400. Id. See also Letter from J.E. Gilliland to Ira Husky (Sept. 22, 1952); Letter from Ira
Husky to J.E. Gilliland (Sept. 25, 1952).
401. See Letter of Sept. 12, 1952, supra note 399.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. See Letter from Ira C. Husky to N.R. Graham, Vice-Chairman of OPRB (Sept. 12,
1952). A member of the Texas Board of Water Engineers also thought that the Frisco railway
ad suggested the need for a compact for the Red River. See Letter from A.P. Rollins to Ira
C. Husky (Sept. 18, 1952).
405. See Letters from the Governor of Oklahoma to Allan Shivers, Robert F. Kennon, Edwin
L. Mechem, and Sidney S. McMath, governors of Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Ar-
kansas, respectively (Sept. 19, 1952).
406. See Letter from N.R. Graham, Vice-Chairman of the OPRB, to Ira Husky (Oct. 16,
1952).
407. See Letter from Governor of Oklahoma to G.W. McCullough, President, Okla. Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs (OSPE) (Oct. 21, 1952) (seeking the assistance of the OSPE in assessing
Oklahoma's grave deficiency in municipal water supply and offering suggestions toward efficient
water utilization in light of the protracted drought).
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ened by the intrusion of sea water because of the low level of the Mississippi
River.
401
During the same period, Texas became concerned about an application
filed by the Lugert-Atlus Irrigation District in southwestern Oklahoma with
the Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board for the impoundment and
appropriation of water of the Salt Fork of the Red River for irrigation
purposes. 40 9 The Texas Board of Water Engineers requested that Oklahoma
officials refrain from allocating any of the water of the Salt Fork.410 Since
the Salt Fork is interstate in character, with a large portion of its watershed
lying in Texas, the Texas Board of Water Engineers maintained that the
interests of Oklahoma and Texas should be established by compact before
any permits were granted.41' Oklahoma officials took Texas' request under
advisement.
412
Meanwhile, response from the other governors to Governor Murray's let-
ters expressing continued interest in negotiating a compact for the Red River
was mixed. 413 Because of the apparent inertia of the states, the year 1952
ended without congressional consent for negotiations to officially begin.
In April of 1953, representatives of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and
Texas met while attending a meeting of the Red River Valley Association
in Shreveport and agreed on a draft of a proposed bill granting the consent
of Congress for these states to conduct negotiations and enter into a compact
for the Red River. 4 4 Perhaps heeding Colonel Wilson's earlier advice to
draft a compact broad in scope and reflective of a balanced approach to
resource development, the proposed language not only authorized the draft-
ing of a compact apportioning the water of the river but also approved the
negotiation of provisions "concerning the interests of the respective states
in the development of water resources of the Red River and its tributar-
ies. ' 41 After slightly modifying the language, Congressman Wright Patman
408. See Letter from N.R. Graham, OPRB Vice-Chairman, to Oklahoma Governor Johnston
Murray (Oct. 24, 1952).




412. See Letter from Ira C. Husky to A.P. Rollins (Sept. 25, 1952).
413. Louisiana responded affirmatively to Governor Murray's letter. See Letter from Loui-
siana Governor Robert F. Kennon to Oklahoma Governor Johnston Murray (Oct. 21, 1952).
However, since only 5 percent of the watershed of the Red River is located in New Mexico,
that state again declined to participate in any compact negotiations for the Red River system.
See Letter from John H. Bliss, New Mexico State Eng'r, to Oklahoma Governor Johnston
Murray (Oct. 31, 1952).
414. See Letter from N.R. Graham, OPRB Vice-Chairman, to Oklahoma Governor Johnston
Murray (Oct. 24, 1952). Graham also reported the willingness of Texas Governor Allan Shivers
to propose a meeting of the Red River basin governors to discuss an interstate compact for
the Red River. Id. Since Oklahoma had previously tried without success to ignite negotiations,
Graham recommended that the next move should come from another state. Id. See also Letter
from Texas Governor Allan Shivers to Oklahoma Governor Johnston Murray (Jan. 16, 1953).
415. See Memorandum by Ira C. Husky to Files and attached proposed Red River Bill (Apr.
11, 1953).
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of Texas introduced the bill in the United States House of Representatives
on May 20, 1953.416 The bill was referred to committee, and no further
action was taken on it that year.
4 1 7
Requests for permits to appropriate water from the main stem of the Red
River continued to be filed with both the Oklahoma Planning and Resources
Board and the Texas Board of Water Engineers. 4 8 Texas officials advised
applicants that no permits would be issued for diversion of water from the
main stem of the river until an interstate compact had been negotiated and
a definite portion of the flow of the river had been allocated.41 9 Although
rumors to the contrary were rampant among Texas farmers, Oklahoma of-
ficials also told permit applicants that their applications were being dated
and filed subject to any compact that might be negotiated, with priority of
right for purposes of an Oklahoma adjudication determined by the date of
filing.
420
During the spring of 1953, the protracted drought in the Red River basin
confronted the city of Dallas with a serious water shortage.4 2' The Governor
of Oklahoma gave his consent to the issuance of an emergency permit to
Dallas for the diversion of water from the Red River in Cooke County,
Texas, until the impounding reservoirs regularly used by Dallas for water
supply were filled.4 2 Although the permit contained language designed to
protect Oklahoma and Texas in the event that a water compact was later
reached, Oklahoma officials became concerned that Dallas might acquire
"squatter's rights to Oklahoma's property [i.e., water]" when the diversion
of water had not ceased by July of the following year.
423
416. H.R. 5309, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
417. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 1953-
54 CONG. INDEx 4401. The language as modified was also very broad-consenting to the ne-
gotiation and entering into a compact "relating to the interests of such [s]tates in the devel-
opment of the water resources of the Red River and its tributaries, and providing for an
equitable apportionment among them of the waters of the Red River and its tributaries, and
for matters incident thereto." H.R. 5309, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1953).
418. See Letter from A.P. Rollins, Member of Texas Bd. of Water Eng'rs, to Ira C. Husky
(Feb. 10, 1954); Letter from Ira C. Husky to A.P. Rollins (Feb. 18, 1954) (in reply).
419. See Letter dated Feb. 10, 1954, supra note 418, at 1.
420. Id. See also Letter dated Feb. 18, 1954, supra note 418, at 1.
421. See Letter from A.P. Rollins, Member of Texas Bd. of Water Eng'rs, to Wright Patman,
Member, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 10, 1954).
422. Id. Permit No. 1670 was issued to Dallas by the Texas Board of Water Engineers on
Apr. 30, 1953, authorizing the diversion of no more than 112,000 acre-feet of water annually
at a rate of diversion not exceeding 155 cubic feet per second. See Letter from A.P. Rollins
to N.R. Graham, OPRB Vice-Chairman (Aug. 5, 1954) (quoting language from the permit).
The permit specifically provided that it was
to remain in effect only until there is stored in reservoirs on Elm Fork of the
Trinity River and its tributaries to the credit of the City of Dallas, Texas, an
amount of water equal to the original capacity of Lake Dallas; and is issued
without prejudice to the rights of Oklahoma or Texas to waters of [the] Red
River, as rights may be hereafter determined by compact.
Id.
423. See Letter from Morton R. Harrison, OPRB Chairman, to Oklahoma Att'y Gen. Mac
Q. Williamson (July 29, 1954).
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Except for the emergency permit for Dallas, the Texas Board of Water
Engineers generally declined to grant permits to applicants who sought to
divert water from the Red River for domestic, municipal, and irrigation
purposes in the absence of a compact definitively apportioning the water of
the Red River among the interested states. 424 The stymieing effect that the
lack of a compact had upon potential individual and municipal investments
in needed diversion, works was outlined to Congressman Wright Patman in
August of 1954. 42 Patman again introduced his bill in March of 1955, and
after amendment in committee, it received a "do pass" recommendation.
426
On August 11, 1955, Congress approved the act granting the consent of
Congress for the negotiation of an interstate compact "for an equitable
apportionment ... of the water of the Red River and its tributaries. ' 427 In
addition to incorporating amendments added by the House and Senate com-
mittees, the act stipulated that any compact negotiated and concluded pur-
suant thereto would not be binding or obligatory upon any signatory parties
until ratified by the legislatures of each of the respective states and approved
by the Congress.42
Ironically, the protracted effort to secure congressional consent to ne-
gotiate a compact for the Red River, though politically pragmatic, was not
constitutionally mandated. Although interstate compacts dealing with water
resources are generally deemed to require the consent of Congress, consent
"to negotiate" a compact is not constitutionally required.4 29 However, the
424. See Letter dated Aug. 5, 1954, supra note 422.
425. Id. "No individual or municipality can afford to invest any considerable sum in di-
version works on such an indefinite basis."
426. H.R. RaP. No. 1444, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1955) (discussing H.R. 5259). In the
absence of studies showing the effect of the ambiguous language in H.R. 5259 upon federal
interests and activities in the basin, the House Committee insisted that the compact be limited
to the apportionment of the water of the river. Id. The comparable Senate bill was S. 2260,
84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955).
427. Act of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 784, 69 Stat. 654.
428. Id.
429. Although there is scant historical documentation to shed light upon the scope and
purpose of the compact clause, it was patterned after the language in the Articles of Con-
federation in an apparent effort to continue the previous pattern of cooperative adjustment
of interjurisdictional disputes, subject to oversight by the Congress. See MuYs, INTERSTATE
WATER COMPACTS, supra note 82, at 242. Certain types of interstate agreements are beyond
the scope of the compact clause. For example, an interstate agreement or compact to which
Congress has not consented would only violate the compact clause if it were a "combination
tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere
with the supremacy of the United States." United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n,
434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978) (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893)); New Hamp-
shire v. Maine, 425 U.S. 363, 369 (1976). Accord, Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Federal Reserve
Bd., 105 S.Ct. 2545, 2554-55 (1985). In view of the broad authority the federal government has
over water resources, "there is a very strong presumption that any compact or agreement dealing
with water resources is subject to the consent requirements of the compact clause." Muys, supra
note 82, at 174 (emphasis in original) (also noting that there may be some categories of water
resouce compacts that have no apparent effect upon national interests). However, the Constitu-
tion "makes no provision respecting the mode or form in which the consent of Congress [to an
interstate compact] is to be signified." Green v. Biddle, 22 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 86 (1823). The
Supreme Court held that the fundamental issue is whether the "Congress by some positive act in
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practice of first securing the consent of Congress to negotiate a compact
prior to undertaking substantive negotiations "enables Congress to guide the
states by specifying any conditions to its ultimate consent and by providing
any guidelines it may deem appropriate to facilitate negotiations.
'430
The years consumed by the process of obtaining congressional consent to
negotiate could have been better devoted to substantive negotiations. The
lack of advance congressional approval to negotiate could have been over-
come by inclusion of a federal representative in the negotiations and the
conscientious maintenance of open lines of communication with the Congress
and the executive branch. 43 Unfortunately, the five-year effort that cul-
minated in securing congressional authorization to undertake negotiations
on a compact for the Red River foreshadowed the glacial speed of the formal
negotiation process that was to ensue.
The Beckman Years: Charting a Course for the Negotiations
Shortly after approving the legislation in 1955 granting consent to ne-
gotiate a compact for the Red River basin, President Eisenhower appointed
Henry C. Beckman, a regional engineer with the United States Geological
Survey in Rolla, Missouri, as the chairman and nonvoting representative of
the federal government to the Red River Compact Negotiation Commis-
sion.4 2 By the end of January, 1956, Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, and
Arkansas had named their respective representatives to the negotiation com-
mission. 43 Since the portion of the Red River basin lying within New Mexico
relation to [the interstate] agreement, [has] signified [its] consent [to the] validity [of the agree-
ment]. Id.
430. See Muys, supra note 82, at 175.
431. Historically, "[e]xperience has shown that federal agencies can be quite successful in
delaying Congressional consent to a proposed Compact if they have even minor objections to
any of its provisions." MuYs, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS, supra ntoe 82, at 276 (quoting
from Calif. Assem. Comm. on Water, Report on the California-Nevada Interstate Compact,
at 1, 8-10, 11-12 (undated) ). However, as Muys points out, the participation of a federal
representative in compact negotiations is not without its drawbacks:
The matter of coordination of federal agency views by the federal representative
is . . . troublesome. In the Upper Colorado River Compact negotiations, coor-
dination efforts produced only innocuous, well-wishing statements from the agen-
cies, even though there were extensive and significant federal interests in the area.
This suggests that a federal representative's coordinating efforts are probably going
to be generally unsuccessful, even with the help of OMB personnel, as long as
each federal representative must attack his assignment on an ad hoc basis with
no clear policy at the Washington level to guide him on difficult matters in a
constructive way. All that can result from his coordinating efforts, no matter how
diligent, is a composite of uncertain, hesitant responses from the affected agencies,
none of which wish to be accused of sacrificing any portion of the federal interest.
There is little utility to anyone coordinating a host of non-commital [sic] views.
Id. at 278-79.
432. See Letter from Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to RRCNC State Comm'rs,
at 1 (Jan. 23, 1956).
433. See Letter dated Jan. 23, 1956, supra note 432, at 1-2.
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was small and the flow of the streams infrequent, New Mexico declined to
participate in the negotiations and to become a member of the compact.
434
When the organizational meeting of the Red River Compact Negotiation
Commission convened in New Orleans in March of 1956, all four partici-
pating states had varying degrees of experience in negotiating compacts for
other river basins. Texas had signed the Rio Grande Compact with Colorado
and New Mexico in 1938 and the Pecos River Compact with New Mexico
in 1948; Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico had completed the Canadian
River Compact in 1950; and Louisiana and Texas had approved the Sabine
River Compact in 1953. 411 In addition, progress had been made between
Arkansas and Oklahoma and between Oklahoma and Kansas on the ne-
gotiation of compacts apportioning the waters of the Arkansas River and
its tributaries within those two states.
436
Under the guidance of Chairman Beckman, the work of the Red River
Compact Negotiation Commission proceeded methodically from the initial
meeting of the negotiators in 1956 until Beckman's sudden death following
the twenty-sixth meeting of the commission on December 14, 1962. During
his tenure, Beckman encouraged the Red River Compact negotiators to avail
themselves of the experience and expertise of other river basin compact com-
missions.4 7 The salient features of nine existing water apportionment com-
pacts, including those for the Sabine, Rio Grande, Canadian, and Pecos
rivers, and several stream pollution control compacts, were analyzed to help
formulate a compact for the Red River basin. 438 As new river basin compacts
were approved, the Red River negotiators examined them for useful ideas.
439
The negotiators recognized early in the deliberations that a lot of data
would be needed before negotiations for a compact for the Red River system
could be undertaken intelligently. The negotiation commission established
an Engineering Advisory Committee and a Legal Advisory Committee to
perform the critical information-gathering and processing function. Al-
though the members of both committees were initially appointed to serve
as technical advisers to the commissioners, much substantive decision making
was actually accomplished by the two committees. 44°
434. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 468. Only 450 square miles
of the watershed are located within New Mexico.
435. See Water Allocation Compacts, supra note 173.
436. See supra note 174.
437. See 1967 RRCNC Draft Eng'g Report, supra note 13, at 3-4.
438. See Letter from Francis B. Sessums, Chief, OPRB Water Resources Div., to RRCNC
Comm'rs and Members, Legal and Eng'g Advisory Comm's., at I (July 20, 1956).
439. See Letter from Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to RRCNC State Comm'rs,
at 1 (July 8, 1957) (enclosing a copy of the "new" Klamath River Basin Compact, noting its
unusual features, and commenting that the priorities of use set forth in the compact and that
the powers given the compact administration over stream pollution are different from those
in other compacts).
440. See Minutes of 28th Meeting of RRCNC, at 1-2 (Nov. 7, 1963) (in which the chairman
of the Legal Advisory Committee recommended that further legal work on the draft compact
"should await receipt of work of the Engineering Advisory Committee on the apportionment
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The Engineering Advisory Committee was composed of an engineering
official from each of the participating states who had direct responsibility
relating to water resources development in his state. 441 The committee was
given a large assignment: (1) to update the surface water and monthly and
annual discharge records for the gauging stations throughout the Red River
basin; (2) to develop a map pinpointing locations of all stream gauging,
chemical quality, and sediment stations within the basin; (3) to prepare a
table summarizing discharge records for all stream gauging stations on the
Red River and its major tributaries, particularly those near interstate cross-
ings; and (4) to compile information concerning present and contemplated
future uses of water for municipal, industrial, irrigation, power, and other
purposes. 442
The members of the Legal Advisory Committee were either assistant at-
torneys general or attorneys for a state governmental division with major
responsibility in the use and control of water resources." 3 The dual tasks
of this committee were to study the legal and administrative features of a
desirable compact and to serve as legal advisers to the commission. The legal
advisers were asked to anticipate the problems that might be encountered
in formulating a compact for the Red River system, focusing particularly
upon the legal aspects of apportioning the water of the river and the de-
velopment of legal mechanisms to improve water quality."
The negotiators decided during the initial phases of the deliberations that
water quality is as important as water quantity. A compact would be of
little value if a state's equitable share of water was so polluted that it was
unfit for use.445 Therefore, the commissioners decided that a goal of the
compact was to enhance the quality of water in the basin. Since the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1956 conferred blanket authority upon the
states to begin negotiations to form compacts to control water pollution," 6
it was not necessary to secure specific congressional authorization in order
to include pollution provisions in a compact for the Red River system.
Because the problems of natural contamination and man-made pollution
of the waters of the river system merited particularly close attention, the
commissioners established a subcommittee of the Engineering Advisory
Committee on stream pollution control. 447 This subcommittee was composed
of a representative from each participating state who had important re-
sponsibilities pertaining to the control of stream pollution within his state."4
of water"). See, e.g., Minutes of 49th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 25, at 1-3 (reflecting
the important roles performed by the two advisory committees to the RRCNC).
441. See Beckman Address to Red River Valley Ass'n, supra note 18, at 2.
442. See Minutes of 2d Meeting of RRCNC, at 1-3 (May 2, 1956).
443. See Beckman Address to Red River Valley Ass'n, supra note 18, at 3.
444. See Minutes of 2d Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 442, at 3.
445. See Beckman Address to Red River Valley Ass'n, supra note 18, at 3.
446. See supra notes 166-168 and 251 and accompanying text.
447. See Minutes of 4th Meeting of RRCNC, at 1, 3 (Dec. 18, 1956).
448. See Beckman Address to Red River Valley Ass'n, supra note 18, at 3.
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The subcommittee was assigned the task of investigating the presence of
stream pollution in the basin and advising the commissioners as to the man-
ner and extent to which the control of interstate stream pollution should be
included in the contemplated compact. The agenda of the subcommittee
included examining the effects of various methods of controlling natural
pollution upon the flow characteristics of the main stem of the river and
reviewing other compacts to ascertain how water quality problems had been
addressed elsewhere. 449
Two of the most complicated problems faced by the Subcommittee on
Stream Pollution Control and later by the negotiation commission were (1)
the scope of authority the permanent interstate administrative agency of the
compact would have over stream pollution and (2) the extent to which the
control of natural contamination of the river system should be addressed. 450
When the subcommittee began its work in 1957, most river basin compacts
only empowered their interstate administrative agencies to investigate stream
pollution and to recommend the initiation of certain enforcement actions
by other agencies. Only two compacts authorized their administrative entities
to bring enforcement actions in the courts. Moreover, the dimensions of the
second problem-the natural deterioration of the water in the upper basin
of the river system created by the flow of water over and through salt-laden
soils-were not fully understood.
451
A survey to determine the source, extent, and volume of chemical pol-
lution in the Red River basin was undertaken in 1957 by the U.S. Public
Health Service, representatives of which worked closely with the compact
negotiators and their advisers throughout the negotiations. 42 In addition,
the Army Corps of Engineers began examining the economic and engineering
feasibility of reducing the chemical content of the river system by controlling
sources of natural pollution.
4
11
When the Eisenhower administration sought to limit the budget for the
U.S. Public Health Service water quality study to $85,000, the negotiating
commission formally petitioned the Congress to make adequate funds avail-
449. Id. See also Minutes of 4th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 447, at 4.
450. See Minutes of 5th Meeting of RRCNC, at 3 (Feb. 20-21, 1957).
451. See Beckman Address to Red River Valley Ass'n, supra note 18, at 3.
452. See, e.g., Minutes of 3d Meeting of RRCNC, at 1-3 (Oct. 17-18, 1956); Minutes of
7th Meeting of RRCNC, at 1-2 (Aug. 6-7, 1957) (during which a representative of the U.S.
Public Health Service explained the objectives, nature, and scope of the water pollution survey
being conducted in the Red River basin); Minutes of 9th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 38,
at 2-3; Minutes of 10th Meeting of RRCNC, at 3 (Apr. 8-9, 1958) (addressing the problems
encountered by the U.S. Public Health Service in securing sufficient funding to continue the
water quality study); Tentative Draft of Eng'g Advisory Comm. Rep., at 5 (Dec. 7, 1961).
453. See Tentative Draft of Eng'g Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 452, at 5. The role
of the Corps of Engineers was to try to determine measures to alleviate the conditions identified
by the Public Health Service study. Id. The ramifications of developing a solution to the
problem of naturally occurring chloride and sulfate contamination in the Red River system
transcended the basin. Id. Great quantities of water are contaminated by salt pollution as-
sociated with the Blaine formation, which extends from the Pecos River in New Mexico, around
the Cap Rock escarpment in Texas, through Oklahoma, and northward into Kansas. Id.
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able for the continuation of the survey and research. 4 4 Salt contamination
of Lake Texoma seriously undermined the potential of this major impound-
ment for industrial and municipal uses. The city of Denison, Texas, was
unable to attract a food processing plant in 1958 because of the high mineral
content of the water. 4ss Dallas newspapers editorialized for increased funding
to complete the study; Dallas plumbing was "still paying the high price"
of using the Red River as a source of domestic water during the droughts
of the early 1950s. 456 Congressman Sam Rayburn, the Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives, joined a delegation from the Red River basin in
urging that the budget be increased to $400,000. 417 Ultimately, adequate
funding was secured to complete the project.
Meanwhile, the advisory committees to the negotiation commission vig-
orously tackled their assignments. The legal advisers provided the negotiating
commissioners with synopses of major Supreme Court cases dealing with
interstate water problems and summaries of the pollution laws of the four
interested states. 458 The authorizing legislation for Denison Dam was ex-
amined, and compact provisions addressing the operational status of Denison
Dam became a point of contention between Louisiana and the upstream
states of Oklahoma and Texas. 459 The Legal Advisory Committee had a
454. See Editorial, Salty Red River, Dallas Morning News, Apr. 16, 1959; Minutes of 9th
Meeting and attached resolution, supra note 38, at 4. Individual negotiators and other state
officials also lobbied for adequate funding to support the completion of the study. See, e.g.,
Letter from Oklahoma Governor Raymond Gary to Arthur Flemming, Secretary, U.S. Dep't
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) (Sept. 12, 1958) (urging inclusion in the HEW
budget of requisite funding for the Public Health pollution research program in the Red and
Arkansas rivers); Letter from Francis Borelli, OWRB Executive Director, to J.T. Ellis, Jr.,
Admin. Assistant to Texas Governor Price Daniel, at 1-2 (Oct. 7, 1958) (encouraging Governor
Daniel to write to HEW Secretary Arthur Flemming regarding increased funding in the HEW
budget for the next biennium for the continuation of the Public Health Service pollution control
study); Letter from Francis J. Borelli, OWRB Executive Director, to Calvin T. Watts, Assistant
Director, Louisiana Dep't of Public Works 1 (Oct. 7, 1958) (requesting Watts to inform Lou-
isiana Governor Huey Long of the urgent need for the completion of the Public Health Service
study in the Red River basin and asking the Governor to contact HEW Secretary Arthur
Flemming about increased funding for the continuation of the research program on water
quality in the Arkansas and Red rivers).
455. More Funds Asked for Study of Red River Salt Pollution, Dallas Morning News, Apr.
14, 1959, at 3, § 1. The abatement of salt contamination of the water of Lake Texoma was
vital to the maximum utilization of this body of water by both industry and municipalities.
See Letter from Francis Borelli to J.T. Ellis, Jr., supra note 454, at 1.
456. See Editorial, supra note 454.
457. Id.
458. See Minutes of 4th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 447, at 3; Minutes of 5th Meeting
of RRCNC, supra note 450, at 3.
459. See Letter from Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to Richard Huff, Chairman,
RRCNC Legal Advisory Comm., at 1 (Sept. 23, 1957); Minutes of 33d Meeting of RRCNC,
at 2-3 (Jan. 25, 1965). Oklahoma and Texas objected to language in the draft provision ap-
portioning the water of Reach I, the boundary reach above Lake Texoma, which stipulated
that any diversion, impoundment, or use of these waters by Oklahoma and Texas "shall not
be detrimental to the authorized purposes of Denison Reservoir." Id. The two upstream states
argued that the proviso sought by Louisiana was in direct conflict with the 1938 authorizing
[Vol. 3 8:1
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rough draft of the general features of the compact by the end of 1956.46
The draft was heavily revised, and proposed congressional consent legislation
was written as well.
Copies of the rough draft, subsequent revisions, and proposed consent
legislation were sent to the U.S. Department of Justice for review and com-
ment. The initial draft of the compact included a broad waiver of the sov-
ereign immunity of the United States and a suggestion that the federal
government defray the expenses of the interstate entity to be set up to ad-
minister the compact. 46' These provisions were strongly resisted by the De-
partment of Justice.462 The language concerning the payment of compact
expenses by the federal government was deleted, but the effort to secure a
partial waiver of sovereign immunity became a major point of debate be-
tween the legal advisers and the Department of Justice throughout the re-
mainder of the negotiations. Ultimately, the negotiators secured a partial
waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States in certain cases arising
under the compact in which the federal government was determined to be
an indispensable party.
463
legislation for Denison Dam and Reservoir. Id. Louisiana countered that the limitation "ex-
pressed Louisiana's belief that operation of projects as at present [1965] should be insured."
Id. For an analysis of the 1938 Denison Dam authorizing legislation, see supra text accom-
panying notes 350-355, 363, and 372.
460. See Minutes of 3d Meeting of RRCNC and app., Report of Legal Advisory Comm.,
supra note 452 (indicating that the Legal Advisory Committee distributed a copy of a revised
form of "rough draft" compact at this meeting). See also Letter from Perry Morton, Assistant
Att'y Gen., Lands Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, at
1-4 (Apr. 22, 1957) (commenting on the "Rough Draft of Red River Compact").
461. See Letter from Perry Morton dated Apr. 22, 1957, supra note 460, at 4 (objecting to
a number of provisions, including article VI, paragraph B, of the "Rough Draft," which was
interpreted as a suggestion that the federal government pay the expenses of administering the
compact).
462. Id. at 2-3 (regarding as "indispensable" to any interstate compact a general exclusion
of the rights and powers of the United States from the operation of the compact and questioning
the draft language in which the states attempted by compact to prejudge the legal question of
the compact commission's standing as a real party in interest "for the purposes of enforcing
or preventing the violation of any law, rule, or regulation of any signatory state or of the
United States, . . . relating to the use or pollution of any of the waters of the Red River
System"). See also Minutes of 16th Meeting of RRCNC, at 2 (Sept. 25, 1959) (summarizing
the remarks by Walter Kiechel, Jr., the U.S. Department of Justice representative at the meet-
ing, who stated that "some provisions [in the draft compact] were very drastic and without
precedent," "were not essential to the successful operation of the compact," and "could be
accomplished better by other means than by writing them into the compact"). The Department
of Justice particularly objected to provisions in the draft compact for joining the United States
as a party defendant in a lawsuit and for serving notice on federal officers and agencies. Id.
at 3 (reflecting Kiechel's comment that such provisions were "unduly and unnecessarily drastic").
When a revised draft of the compact and a draft of the proposed consent legislation were later
forwarded to the Department of Justice following the sixteenth meeting, federal attorneys again
warned that "many provisions are most inappropriate" and "undesirable, both from the point
of the compacting states and the federal government." See Letter from Perry Morton, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, supra note 81, at 1.
463. See Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, § 2, 94 Stat. 3305, 3319-20.
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Many of the negotiators and technical advisers for the Red River Compact
were also members of the negotiating committees for the Kansas-Oklahoma
and Arkansas-Oklahoma compacts for the Arkansas River basin. Walter
Kiechel, Jr., an attorney with the Lands Division of the Department of
Justice, met with the negotiators and the technical advisers for all three
contemplated compacts in an unprecedented joint session of the negotiating
commissions in 1960 in an effort to resolve the differences between the
federal government and the states over language that was common to the
drafts of all three compacts and the proposed consent legislation.
46"
The technical advisers decided that a readily available federal forum was
imperative to the effective enforcement of the pollution provisions of the
compact. 465 The enforcement procedures set forth in the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act in effect at the time were quite weak in the opinions of
a number of experts.46 The Constitution gave the Supreme Court original,
but not exclusive, jurisdiction of suits by a state against another state or
464. See Minutes of 20th Meeting of RRCNC, at 3-7 (June 27-28, 1960). In expressing his
views and those of the Department of Justice, Mr. Kiechel made the following points:
1. Reiteration of inadvisability of specific provisions in the consent legislation
which the compacting States require to be enacted by Congress before the
Compact can become effective;
2. If compacting States insist on specific provisions of consent legislation, the
least of such, the less likelihood of Congress' declining to meet their terms;
3. Consent to sue sovereign is cautiously granted, and if such consent is made
a part of the consent legislation, it should be limited to the actual need, i.e.,
to insure the enforceability of the compact;
4. Conferral of jurisdiction on United States district courts over pollution abate-
ment suits brought by a signatory State against a polluter in another State
is not appropriate in legislation consenting to a compact. Such jurisdiction,
even though it may be desirable, should be obtained by amendment of the
Judicial Code or a law of general application; and
5. Pointed out that, in consenting to recent compacts, Congress has invariably
reserved the right to amend, alter, or repeal its consent, and that even though
the exercise of such reservation may be unlikely, the Compact should not
include provisions which would impliedly or otherwise negate the possibility
of Congressional exercise of such power.
Id. at 6. During the discussion that followed Kiechel's formal remarks to the joint session of
the three compact negotiating groups, Kiechel addressed the question of "whether Congressional
consent to a compact in which the States had agreed upon criteria of regulation for a federal
project superseded the original authorization act." Id. at 6-7. Kiechel answered negatively,
explaining that "it would take affirmative action by Congress to amend the original author-
ization act [for the federal project]." Id. at 7. During the ensuing exchange of comments
between Kiechel and some of the compact negotiators, attention was called to language in the
existing Arkansas River Compact between Colorado and Kansas that made specific provision
for the operation of the John Martin Reservoir. Id. Kiechel stressed that the Chief of Engineers,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "had been expressly authorized by Congress to operate that
reservoir in accordance with the compact provisions." Id.
465. See Progress Reports of Eng'g Advisory Comm. and Legal Advisory Comm. appended
to Minutes of 9th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 38.
466. See, e.g., I~rrzE, supra note 38, at four-34.
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its citizens. 467 Federal statutory law in force during the negotiations conferred
exclusive jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court in controversies between
states. 46s The Supreme Court's jurisdiction was nonexclusive in actions by
a state against a citizen of another state; however, no statutory provision
explicitly stipulated the jurisdiction of the federal district courts in such
cases. 469 The somewhat risky strategy adopted by the negotiators and their
technical advisers during the early stages of the deliberations was the in-
clusion of a provision in the draft compact requiring specific and precise
language concerning the waiver of sovereign immunity and jurisdiction of
federal district courts to appear in the congressional consent legislation as
a condition precedent to the interstate compact becoming effective. 470
At the behest of the Department of Justice, the negotiators were successful
in 1962 in getting Congress to enact legislation of general application that
conferred jurisdiction upon the federal district courts of cases involving the
pollution of interstate rivers where the pollution is an alleged violation of
an interstate compact and the signatory states have consented to such jur-
isdiction in the compact. 47' The 1962 act also clarified the concurrent jur-
isdiction of the federal district courts in interstate pollution suits against a
citizen of another state. 472 Because the negotiators feared that Congress might
some day repeal the 1962 act, they retained the conditional language in the
draft compact and ultimately secured passage of congressional consent leg-
islation containing the desired language. 473
467. U.S. CoNsr., art III, § 2. See also S. REP. No. 2211, supra note 40, at 3282.
468. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982). See also S. REp. No. 2211, supra note 40, at 3282.
469. See 28 U.S.C § 1251(b)(3) (1982). See also S. REP. No. 2211, supra note 40, at 3282.
470. See Letter from Perry Morton, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC
Chairman, supra note 81 (reiterating that by requiring the inclusion of specific and precise
language in the congressional consent legislation as a condition precedent to an interstate com-
pact becoming effective, the compacting states risked the problem of having to renegotiate and
re-ratify the compact should Congress reject or modify the language in the proposed consent
legislation).
471. See Act of Oct. 15, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-830, 76 Stat. 957 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §
466g-I (1982)).
472. Id. See also S. REP. No. 2211, supra note 40, at 3282-83.
473. See Minutes of 38th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 38. Keichel continued to object
to inclusion of this language in the compact, particularly in light of the fact that the RRCNC
in 1962 had secured the enactment of federal legislation of general application containing the
identical provisions found in the draft compact and proposed consent legislation. Id. In the
event the federal law was repealed, the legal advisers wanted a mechanism for the signatory
states to seek recourse against each other in litigation involving pollution of the water of the
Red River system; they sought, in effect, to bind Congress with the Red River Compact and
the consent legislation. Id. Dicta in controversies over boundary compacts in the early 1800s
suggested that once Congress had granted its consent to a compact, it was precluded from
revoking or modifying that consent. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S (12 Pet.) 883, 894-
95 (1838); Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 395, 396-97 (1837). The better view is that
Congress may enact legislation that is inconsistent with an interstate compact to which it has
previously given its consent. See Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409, 418
(1917); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433 (1855).
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. involved a situation in which Congress first
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The engineering advisers completed their initial assignments in February
of 1959 and distributed a 150-page bound volume of data concerning water
supply and usage in the river basin. 474 However, as the commissioners dis-
cussed criteria and examined various methods for apportioning the water
among the states, they concluded that additional data was still needed.4
7
1
For example, preliminary apportionment discussions were held in 1959 be-
tween Louisiana and Arkansas concerning the Ouachita River and Bayou
Bartholomew. 476 These discussions, in turn, called attention to the need to
consider the water requirements of the authorized Overton Waterway on the
lower Red River and the proposed improvements for navigation on the
Ouachita River.477 The compact negotiators and technical advisers met with
federal officials from the Corps of Engineers, the Southwest Power Admin-
istration, the Federal Power Administration, the Soil Conservation Service,
and the Bureau of Reclamation to assess the water requirements of existing
and proposed water-related projects and activities of these agencies. 47 Dis-
approved a compact that stipulated that the Ohio River should forever remain open for nav-
igation; then Congress passed legislation authorizing the construction of a bridge across the
river. 59 U.S (18 How.) at 429, 432-33. The congressional authorization was challenged as
being incompatible with the prior compact. Id. at 432. In upholding the constitutionality of
the bridge authorization, the Court said: "The question here is, whether or not the compact
can operate as a restriction upon the power of Congress under the Constitution to regulate
commerce among the several states. Clearly not. Otherwise Congress and two states would
possess the power to modify and alter the Constitution itself." Id. See Muvs, INTERSTATE
VATER CoMPAcTs, supra note 82, at 292-93, for an analysis of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co. But see Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 272-74 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1963) (in which the court of appeals in dictum found "not un-
persuasive" the argument that congressional consent to a compact is irrevocable and any sub-
sequent congressional action relative to the subject of the interstate compact had to be
accomplished through direct legislative action pursuant to other constitutional powers). For a
discussion of Tobin, see Muvs, INTERSTATE WATER CompAcTs, supra, at 290-92.
474. See Minutes of 13th Meeting of RRCNC, at 2 (Feb. 11-12, 1959). In July of 1958, the
Engineering Advisory Committee had distributed to the negotiating commissioners copies of
(1) bar charts showing the availability of discharge records for the Red River and interstate
tributaries, (2) tables of monthly and annual runoff for those streams, (3) a tabulation of water
rights issued by Texas, (4) a map of the Red River basin with drainage areas and other in-
formation, and (5) an isohyetal map of the basin. See Minutes of llth Meeting of RRCNC,
at 2 (July 9-10, 1958).
475. See, e.g., Minutes of l1th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 474, at 2; Memorandum
of Conference between Representatives of States of Louisiana and Arkansas, at I (Dec. 10,
1959); Minutes of 27th Meeting of RRCNC, at 2 (Sept. 26, 1963). Information submitted by
state and federal agencies was often scrutinized very carefully. For example, when Louisiana
became apprehensive about certain basin areas of Texas that had been shown on preliminary
maps as being "non-contributing," a compact negotiation meeting was held in Wichita Falls,
Texas, and part of the group made a field trip to the questioned areas to resolve the concerns
of Louisiana. See Tentative Draft of Proposed Report of RRCNC, Eng'g Advisory Comm.,
at 10 (Dec. 7, 1961).
476. See Minutes of 13th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 474, at 3.
477. Id.
478. See Tentative Minutes of RRCNC Eng'g Advisory Comm., at ii (May 19-20, 1960);
Minutes of 20th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 464, at 2 (reporting on results of similar
conference held on June 27, 1960, with the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) to determine the
effect of its watershed improvement projects on water supplies in the basin).
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cussions with the Corps of Engineers eventually led to the modification of
the proposed Broken Bow Reservoir in Oklahoma to add storage for power
development and releases for power generation. 479 These releases would aug-
ment the natural low flows on Mountain Fork of the river system. This
change, in turn, facilitated the negotiation of the apportionment of the water
in Reach II of the basin.
Detailed written statements of interests were obtained from the Corps of
Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Soil Conservation Service, the
Southwest Power Administration, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau
of Land Management, the USGS, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 480 The
time-consuming data collection process nearly became a self-defeating en-
deavor. In addition, there was a continual need to update the data as time
passed and as development of the basin continued. The years devoted to
collecting and assessing data nearly equaled the average of those required
to negotiate the entire compacts for other river basins.48' The gathering of
information almost seemed to become a mechanism to avoid the tough de-
cision-making process before the commission. 482
During the Beckman years of the negotiations, disputes erupted between
Oklahoma and Texas over the utilization of the water of the Salt Fork in
the western portion of the basin. Local citizens, city officials, and private
organizations in Altus, Oklahoma, had long been interested in developing
the Mangum Project to augment the W. C. Austin Project on the Salt Fork
in Oklahoma. 4 3 In October of 1958, the Texas Water Board unanimously
479. See Minutes of 20th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 464, at 3; Minutes of 21st Meeting
of RRCNC, at 2-3 (Sept. 28-29, 1960); Tentative Draft of RRCNC Eng'g Advisory Comm.
Report, supra note 475, at 17; Minutes of 24th Meeting of RRCNC, at 4 (Jan. 17-18, 1962).
Since the negotiators anticipated construction in the future of several other reservoirs on tri-
butaries of the Red River that will also augment low flows, they decided not to mention the
Broken Bow Reservoir specifically in the compact as an important source of enlarged low-
water flow. Minutes of 24th Meeting, supra, at 4.
480. See Letter by Douglas G. Wright, Adm'r of Southwestern Power Admin., U.S. Dep't
of Interior, to Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman (Oct. 7, 1957); Statement of the U.S.
Dep't of Army, supra note 11; Statement of Dep't of Interior, supra note 11; Letter from
John A. Short, River Basin Rep., U.S. Dep't of Agriculture (USDA), Soil Conservation Service
(SCS), to Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, at 1-3 (Mar. 6, 1959); Statement of Interests
of U.S. Dep't of Interior in Areas Being Considered for Interstate Compact Negotiation, at
1-10 (July 31, 1959) [hereinafter cited as Statement of DOI Interests dated July 31, 1959];
Letter from Jerome Svore, Regional Program Director, U.S. Public Health Serv., U.S. Dep't
of Health, Education & Welfare (HEW), to Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman (Nov. 12,
1959); Letter from A.A. Fischback, Jr., District Engineer, USGS, U.S. Dep't. of Interior, to
Forrest Nelson, OWRB, at 1-2 (Jan. 5, 1960); U.S. Bureau of Reclamation: Revision of 1959
Data Submitted Through Southwest Field Committee to RRCNC, at 1-2 (May 1960); U.S.
Corps of Eng'rs Projects Water Requirements for Navigation, Power, Water Supply, and Low
Flow Releases (Apr. 20, 1962).
481. See Beckman Letter to Red River Valley Ass'n, supra note 37, at 2.
482. See Letter from Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to Okla. Comm'r Guy James,
at I (Mar. 14, 1960).
483. See Letter from Mrs. Mattye Wilson Williams, Manager, Altus, Okla. Chamber of
Commerce to M.G. Barclay, Area Engineer, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Oct. 29, 1958); Letter
from James P. Garrett, Executive Director, The Mangum Project, Supplementing the W.C.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
approved the water right permit application filed by the Green Belt Mu-
nicipal and Industrial Water District of Texas to build a reservoir on the
Salt Fork in Texas. 414 Construction of the reservoir in Texas would intercept
about two-thirds of the total amount of water flowing into Oklahoma, thereby
jeopardizing the development of the proposed lake near Mangum, Okla-
homa.415 Officials of the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal agency primarily
involved in the Mangum and W. C. Austin projects, urged local interests
in Altus, Oklahoma, to work through their representative to the Red River
Compact negotiations to try to resolve the problem posed by the proposed
reservoir in Texas. 4 6 Unfortunately, just as preliminary discussions between
the Oklahoma and Texas representatives to the compact negotiations were
about to get under way, both individuals left the negotiation commission.487
Delay on the part of Texas in naming another commissioner then handi-
capped the work of the commission. 411
In sum, the six years during which Henry Beckman chaired the negoti-
ations were devoted either to (1) the collection and evaluation of information
or (2) consideration of the general features of the contemplated compact
that were not dependent on the apportionment of the waters of the Red
River system. The negotiators and their advisers labored over the organi-
zation, the composition, the range of authority, and the duties of the in-
terstate entity that would administer the compact; a method of resolving tie
votes by the administrative entity; investigations and findings of fact by the
administrative body; methods of financing the work of the entity; waiver
of the sovereign immunity of the United States in lawsuits arising under the
compact; conferral of jurisdiction of certain interstate pollution cases upon
the federal district courts; and the draft legislation by which Congress would
consent to the compact. 489 If anything, the legal advisers were too efficient
and too meticulous. At times their work caused the negotiators to become
bogged down in legal aspects of the compact that were not central to its
Austin Project to Develop the Waters of Salt Fork of Red River, to Francis Borelli, Director,
OWRB (Apr. 3, 1959).
484. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Revision of 1959 Data, supra note 480, at 1-2. See
also Texas Water Rep. (Oct. 9, 1958).
485. See 5 Texas Water Rep., supra note 484; Letter from M.G. Barclay, Area Engineer,
Bureau of Reclamation, to Mattye Wilson Williams, Manager, Altus, Okla. Chamber of Com-
merce, at 2 (Nov. 3, 1958).
486. See Barclay Letter dated Nov. 3, 1958, supra note 485, at 2.
487. Texas terminated the services of RRCNC representative John J. Ledbetter as of Dec.
31, 1958. See Minutes of 13th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 474, at 1-2. Buster Cole, an
attorney from Bonham, Tex., and Guy James of Oklahoma City were later seated as the new
representatives of Texas and Oklahoma, respectively, to the RRCNC. See 16 Texas Water Rep.,
at 5 (Nov. 1959).
488. See Minutes of 14th Meeting of RRCNC, at 2 (Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1959). See also Letter
from Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to Texas Governor Price Daniel (Apr. 3, 1959).
Commissioner Ledbetter had been designated by former Texas Governor Allan Shivers. Id.
489. See, e.g., Report by Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to the President of the
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formulation.49° The preoccupation of the legal advisers with the issues in-
volving sovereign immunity and federal district court jurisdiction of inter-
state pollution cases may have caused them to overlook the importance of
the development of the federal-interstate compact model.4 9' In any event,
when Henry Beckman died in December, 1962, the negotiation of the ap-
portionment provisions of the compact had hardly begun.
The Role of the Army Corps of Engineers
Approximately nine months after Beckman's death, the President of the
United States appointed Major General Ellsworth Davis, United States Army
Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg, Mississippi Division, as the new RRCNC
chairman.4 92 The primary focus of the commission from 1963 until 1978 was
the negotiation and completion of the apportionment provisions of the com-
pact. The many difficulties encountered during this process are described in
the overview of the compact negotiations set forth earlier. A secondary goal
was redrafting the pollution provisions, written during the Beckman years,
in light of the recent amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act.493 A third goal was the preparation of the Engineering Report and the
Supplemental Interpretive Comments by the technical advisory committees. 494
Unfortunately, Major General Davis was only the first in a series of six
different officers of the Corps of Engineers who were to be named as federal
representative and chair of the negotiation commission between 1963 and
1978. 491 The frequent change of the federal representative was only part of
a larger problem of turnover that frustrated the work of the negotiation
490. See, e.g., Letter from Perry Morton, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Henry C. Beckman,
RRCNC Chairman, supra note 460, at 3; Memorandum from Richard Huff, Chairman, RRCNC
Legal Advisory Comm., to RRCNC Members (Mar. 17, 1959); Minutes of 16th Meeting of
RRCNC, supra note 462, at 3. The RRCNC devoted many hours to a discussion of legal
problems involving questions of "standing" and "fact-finding authority" of the permanent
compact administrative agency, even though no substantive negotiations had begun. See Letter
from Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, to RRCNC Members, at 1-2 (Oct. 2, 1959).
491. See, e.g., Memorandum from Richard Huff, Chairman, RRCNC Legal Advisory Comm.,
to Homer Belanger, Louisiana Representative to RRCNC Legal Advisory Comm., at 1-2 (Jan.
15, 1962); Minutes of 24th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 479, at 3.
492. See Minutes of 27th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 475, at 1. Major General Davis
treated the first meeting which he chaired as the initial meeting of the "reconstituted" RRCNC.
Id.
493. See Minutes of 38th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 38, at 3.
494. See Letter from Fred Simpson, P.E., OWRB, to Glade Kirkpatrick (Aug. 19, 1969);
Minutes of 42d Meeting of RRCNC (Nov. 19, 1969).
495. See Program of 60th Meeting of RRCNC and Red River Compact Signing Ceremony
2 (May 11-12, 1978). The other officers of the Corps of Engineers who were named federal
representative and chairman were R.G. MacDonnell, A.P. Rollins, Jr., Charles C. Noble, F.P.
Koisch, and R.C. Marshall, who presided over the signing ceremony at Denison Dam. Id. In
addition, Fred Bayley III, another Corps official, served as acting chairman at the 56th, 57th,
and 58th meetings of the RRCNC. See Minutes of 56th Meeting of RRCNC, at 1 (Apr. 28,
1977); Minutes of 57th Meeting of RRCNC, at 1 (June 29, 1977); Minutes of 59th Meeting
of RRCNC, at I (Feb. 16, 1978).
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commission. Texas was represented on the negotiation commission by eleven
different individuals between August, 1955 and December, 1980.496 Okla-
homa changed its representative five times, and Arkansas was represented
by six different individuals. 497 Louisiana was the only state that was able to
maintain continuity of representation. Louisiana was represented by three
different commissioners, the latter two having served on the Engineering
Advisory Committee prior to becoming a commissioner 9.4 8 The technical ad-
visory committees encountered similar problems with membership changes.
The turnover of commissioners and technical advisers typically delayed com-
mission work while the newly designated individuals were becoming oriented
to the mission and progress of the negotiation commission.
499
A draft of the Red River Compact was tentatively approved by the com-
mission for review by state and federal agencies at its thirty-sixth meeting
on February 21, 1966.00 However, the major turnover of representation to
the commission and a change in negotiating posture on the part of some
of the states caused the resurfacing of problems that had been plastered over
by the draft agreement. 10'
For example, when Winthrop Rockefeller was elected Governor of Ar-
kansas, that state not only replaced its representative to the commission but
also dramatically changed its negotiating posture.50 Arkansas adopted a "team
approach," sending not only its negotiating commissioner but also Dr. Leslie
Mack, the Governor's adviser on water resources, and several other state
496. Between 1956 and 1978, Texas was represented on the RRCNC by the following men:
John J. Ledbetter, Durwood Manford (Acting), R.M. Dixon (Acting), Buster Cole, R. Leighton
McKinney, W.R. Bryant, Ralph Elliott, Deskin Wells, Judge Otha Dent, and Fred Parkey.
See Program of 60th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 495, at 2. In addition, still another
representative, Kenneth E. Nelson, was authorized to represent Texas at the 61st meeting of
the RRCNC held after the signing ceremony and prior to congressional approval of the compact.
See Minutes of 61st Meeting of RRCNC, at 1 (Sept. 19, 1979).
497. The Oklahoma representatives were Ira C. Husky, Francis J. Borelli, Guy H. James,
Guy N. Keith, and Orville B. Saunders. See Program of 60th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note
495, at 2. The men who served as commissioners from Arkansas included Leonard N. White,
Ewing Kinkead, W. Glenn Francis, A.J. Troxell, S. Keith Jackson, and John P. Saxton, Id.
498. Louisiana's commissioners were Calvin T. Watts, Daniel V. Cresap, and Arthur R.
Theis. Id. See Minutes of 42d Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 494, at 4 & enclosure 1; Letter
from Louisiana Governor John J. McKeithen to Major General A.P. Rollins, Jr., RRCNC
Chairman (Dec. 22, 1969); Minutes of 58th meeting of RRCNC, at 1 (Aug. 11, 1977); Minutes
of 59th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 495, app., attendance list.
499. See, e.g., Minutes of 13th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 474, at 1, 4; Minutes of
14th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 488, at 1-2. See also Minutes of 37th Meeting of RRCNC,
at 3-4 (Sept. 15, 1966); Minutes of 38th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 38, at 1, 5-6; Minutes
of 39th Meeting of RRCNC, at 2-4 (June 23, 1967).
500. See Minutes of 36th Meeting of RRCNC, at 1 (Feb. 21, 1966).
501. See Minutes of 37th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 499, at 1-4; Minutes of 38th
Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 38, at 2-8 Minutes of 39th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note
499, at 1-4; Minutes of 40th Meeting of RRCNC, at 1-3 (Sept. 14, 1967); Letter from Guy
N. Keith, OWRB, to John Bliss, Consulting Engineer (Jan. 4, 1968); Letter from John Bliss
to Guy N. Keith, at 1 (Jan. 12, 1968).
502. See Minutes of 39th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 499, at 2.
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officials to the meetings of the commission and the advisory committees. 03
Beginning with the Rockefeller administration, the Arkansas commissioner
and advisers seemed to become more aggressive in asserting Arkansas' in-
terests in a share of the water; some even accused Arkansas of being ob-
structionist. 04
The vigilance on the part of Arkansas in protecting its interests continued
in 1972 with the appointment of John Saxton as the Arkansas commis-
sioner. 55 Arkansas' insistence upon language in the compact that would
protect future development in the basin, including navigation to Index, Ar-
kansas, threatened to unravel the agreement through the fifty-ninth meeting
of the commission. In the end, Arkansas agreed to compromise language
governing the use of the water in Reach II of the basin506
During the period between 1963 and 1976, problems also intensified be-
tween Oklahoma and Texas over the use of the water in the western portion
of Reach I, the part of the Red River system that extends from the New
Mexico-Texas state boundary to Denison Dam. Oklahomans protested the
continued development of dams and reservoirs by Texas on interstate streams
flowing from Texas into Oklahoma. 07 Texas water officials refused to rec-
ognize any Oklahoma claims to water originating in Texas, maintaining
that the water supply falling on Texas' soil was the property of Texas and
its citizens and could be used for any purpose approved by Texas. 508 Okla-
homa water officials countered that Oklahomans in the area of Altus, Okla-
homa, had perfected water rights to the interstate streams based upon the
appropriation doctrine and expected Texas to respect those rights. 5°9 There-
503. See Minutes of 35th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 25, at 1; Minutes of 38th Meeting,
supra note 38, at 1, 5-6; Minutes of 39th Meeting, supra note 499, at 3.
504. See, e.g., Minutes of 37th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 499, at 3-4; Minutes of
39th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 499, at 2. The aggressive posture of the Arkansas ne-
gotiating team later culminated in a formal statement to the RRCNC by the Arkansas rep-
resentative in November, 1973 acknowledging that "some [feel Arkansas is] being obstructionist
towards the negotiation of a compact and . . . unreasonable in [its] refusal to accept earlier
proposals regarding the allocation of waters between Arkansas and Louisiana in Reach IV."
Minutes of 48th Meeting of RRCNC, enclosure 2, supra note 66, at 1.
505. See Minutes of 45th Meeting of RRCNC, at 1 (Sept. 15, 1972); Minutes of 48th Meeting
of RRCNC, enclosure 2, supra note 66, at 1; Minutes of 54th Meeting of RRCNC, at 2 &
attached proposal (Sept. 1-2, 1976); Minutes of 55th Meeting of RRCNC, at 2-4 (Mar. 16,
1977); Minutes of 56th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 495, at 2; Minutes of 58th Meeting
of RRCNC, supra note 498, at 2-4.
506. See Red River Compact, art. V, § 5.05(c), 94 Stat. 3312.
507. See, e.g., Letter from Joe D. Carter, Chairman, Texas Water Comm'n, to Charles E.
Engleman, Chairman, Foss Reservoir Master Conservancy Dist., Clinton, Okla. (May 31, 1963).
508. Id. However, the Supreme Court has held that the mere fact that a river originates in
an upstream state does not automatically entitle the upstream state to a share of the river's
waters. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 181 n.8 (1982) (remanding case to the Special
Master for additional specific findings). Accord, Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S.Ct. 2433,
2442 (rejecting the notion that the mere fact that the Vermejo River originates in Colorado
automatically entitles Colorado to a share of the river's waters and dismissing Colorado's case
for failure to carry its burden of proof), reh'g denied, 105 S.Ct. 19 (1984).
509. See General Statement of 30th Meeting of RRCNC, at 4-5 (June 16, 1964).
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fore, Oklahoma water officials asserted, no encroachments upon the "Okla-
homa supply" in the interstate streams should be made for irrigation and
recreation by Texans.5
10
A number of proposals and counterproposals to apportion the water in
this reach of the river system were made by Oklahoma and Texas. The
possibility of modifying the Canadian River Compact to alleviate possible
water shortages in the Texas Panhandle was considered and rejected by the
compact negotiators.51' The suggestion of including in the compact a "sliding
scale for development of irrigation" along the interstate tributaries origi-




In April of 1965 the city of Altus, Oklahoma, threatened Texas with
litigation over a proposed development by Texans on Sweetwater Creek.513
Because of the portent of litigation, Texas delayed the presentation of its
studies of water utilization on one of the tributaries of the river in this
area. 1 4 Meanwhile, the Oklahoma representative to the RRCNC was accused
of "forsaking" the Lugert-Altus Irrigation District and of "giving away




511. See Draft Transcript of 34th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 25, at 32-33. Because of
the low rainfall pattern of the westernmost portions of Reach I of the watershed, Oklahomans
were especially concerned about proposed developments by Texans on a number of tributaries
in the Texas Panhandle that extend into Oklahoma, including Salt Fork, North Fork, Elm
Fork, and Sweetwater Creek. Id. at 23-32. Oklahoma was primarily concerned with the reservoir
capacities of proposed Texas developments on Sweetwater Creek and the North Fork of the
Red River, each of which provides some of the water supply of the Lugert-Altus Reservoir
Project in Oklahoma. Id. at 24-29. See also supra text accompanying notes 60-64, and infra
text accompanying notes 566, 576-578. The idea of amending the Canadian River Compact
was complicated by the fact that New Mexico is a party to that compact. Draft Transcript of
34th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 25, at 33.
512. See Minutes of RRCNC Eng'g Advisory Comm. Meeting, at 2 (Mar. 30, 1970). Com-
missioner Guy Keith of Oklahoma advanced the sliding-scale proposal that Texas rejected on
the basis that "this would take care of itself and should not be written into the compact."
Id.
513. See Draft Transcript of 34th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 25, at 31. Historically,
the Lugert-Altus Reservoir has experienced a sediment problem. Id. at 24. The U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation reportedly estimated that without upstream development, Lugert-Altus Reservoir
would lose 40,433 acre-feet of reservoir capacity due to silting between 1962 and 2012. Id. at
14. Texas maintained that the useful life of the Lugert-Altus Reservoir would be extended with
the construction of one or both reservoirs proposed by Texas on the North Fork and Sweetwater
Creek. Id. at 24-30. Oklahoma did not object to all upstream reservoir development in Texas
since some upstream development would reduce the silting problem. Id. The disagreement was
over the capacity of the upstream reservoirs on Sweetwater Creek and North Fork. Id. The
application pending before the Texas Water Commission in April, 1965 was for a water permit
for a project on Sweetwater Creek with 90,000 acre-feet of storage. Id. at 31. Oklahoma
apparently was negotiating on the basis of 35,000 acre-feet of storage for the same project.
Id.
514. Id. at 30-31.
515. See Letter from Guy Keith, Oklahoma Comm'r, to Robert Harbison, Attorney for
Lugert-Altus Irrigation Dist., at 1 (Mar. 4, 1970).
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Legal counsel for the Irrigation District also vigorously protested devel-
opment by Texas on the North Fork above the Lugert-Altus dam site.516 He
pointed out that the original 1938 survey and report, upon which the Lugert-
Altus project was based, clearly disclosed that the Bureau of Reclamation
contemplated the utilization by the project of all of the water of the entire
2,560 square miles of watershed in Oklahoma and Texas of the North Fork
above the dam site; moreover, the construction of the project was justified
on the basis of 100-year benefits accruing to the region and the nation.
5 17
The attorney for the Irrigation District argued that the western appropriation
doctrine, public policy, and general welfare condemned upstream appro-
priators in Texas from taking water of an interstate stream and destroying
the economic feasibility of a prior downstream appropriation in Okla-
homa. 18
In the view of Oklahomans, strictly recreational lakes or evaporation ponds
built by Texans were "luxuries in a water short area. '" 19 Throughout this
period, Texas water officials "unswervingly adhered" to the position that
water originating in Texas belonged to Texans and was in no way dedicated
to other states into which the waters might flow.
5 20
When a Soil Conservation Service plan was proposed for the construction
in Texas of the McClellan Creek Watershed Project, Oklahoma water of-
ficials were successful in getting the congressional delegation from Oklahoma
to exercise a "hold" on the project pending the approval by Oklahoma of
the plan.5 2' Information assembled by Oklahoma water officials and the U.S.
516. See Letter from Robert Harbison, Attorney for Lugert-Altus Irrigation Dist., to Guy
Keith, Oklahoma Comm'r, at 2-4 (Apr. 4, 1972).
517. Id. at 2. For additional background on the W.C. Austin Project and the Lugert-Altus
Reservoir, see Letter from K.B. Shroeder, Planning Officer, U.S. Water Resources Council,
to Fred Bayley III, RRCNC Acting Chairman, at I (July 7, 1977). Since the W.C. Austin
Project was completed in 1949 and was justified for federal construction on the basis of 100-
year benefits accruing to the region and the nation, Shroeder intimated that there should be
no development that would adversely affect the project until 2049, long after the outstanding
bonded indebtedness had been retired in 1990. See id. at 1.
518. See Letter from Robert Harbison dated Apr. 4, 1972, supra note 516, at 3-4. For an
analysis of the doctrine of equitable apportionment and the Supreme Court's decisions in cases
involving the allocation of waters of interstate streams, see supra text accompanying notes 188-
215. Although the burden of proof on the complainant state is a difficult one to carry, available
evidence of the economic development in this area suggests that Oklahoma should have prevailed
in an original action against Texas for the equitable apportionment of the water of the North
Fork and other tributaries upstream from the Lugert-Altus Reservoir in view of the weight the
Court previously had attached to the protection of established water-dependent economies in
semiarid regions. It should be noted that a legal statement similar to Harbison's position had
been asserted by the Oklahoma commissioner during the negotiations with Texas. See, e.g.,
Letter from Guy Keith, Oklahoma Comm'r, to Ralph Elliott, Texas Comm'r, at 2 (Sept. 28,
1971).
519. Letter from Guy Keith, Oklahoma Comm'r, to Major General Charles C. Noble, Chair-
man, RRCNC (Feb. 22, 1972).
520. See Letter from Robert Harbison, supra note 516, at 1. But see Colorado v. New
Mexico, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 2442, reh'g denied, 105 S.Ct. 19 (1984); 459 U.S. 176, 181 n.8 (1982).
521. See Letter from Guy Keith, Oklahoma Comm'r, to Gary Dage, Legislative Assistant
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Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, indicated that devel-
opment of the McClellan Creek Watershed Project would materially reduce
yields of the water supply on the North Folk to Altus, Oklahoma and the
Lugert-Altus Irrigation District, thereby impairing the ability of the Irri-
gation District to repay the costs of the W. C. Austin Project by some
$24,000 per year for the twenty years remaining under the contract with the
federal government. 22 Oklahoma officials refused to release the hold until
Texas agreed that any water impounded on the McClellan Creek would be-
come part of the Texas allocation of such waters under any future compact
for the Red River. Texas conceded, and Oklahoma gave its conditional ap-
proval to the McClellan project during the spring of 1970.523
Many alternatives for apportioning the water of Reach I continued to be
proposed by Texas and Oklahoma. When no voluntary agreement seemed
possible by the fall of 1970, Texas and Oklahoma began exploring a
"friendly" suit to obtain an equitable apportionment of the water of the
North Fork.524 If the outcome of the friendly litigation was unfavorable to
Oklahoma, then its state water officials planned to request financial relief
from the federal government for the retirement of the outstanding bonded
indebtedness of the W. C. Austin Project. If the findings were favorable
to Oklahoma and unfavorable to Texas, then any reduction in Texas' re-
quested share of the water of the North Fork could be made up from other
streams in Reach 1.525
When no agreement had been reached between Oklahoma and Texas by
August, 1973, the attorney for the Lugert-Altus Irrigation District suggested
that "the compact recognize that litigation would be required, and that,
subsequent to the litigation, the water would be allocated in accordance with
the decision of the court. '526 The federal representative and chairman of
the RRCNC at that time urged the two states to reach a voluntary agreement
on the division of the water of the North Fork rather than recognize liti-
gation in the compact.5 27 In addition, in November, 1973 the Legal Advisory
to U.S. Senator Fred Harris (Apr. 7, 1970); Letter from Guy Keith, Oklahoma Comm'r, to
Oklahoma Governor Dewey F. Bartlett (Apr. 7, 1970); Letter from Guy Keith, Oklahoma
Comm'r, to U.S. Senator Jennings Randolph, Chairman, U.S. Senate Public Works Comm.,
at 1-2 (July 21, 1970).
522. See Letter from Guy Keith to Gary Dage, supra note 521. As previously discussed in the
text accompanying notes 60-64 supra, Lugert-Altus Reservoir and the W.C. Austin Project was a
concern of the U.S. Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation. The McClellan Creek
Watershed Project was sponsored by the Soil Conservation Service within the U.S. Department
of Agriculture. See Letter from Guy Keith to Senator Jennings Randolph, supra note 521, at 1.
523. See Letter from Guy Keith to Governor Dewey F. Bartlett, supra note 521. See also
Letter from Guy Keith to Senator Jennings Randolph, supra note 521, at 1-2.
524. See Minutes of 43d Meeting of RRCNC, at 1-2 (Sept. 25, 1970).
525. Id. See also Memorandum from Guy Keith, Oklahoma Comm'r, to Ralph Elliott, Texas
Comm'r, and Robert Harbison, Attorney for Lugert-Altus Irrigation Dist., at 1-2 (Sept. 30,
1970).
526. Minutes of 47th Meeting of RRCNC, at 1 (Aug. 3, 1973).
527. Id. at 2.
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Committee recommended that the negotiating states not recognize in the
draft compact that litigation would be required to resolve the interstate dif-
ferences over the North Fork.52 Although the commissioners from Texas
and Oklahoma expressed optimism that the difficulties could be resolved,
no solution was found until September, 1976.529 The presentation and ap-
proval at the fifty-fourth meeting of the RRCNC in September, 1976 of a
new draft article apportioning the water of Reach I was a major break-
through in the negotiations that permitted the compact negotiations to ad-
vance to their successful conclusion in 1978.530
The protracted negotiations were finally concluded with the signing of the
compact by the negotiating commissioners on May 12, 1978, at Denison
Dam on the Oklahoma-Texas border. The compact was then ratified by the
legislatures of the four signatory states with no apparent difficulty. Louisiana
enacted the compact into law the same year that it was signed, and the
legislatures of Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, which convened in odd-
numbered years, approved the compact in 1979.
5 1
1
Congressional Consideration and Approval of the Compact
As ratified by the states, the compact was to become effective, binding,
and obligatory when, and only when, the consent of the United States to
the compact had been given by congressional enactment of legislation con-
taining certain precise language relating to a partial waiver of sovereign
immunity of the United States and the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts in certain cases arising under the compact.
5 32
The compact was officially reviewed by all interested federal agencies un-
der the coordination of the Office of Management and Budget. Language
concerning the partial waiver of the sovereign immunity of the federal gov-
ernment, which was contained in the ratification bills introduced by Senator
Long of Louisiana and Congressman Hall of Texas on January 28, 1980,
and April 29, 1980, respectively, proved to be somewhat troublesome to the
Department of Justice and the Corps of Engineers. Accordingly, the De-
partment of Justice recommended to the House Subcommittee on Admin-
528. See Minutes of 48th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 66, at 1. The negotiators from
Texas and Oklahoma went on record at this meeting expressing their optimism that the dif-
ficulties involved in the allocation of the water of the North Fork and Sweetwater Creek could
be resolved. Id.
529. See Minutes of 54th Meeting of RRCNC, at 2 (Sept. 1-2, 1976). Only two years earlier,
the chairman of the RRCNC Engineering Advisory Committee had listed these options for the
negotiators: (1) omit the North Fork from the compact; (2) litigate and mutually press for an
early decision; and (3) continue to work toward mutual agreement within the compact. See
Minutes of 49th Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 25, at 1.
530. See supra text accompanying note 1. For a discussion of the final compact provisions
governing the apportionment of water in Reach I, see infra text accompanying notes 566-578.
531. See supra note 7. For a description of the legislative calendars, see Minutes of 28th
Meeting of RRCNC, supra note 440, at 1.
532. Red River Compact, art. XIII, § 13.02, 94 Stat. at 3319.
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istrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Judiciary Committee
that the bill be amended to clarify the limited waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. 3
3
The House Subcommittee conducted a one-day hearing on the compact
on November 13, 1980. Witnesses appearing at the hearing included a rep-
resentative of the Corps of Engineers, an assistant attorney general of Texas,
the general manager of the Red River Authority of Texas, the director of
the Northeast Texas Municipal Water District, the RRCNC commissioners
of Texas and Louisiana, and many others.53 4 The House Subcommittee re-
ceived statements from the Department of Interior and the U.S. Water Re-
sources Council, both of which urged ratification of the compact.
While considering the Red River Compact, the House Subcommittee also
heard testimony regarding the Caddo Lake Compact, which was proposed
by Texas and Louisiana as an adjunct to the Red River Compact. The pro-
posed Caddo Lake Compact, which was negotiated by the Red River Com-
pact commissioners representing Louisiana and Texas, without any direct
federal involvement, governs the use and apportionment of the water of the
Caddo Lake, a natural lake on a Red River tributary known as Twelve Mile
Bayou. 535 Since the Red River Compact did not include a detailed appor-
tionment of Caddo Lake itself, the Caddo Lake Compact was proposed as
a "further refinement and definition of the intention of Louisiana and Texas
to appropriate and protect waters of this lake. 5 36 Both the Corps of En-
gineers and the Department of Justice urged that action be deferred on the
Caddo Lake Compact until it had undergone full administration review,
particularly in view of provisions in the compact that dealt with raising the
spillway elevation. 5 7 Citizen groups from the Caddo Lake area also ex-
pressed concern over the compact and urged that a full environmental impact
study be undertaken prior to congressional ratification of the agreement. 38
Ultimately, Congress deferred action on the Caddo Lake Compact.
533. See Letter from Alan A. Parker, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Hon. Peter Rodino, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S.
House of Representatives, at 1-2 (Nov. 12, 1980) [hereinafter cited as DOJ Letter].
534. See 126 CONG. REC. H11386 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980).
535. Id.
536. Red River Compact and Caddo Lake Compact: Hearings on H.R. 7205 and H.R. 7206
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980) (statement by Arthur Theis of Louisiana).
537. See id. at 1-2 and Hearings, Statement by Col. Laubscher, supra note 14, at 8-9. The
Caddo Lake Compact expressed the intention of the two signatory states to enlarge Caddo
Lake by raising the spillway level two feet, a proposal that generated a number of concerns,
including compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and with the permit
requirements of section 9 of the River and Harbors Act of 1899 and section 404 of thE Clean
Water Act. See DOJ Letter of Nov. 12, 1980, supra note 533, at 2; Hearings, Statement by
Col. Laubscher, supra, at 9.
538. See 126 CONG. REc. H11386 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980). Another problem with the Caddo
Lake Compact was the somewhat confusing and ambiguous language contained therein, which
raised "serious questions as to whether or not the residents on the Texas side of Caddo Lake
would receive fair market value for their property if it is taken by the raising of the spillway."
[Vol. 38:1
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The consent bill for the Red River Compact was amended with the "tech-
nical clarification" proposed by the Department of Justice, and the amended
bill was then passed by the Congress. The compact became effective when
President Carter signed the consent legislation on December 22, 1980. 59
VI. An Analysis of the Red River Compact
The Structure of the Compact
The Red River Compact consists of thirteen articles. Article I describes
the multiple purposes the states ultimately seek to advance with the compact,
which are:
(a) To promote interstate comity and remove causes of contro-
versy between each of the affected states by governing the
use, control and distribution of the interstate water of the
Red River and its tributaries;
(b) To provide an equitable apportionmhent among the Signatory
States of the water of the Red River and its tributaries;
(c) To promote an active program for the control and alleviation
of natural deterioration and pollution of the water of the Red
River Basin and to provide for enforcement of the laws re-
lated thereto;
(d) To provide the means for an active program for the con-
servation of water, protection of lives and property from
floods, improvement of water quality, development of nav-
igation and regulation of flows in the Red River Basin; and
(e) To provide a basis for state or joint state planning and action
by ascertaining and identifying each state's share in the in-
terstate water of the Red River Basin and the apportionment
thereof.140
Article II contains several important substantive provisions governing the
use of water and the implementation of the compact. In addition, article
II divides the Red River system into five major subdivisions-or "reaches"-
for purposes of allocating the water among the signatory states. Fourteen
key terms are defined in article III. The apportionment of the water of the
five reaches of the river is delineated in articles IV through VIII.
Article IX sets forth the provisions for the administration of the compact
by an interstate agency known as the "Red River Compact Commission"
(RRCC). The powers and duties of the Commission are described in article
X. The dual problems of controlling pollution and alleviating the natural
deterioration of the water of the basin are addressed by article XI.
Id. For a discussion of the federal navigational servitude and the rule of no compensation,
see Morreale, supra note 337, at 19-63.
539. See supra note 8.
540. Red River Compact, art. I, 94 Stat. 3305-06.
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Procedures for terminating or amending the compact and the legal effect
of termination upon existing water rights are provided in article XII. The
thirteenth and final article specifies the conditions for the ratification and
effective date of the compact.
General Compact Provisions Governing the Use of Water
The general provisions set forth in article II governing the use of water
by the signatory states apply in the absence of more specific provisions
delineated elsewhere in the compact. Foremost among the general provisions
is the freedom of each state to use the water allocated to it in any manner
it deems "beneficial." '54' The autonomy of each signatory state to control
the internal administration of its share of water is thus preserved. The right
of a signatory state to freely administer its water rights and uses is limited
only by the apportionment of the water made by the compact, the actual
availability of water within the basin, and the authority of the federal gov-
ernment over water. Subject to these constraints, each state may maintain
its existing water law system or modify its water rights laws as the state
deems appropriate. Even though other provisions of the compact require an
upstream state to take certain affirmative steps during periods of water short-
ages to assure water deliveries to downstream states, no attempt is made to
dictate to an upstream state how this will be accomplished.
42
The autonomy of each state is buttressed by several other provisions, one
of which appears to preserve the status quo relative to water rights existing
within each state as of December 22, 1980. The compact stipulates that its
provisions shall be construed neither to alter, impair, or increase water rights
recognized under state laws on the effective date of the compact, nor to
validate or prejudice these rights.
5 43
Each state also remains free to construct conservation storage capacity
for the impoundment of water allocated to it by the compact. Moreover,
if any storage capacity recognized or authorized by the compact is rendered
unusable due to any cause, including sedimentation, the lost storage capacity
may be replaced by the state within the same geographical area.
5"
The authority of a state to regulate the quality of water within its juris-
diction parallels its right to regulate the appropriation, use, and control of
these waters. Therefore, a signatory state may regulate the quality of water
within its boundaries so long as the regulations are not inconsistent with
541. Id., art. II, § 2.01, 94 Stat. 3306. "Beneficial use" is a concept particularly associated
with the appropriation doctrine. See generally 1 HUTCMNs, NiNETEN \WEsTERN STATEs, supra
note 51, at 493-503. The compact is silent upon what legal ramifications ensue if a state does
not designate which uses are "beneficial" for purposes of the compact. Moreover, it is not
clear whether the riparian rights concept of "reasonable use" is coextensive with the concept
of "beneficial use" in the event a riparian rights state fails to determine formally which uses
are beneficial.
542. Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 5-6.
543. Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.14, 94 Stat. 3307.
544. Id. § 2.05(a), (b), 94 Stat. 3306.
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the obligations of the state under the compact or under federal water quality
laws. A state may impose additional restrictions to reduce or abate the deg-
radation of water within its jurisdiction if the more stringent water quality
regulations do not alter the apportionment of water made by the compact.5 41
In computing the delivery of water in the various reaches of the river
system, water consumed for livestock or domestic purposes is not included
within the total amount apportioned among the member states. The ex-
emption does not extend to the impoundment of water for livestock or do-
mestic purposes in excess of 200 acre-feet.5 46 Thus, as a practical matter,
commercial feedlot operations and rural or urban water distribution systems
are not exempted. 47 The exemption for livestock and domestic usage was
adopted because the laws of Oklahoma and Texas in effect at the time the
compact was approved exempted water used for livestock and domestic pur-
poses from their systems of state water rights administration.5 48 The deter-
mination of whether a particular use qualifies as "livestock or domestic"
is made by reference to the laws of the state in which the use is occurring.
This procedure recognizes existing practices .in some of the signatory states
and allows flexibility in state water rights administration.5 49 Since a 200 acre-
feet "cap" is imposed on impoundments covered by the exemption, the lack
of uniformity that may ensue should not seriously undermine the appor-
tionment of water made by the compact.
The compact affirms the freedom of each signatory state to use the bed
and banks of the Red River system to convey stored water, imported or
exported water, and water apportioned by the compact.550 The right to use
imported water is vested in the state importing the water into the Red River
basin."' 1 Should the need for an accounting arise, transmission losses must
be deducted at the point of removal of any stored water conveyed through
the channels of the river system.552 The cumulative effect of these provisions
is an implied authorization of the importation and exportation of water to
and from the Red River basin."' Any exportation of water, of course, would
545. Id. § 2.10(a), (b), 94 Stat. 3306-07.
546. Id. § 2.08, 94 Stat. 3306.
547. Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 6-7.
548. Id. at 6.
549. Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.08, 94 Stat. 3306. See also Supplemental Interpretive
Comments, supra note 21, at 7.
550. Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.05(d), 94 Stat. 3306. See also Supplemental Interpretive
Comments, supra note 21, at 6.
551. Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.09, 94 Stat. 3306. This provision was probably added
because case law in some riparian rights jurisdictions indicates that all waters that flow into
a natural stream "become part of that stream, and subject to the same natural rights as the
rest of the water." See CmBRET, supra note 44, at 386 (discussing Druley v. Adam, 102 Ill.
117 (1882)).
552. Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.03, 94 Stat. 3306.
553. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 6. A major concern in this
region is the depletion of the Ogallala Aquifer, the principle source of water for irrigation in
the high plains of west Texas and Oklahoma. Banks, Six-State High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer
Area Regional Studies, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK oF KANSAS CiTy, WESmRN WATER RE-
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be subject to the amount of water apportioned to each state and the avail-
ability of water within the system. Finally, the compact contemplates the
execution of a specific importation or exportation agreement by a signatory
state prior to the actual transfer of water
54
As a general rule, an accounting of the delivery and utilization of the
water of interstate streams is necessary only upon the demand of an affected
stateY55 Because of the financial burden placed upon the affected states, the
drafters of the compact did not envision that accounting would be under-
taken as a routine matter.
5 6
The compact neither waives the immunity of any signatory state under
the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States nor grants
the consent of any signatory state to be sued by its own citizens 5 7 The
sovereign immunity of each compacting state is therefore preserved.
Since the Red River Compact is an interstate compact rather than a fed-
eral-interstate compact, it does not impair or affect the powers, rights, or
obligations of the United States, or those claiming under its authority, in,
over, and to the water of the Red River basin. 58 Thus, the interests of the
federal government and the rights of the Indians who receive federal pro-
tection are not included in the apportionment of water made by the compact.
The use of water by the federal government in connection with a specific
federal project, of course, must be in compliance with the federal authorizing
act. Water consumed by a federal project will be charged against the share
of the state deriving the benefits from it. 59 The determination of which state
derives benefits from some projects may be difficult to make, and the com-
pact offers no guidance on this matter.
The omission of federal and Indian rights from the apportionment of
water in the river system and the failure to bind the federal government as
signatory party to the compact are two of the major weaknesses of the Red
River Compact. The federal government has no legal obligation under the
compact to ensure that federal activities and projects in the basin are co-
ordinated to the fullest extent possible with the conservation and develop-
ment programs of the signatory states. Although the Congress is free to
souRcEs: COMING PROBLEMS AND THE PoLIcY ALTERNATIv 49-52 (Symposium Sept. 27-28,
1979) [hereinafter cited as WEsrmR WATER REsouRcEs]. Also, the prospects of interstate,
interbasin transfers of water from the Arkansas, White and Red rivers to the semiarid high
plains states is an area of great concern to some Arkansans. See, e.g., Editorial, Foiling the
Water Rustlers, Ark. Gazette, Aug. 5, 1984, at 14B, col. 1. There were 146 interbasin transfers
in the western portion of the nation as of 1965, transferring more than 18 million acre-feet
per year. See Schad, Western Water Resources: Means to Augment the Supply, in WESTERN
WATER REsourcEs, supra, at 119. See generally U.S. ARM CORPS or ENo'Rs, SIx-STATE HIGH
PLAINS AQUIFER REGIONAL RESOURCES STUDY: WATER TRANSFER ELEMENTS (1982).
554. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 6.
555. Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.11, 94 Stat. 3307.
556. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 7.
557. Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.10(c), 94 Stat. 3306-07.
558. Id. § 2.07, 94 Stat. 3306.
559. Id. § 2.02. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 6.
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preempt the provisions of the compact, federal officials may feel a moral
obligation to recognize and leave intact the apportionment of water made
by the compact.
5 6
The failure of the compact negotiators to bind the federal government to
the terms of the compact is ameliorated slightly by the Denison Dam au-
thorizing legislation of 1938 and the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment to
the flood control acts of 1944 and subsequent years. As explained in part
IV, the 1938 legislation tries to preserve the status quo with regard to Okla-
homa and Texas water usage and water rights in existence above the site
of Denison Dam prior to the construction of the dam and reservoir.5 61 Pre-
sumably, any federal interests and any rights of Indians existing in the water
of the Red River system above Denison Dam prior to the construction of
the impoundment are also recognized.
As discussed previously, the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment affords lim-
ited protection to Oklahoma and Texas, both of which are bisected by the
ninety-eighth meridian.5 62 This amendment provides that the use by the fed-
eral government of water for navigation in federal projects covered by the
amendment shall not conflict with any beneficial consumptive use, present
or future, of such waters for domestic, municipal, stock water, irrigation,
mining, or industrial purposes in states lying wholly or partially west of the
ninety-eighth meridian.
5 63
Many .other federal interests and activities, such as those of the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, are not affected by the O'Mahoney-Milliken
Amendment, and the downstream states of Arkansas and Louisiana do not
receive comparable protection. Finally, the Congress is free within consti-
tutional limits to modify or repeal in whole or in part both the O'Mahoney-
Milliken Amendment and the special protection afforded by the 1938 leg-
islation authorizing the construction of Denison Dam. 64 In view of the po-
litical muscle exercised by representatives of the Red River basin states in
past years, any attempt to modify these two laws or to preempt the ap-
560. See Goslin, supra note 86, at 432.
561. See Act of June 28, 1938, ch. 795, 52 Stat. 1215, 1215-20 (1938). See also supra text
accompanying notes 350-355, 368, 372.
562. Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887, 889 (1944) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701-
1 (1982)). See also supra text accompanying notes 356-363.
563. See generally Gage, supra note 357, app. C, C-1 to C-15. See also Scoggins, supra note
361, at 1.
564. Federal authority over the nation's waters is discussed in part IV. For a discussion of
federal power in relation to the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment, see generally Gage, supra
note 357, at C-15, C-16. Cf. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 671, 674, 677 (1912) (explaining
in the context of an attempted repeal by Congress of the tax exemption [which was deemed
a property right by the Court] in the patents for Indian allotments under the Curtis Act the
"broad distinction ... between the power [of Congress] to abrogate a statute and the authority
to destroy rights acquired under such law"); Letter from Perry Morton, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, supra note 81, at 5 (discussing the legal ability of
Congress to withdraw its consent to an interstate compact and interpreting Choate v. Trapp
as holding "that a subsequent congressional revision could not impair vested rights obtained
as a result of Federal statute").
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portionment of water made by the compact would be met with intense re-
sistance.
The Apportionment of Water to the Signatory States
Articles IV through VIII of the Red River Compact delineate the ap-
portionment of the water of each of the five reaches of the river system.
Four of the five reaches are then further divided into subbasins, which either
consist of interstate or intrastate streams. The rules, including any special
provisions, governing the use of water within each subbasin are prescribed
in detail. The signatory states are allowed the full use of intrastate tribu-
taries. On interstate streams, the primary basis of apportioning the water
is the percentage-of-flow method, modified to reflect factors unique to each
subbasin or reach. The flow of water in interstate streams is generally ap-
portioned 60 percent to the upstream state and 40 percent to the downstream
state. Although the percentage-of-flow method superficially appears simple
to implement, it is one of the most difficult and expensive to administer. 65
Reach I-Red River System from the New Mexico-Texas State Boundary
to Denison Dam
The water of the Red River and its tributaries above Denison Dam is
apportioned to Oklahoma and Texas. Each state, of course, has the free
and unrestricted use of intrastate streams within the reach. The 60-40 method
apportions the waters of the interstate streams, which include the North
Fork, Salt Fork, Sweetwater Creek, Elm Creek, and the Washita River,
among others.56 Since rainfall in this reach is irregular and the flows are
primarily flood flows, an annual basis of accounting was chosen. 67
The water of the main stem of the Red River and Lake Texoma was
equally divided between Oklahoma and Texas, each state receiving an al-
location of 200,000 acre-feet of the storage of the lake 68 This apportionment
includes the water uses and allocations in existence when the compact was
565. See, e.g., Letter from Norman G. Flagg, Area Eng'rs, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau
of Reclamation, to Forrest Nelson, Executive Director, OWRB, at 1 (Oct. 17, 1969) (cautioning
Nelson of the expense and difficulty Flagg anticipated in policing the delivery of water in Reach
II of the Red River under the percentage-of-flow apportionment set forth in the draft compact
at that time. Compact administration in the interstate boundary reaches of the Red River would
be the most difficult.). During the course of their deliberations, the compact negotiators con-
sidered a number of methods that had been used in making water apportionments in the
compacts for river basins west of the Mississippi River: (1) percentage of available flow, (2)
priority of existing uses, (3) lump-sum volume, (4) inflow-outflow delivery schedule, and (5)
limitation of conservation storage capacity. See Minutes of 19th Meeting of RRCNC, at 2-3
(Apr. 19-20, 1960). Although each method has inherent advantages and disadvantages that are
either enhanced or exacerbated when applied to specific river basins, the apportionment method
expressed as a limitation on storage capacity is the easiest to administer. Id.
566. Red River Compact, art. IV, § 4.01(a), 94 Stat. 3308-09.
567. Id. § 4.01(b), 94 Stat. 3309. See also Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note
21, at 9-10.
568. Red River Compact, art. IV, § 4.04(b)(1), 94 Stat. 3309.
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approved. Additional quantities of flow from the main stem of the river
into Lake Texoma are apportioned 50-50 between the two states. 69 The
compact specifically affirms the right of Oklahoma and Texas to construct
storage or other facilities for the conservation and use of water on the Red
River above Denison Dam.170 It directs attention to the Denison Dam au-
thorizing legislation of 1938, which permits total upstream development by
Oklahoma and Texas of the inflows into Lake Texoma.
Arkansas and Louisiana cannot require Oklahoma and Texas to release
water from Lake Texoma to fulfill their needsY.7 However, power releases
from Denison Dam that are not earmarked for a particular use constitute
"undesignated flow" and must be passed by the upstream states during
periods of low flow for the benefit of the downstream states 272
Hydrological data assembled by the Engineering Advisory Committee and
used by the compact negotiators indicate that Oklahoma actually contributed
"significantly more than fifty percent" of the water flowing into this portion
of the main stem of the Red River and Lake Texoma. 73 Logically, Oklahoma
would seem to be entitled to more than the 50 percent allocation. The com-
pact negotiators from Oklahoma, however, consented to the equal division
for two reasons. First, Oklahoma's relative contribution to these inflows,
in all likelihood, was expected to decline in future years as impoundment
capabilities are expanded within the state. 74 Second, the equal division fa-
cilitated a compromise with Texas over the use of the water of the North
Fork of the Red River, Sweetwater Creek, and other tributaries of the North
Fork within Texas above the Lugert-Altus Reservoir. 75
The 60-40 split of water between Texas and Oklahoma in subbasin one
of Reach I could have a major depletion effect upon the ultimate inflow
of Lake Altus and the delivery of water from the Lugert-Altus Reservoir
to the W. C. Austin Project.176 This, in turn, could adversely affect the
ability of the water users to repay the costs of the project. Under a com-
promise, Texas agreed to limit development on the main stem of the North
Fork and along any of its tributaries located within Texas above the Lugert-
569. Id. § 4.04(b)(2), 94 Stat. 3309.
570. Id. § 4.05(a), 94 Stat. 3309.
571. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 11.
572. Id.
573. Id. at 10.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. See Letter from Guy R. Martin, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to
Hon. Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Aug. 19, 1980),
reprinted in S. PEP. No. 964, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980). Studies differed concerning the
magnitude of the depletion effect. A study by the Water and Power Resources Service of the
Bureau of Reclamation indicated that during the period 1945 to 1968, there would have been
an average annual reduction of 3,800 acre-feet to Lake Altus if the 60-40 percentage division
had been in effect between Texas and Oklahoma. Id. A study completed by the Oklahoma
Water Resources Board found that the reduction during the same time frame could have been
as high as 6,700 acre-feet annually. Id. Both studies assumed full development by Texas of
its entitlement under the compact. Id.
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Altus Reservoir to projects for domestic, municipal, and industrial water
supply until imported water sufficient to meet the municipal and irrigation
needs of western Oklahoma becomes available, or until January 1, 2000,
whichever occurs first.5 77 Therefore, if sufficient water is imported to western
Oklahoma prior to the year 2000, Texas is free to pursue full development,
including recreation and pleasure uses, of the 60 percent of water of these
interstate tributaries allocated to it as the upstream state.578 The "sunset"
date of January 1, 2000, was selected because the repayment requirements
of the water users of the W. C. Austin Project will have ended by then.
Reach II-Red River System from Denison Dam to the Arkansas-
Louisiana Border
Reach II includes the Red River and its tributaries from Denison Dam
to the point where the river system crosses the Arkansas-Louisiana boundary
and all tributaries that contribute to the flow of the river within the reach.
In apportioning the water of Reach II, the compact negotiators divided the
reach into five subbasins. For many of the reasons elaborated in part I, this
portion of the river basin-the reach involving all four states-was the most
complex and the most difficult to apportion.
Although rainfall in Reach II is heavier than in Reach I, many reservoirs
dot the portion lying within Oklahoma and Texas. Various other impound-
ments were either authorized for construction or in various stages of con-
struction at the time the compact was being formulated and reviewed. The
primary task of the negotiators was to meet the demands of Louisiana for
the maintenance of certain minimum flows at the Arkansas-Louisiana state
line without mandating the release of water stored in upstream reservoirs
to fulfill Louisiana's requirements.5 79 A correlative problem was the pro-
tection of Arkansas' interests in providing for possible future water needs
for navigation and other purposes on the main stem of the Red River in
Arkansas.
The division of the reach into five subbasins enabled the negotiators to
arrive at a consensus upon the apportionment of the water. The criterion
of last downstream major dam site-either completed, authorized, or pro-
posed as of December 22, 1980-was used to separate upstream subbasins
from downstream subbasins180 The last downstream major reservoirs were
then described in detail in the compact to minimize possible future disa-
greements among the signatory states. However, data in the compact and
in the Report of the Engineering Advisory Committee concerning reservoir
capacity and location, while providing valuable background information,
does not alter subbasin definitions or modify the apportionment of the
water.58' Data concerning reservoirs authorized but not yet completed was
577. Red River Compact, art. IV, § 4.05(b), 94 Stat. 3309.
578. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 10.
579. Id. at 14.
580. Id.
581. Id. at 15. See also 1978 RRCNC Eng'g Rep., supra note 95, at ii.
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included in the compact and the engineering report to provide approximate
information in facilitating compact administration until work on the pro-
posed reservoirs is actually concluded.
The water in the four subbasins upstream from the last downstream major
dams is divided between the interested states. Subbasins one and two consist
of intrastate tributaries lying wholly within Oklahoma and Texas, respec-
tively. Each state is apportioned the water of its respective subbasin of in-
trastate streams and is given the unrestricted use of the intrastate streams
located therein. 82
Subbasin three, which is divided between Oklahoma and Arkansas, in-
cludes the Little River and its interstate tributaries located above Millwood
Dam in southwestern Arkansas. Low flows historically have been a signi-
ficant concern in this area and are expected to present problems in future
years.583 The 60-40 division of runoff was adopted between Oklahoma and
Arkansas for the portion of the subbasin situated below the specified last
downstream major dams in Oklahoma and upstream from Millwood Dam.5 u
Reservoirs constructed in Oklahoma below the specified last downstream
major dams, therefore, are required to pass on 40 percent of the runoff,
a requirement that may prove critical during low-flow periods. The nego-
tiators decided that, as a general rule, accounting on an annual basis would
be sufficient in this subbasin. However, a shorter accounting period may
be invoked by the states if necessary to assure Arkansas its share of low
flows.58 5
Subbasin four consists of interstate streams of interest to Texas and Ar-
kansas. However, the subbasin lies completely within Texas, which has fully
appropriated the available low flows. Although Texas is given the free and
unrestricted use of the water of this subbasin, Arkansas receives important
benefits of its water, particularly from the water stored in Wright Patman
Reservoir located on the Sulphur River about five miles above the Texas-
Arkansas boundary. Lake Wright Patman operates under permits issued by
the state of Texas; however, it serves as a common supply of municipal and
industrial water for the Texarkana metropolitan areas of both Arkansas and
Texas.5 86 The presence of Lake Wright Patman guarantees a low flow to
Arkansas that is greater than the historical low flows without the reservoir
in place. Under the federal authorizing legislation for the reservoir, a min-
imum release of 10 cubic feet per second is guaranteed; in addition, releases
up to 96 cubic feet per second are made for the benefit of downstream fish
and wildlife.
58 7
Subbasin five, which is equally divided among the four signatory states,
includes the portion of the main stem of the Red River and its tributaries
582. See Red River Compact, art. V, §§ 5.01, 5.02, 94 Stat. 3309-10.
583. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 15.
584. Red River Compact, art. V, § 5.03(a), (b), 94 Stat. 3310.
585. Id. § 5.03(c), 94 Stat. 3311.
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from Denison Dam down to the Arkansas-Louisiana boundary that lie below
the last downstream major dams of the other four subbasins previously
described. In subbasin five, the upstream states agree to cooperate in as-
suring a reliable flow to Louisiana and, under certain circumstances, to
Arkansas. 88 The upstream states' pledge of cooperation is keyed to the level
of flows at the Arkansas-Louisiana boundary line.5 89 For purposes of this
analysis, "high flows" are defined as exceeding 3,000 cubic feet per second
at the Arkansas-Louisiana state line; "intermediate flows" refer to flows
less than 3,000 cubic feet per second but greater than 1,000 cubic feet per
second; and "low flows" indicate flows of 1,000 cubic feet per second or
less. From the day record-keeping was first begun at the Arkansas-Louisiana
boundary, flows of less than 3,000 cubic feet per second have occurred less
than 5 percent of the time and low flows have been recorded even more
rarely.5 °
The compact negotiators chose "weekly runoff" as the basis of appor-
tionment of water within subbasin five in order to assure the downstream
states a relatively continual flow and a portion of the low flows. During
periods of high flows, the signatory states have equal rights to apply the
runoff originating in this subbasin and undesignated water flowing into the
subbasin.5 91 However, no state is entitled to more than 25 percent of the
water in excess of 3,000 cubic feet per second.5 92 According to the Supple-
mental Interpretive Comments of the Legal Advisory Committee, the com-
pact is intended to allow all states the free use of whatever amount of water
they can apply to beneficial uses unless the water in excess of 3,000 cubic
feet per second cannot satisfy their competing uses. In that event, each state
"will honor the other's right to twenty-five percent of the excess flow. ' 593
During periods of intermediate flow in subbasin five, the upstream states
must allow 40 percent of the total runoff originating in the portion of the
subbasin located within each state and 40 percent of the undesignated water
flowing into the subbasin to pass to the downstream states in order to main-
tain the flow of the main stem of the Red River at the Arkansas-Louisiana
boundary line.594 Finally, on those rare occasions when low flows occur at
the Arkansas-Louisiana line, the upstream states are required to pass 100
percent of their runoff within this subbasin and all undesignated releases as
necessary to assure maintenance of a minimum flow of 1,000 cubic feet per
second at the boundary between Arkansas and Louisiana.5 95
Historic records suggest that efforts to assure minimum flows at the Ar-
kansas-Louisiana boundary will have a corresponding effect in assuring min-
588. Id.
589. Id. at 16-17.
590. Id. at 17.
591. Red River Compact, art. V, § 5.05(b)(1), 94 Stat. 3311.
592. Id.
593. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 17.
594. Red River Compact, art. V, § 5.05(b)(2), 94 Stat. 3311.
595. Id. § 5.05(b)(3), 94 Stat. 3310-11.
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imum flows at the Arkansas-Oklahoma boundary.596 Nevertheless, the compact
addresses the situation during which inflows from the Little River watershed
might create a flow of 3,000 cubic feet per second at the Arkansas-Louisiana
boundary while virtually no water was entering upstream to provide a min-
imum flow of 526 cubic feet per second on the Red River at Index, Arkansas,
near the Arkansas-Oklahoma boundary.97 In this unusual event, another
provision of the compact may be invoked "at the request of Arkansas"
under very stringent conditions after Arkansas has ceased diversions above
Index, Arkansas, to govern the diversion of water by the states for the
protection of Arkansas' interests in the main stem of the Red River.59
Small reservoirs with a conservation storage capacity of 1,000 acre-feet
or less which were completed or authorized as of December 22, 1980, are
exempt from the compact's requirements in subbasin five relative to the
maintenance of minimum flows to the downstream states.599 This small res-
ervoir exemption was necessitated by the lack of release capabilities on many
of the existing dams and because the right to operate these reservoirs may
be deemed a vested property right under the laws of Oklahoma and Texas.0
The amount of water involved in this exemption should have only a minor
effect on the flow of the river at the downstream state boundaries. The
exemption is lost if the right to store water in or use water from an existing
reservoir is canceled after December 22, 1980. However, a signatory state
may authorize a change in purpose or place of water use from a small
reservoir without losing the exemption as long as the quantity of the au-
thorized use and storage is not increased. Exemptions from the provisions
governing the use of the water of subbasin five do not apply to direct di-
versions from the Red River to off-channel reservoirs or lands.601
Reach III-Tributaries West of the Red River
Reach III consists of the tributaries west of the Red River that cross the
Texas-Arkansas boundary, the Arkansas-Louisiana boundary, or the Texas-
Louisiana boundary. It includes four topographic subbasins, one of which
consists of intrastate streams in Louisiana to which Louisiana has free and
unrestricted use. Of the three remaining subbasins, two involve interstate
streams between Arkansas and Texas and between Arkansas and Louisiana.
The water of these interstate streams is apportioned using the 60-40 method
596. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 17-18.
597. Id. at 18. See Red River Compact, art. V, § 5.05(c), 94 Stat. 3312.
598. Red River Compact, art. V, § 5.05(c), 94 Stat. 3312. This provision can be invoked
only at the request of Arkansas (1) only after Arkansas has curtailed all of its diversions from
the Red River in Arkansas above Index, Arkansas, and (2) only if the provisions relative to
intermediate and low flows in subbasin five at the Arkansas-Louisiana state line have not limited
diversions in the subbasin. Id. Under no circumstances does any state guarantee to maintain
a minimum low flow to a downstream state. Id., § 5.05(d).
599. Id., § 5.06(a).
600. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 18.
601. Red River Compact, art. V, § 5.06(b), (c), 94 Stat. 3312.
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with 60 percent of the runoff allocated to the upstream state of origin and
a minimum of 40 percent being passed to the downstream state.
6 2
However, the 60-40 method was not feasible for the apportionment of
the water of subbasin three, which includes the interstate streams between
Texas and Louisiana, because Caddo Lake is located on the state boundary
line. 603 Texas and Louisiana were given the unrestricted right to use 50 per-
cent of the conservation storage capacity of Caddo Lake, provided there is
no reduction in supplies for existing uses of water from Caddo Lake as of
the "date of [the] compact." ' The apportionment of subbasin three reflects
the desire of Texas to protect authorized and completed reservoirs and the
eagerness of Louisiana to assure an adequate supply of water to the Shreve-
port metropolitan area.605 The compact protects the yield of Caddo Lake,
exempting only existing upstream water rights and impoundments completed,
proposed, or authorized on December 22, 1980.
Because of the possibility that Caddo Lake would be enlarged in the fu-
ture, Texas and Louisiana received equal shares of the conservation storage
capacity of any enlargement of the reservoir. The compact recognizes,
however, that Texas and Louisiana are free after December 22, 1980, to
negotiate for the release of each state's share of storage space on mutually
agreeable terms. This provision reflects the bi-state effort to secure approval
of a separate compact, entitled the Caddo Lake Compact, governing the use
of the water of this lake. Except for the general compact provision exempting
domestic and livestock uses, Texas' share of water in subbasin three allows
no new diversions that would decrease runoff in this subbasin below an
amount equal to that available with the full operation of the completed,
proposed, and authorized impoundments and water rights existing on the
date of the compact. 6 7 Any depletion exceeding this amount is to be bal-
anced against Texas' share of water in conservation storage in Caddo Lake. 60
Reach IV-Tributaries East of the Red River in Arkansas
The tributaries east of the Red River in Arkansas which cross the Ar-
kansas-Louisiana boundary form Reach IV. As explained earlier, the task
602. Id., art. VI, §§ 6.01(b), 6.02(b), 94 Stat. 3312-13. The intrastate streams to which Loui-
siana has free and unrestricted use are included within subbasin four. Id. § 6.04, 94 Stat. 3313.
603. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 20.
604. Red River Compact, art. VI, § 6.03(b)(2), 94 Stat. 3313. Note that this provision is
geared to "existing uses of water from Caddo Lake, on date of Compact." Id. (emphasis
supplied). It is not clear whether "date of Compact" refers to May 12, 1978, the date on
which the compact was officially executed at Denison Dam, or to Dec. 22, 1980, the date on
which the compact became legally effective. Other provisions of the compact refer to "the
effective date of the Compact," i.e., Dec. 22, 1980. See, e.g., id. §§ 5.06(a), 6.03(b)(1), 94 Stat.
3312-13 (emphasis added).
605. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 20.
606. See Red River Compact, art. VI, § 6.03(b)(3), 94 Stat. 3313. As discussed earlier, Texas
and Louisiana had negotiated a separate compact apportioning the water of Caddo Lake. See
supra text accompanying notes 535-538. Approval of the Caddo Lake Compact was deferred
by Congress for a number of reasons. See supra notes 535-538 and accompanying text.
607. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 21.
608. Id.
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of reconciling Arkansas' "reasonable use" theory of the riparian doctrine
with the demands made by Louisiana for constant maintenance of minimum
flows complicated the negotiations of this portion of the river basin. The
reach was divided into two subbasins, one consisting of intrastate streams
and the other containing interstate streams. Arkansas was given the unre-
stricted use of the water of the intrastate streams. The 60-40 division was
applied in subbasin two, which consists of the interstate streams. Therefore,
Arkansas must allow an amount of water equal to 40 percent of the weekly
runoff originating below or flowing from the last downstream major dam
site on each interstate stream to enter Louisiana.6 Comparable language
applies to interstate streams in the subbasin for which last downstream dam
sites were not designated at the time the compact was completed. 610
"Weekly runoff" again was used to assure Louisiana a relatively constant
flow of water. While Arkansas does not guarantee the maintenance of a
minimum flow to Louisiana in this reach, the problem of assuring Louisiana
an equitable stream flow during periods of extreme low flows was specifically
addressed. In the event that the use of water in Arkansas in four interstate
streams-the Ouachita River, Bayou Bartholomew, Boeuf River, and Bayou
Macon-reduces the flow at the Arkansas-Louisiana boundary to certain
specified levels, Arkansas "pledges to take affirmative steps to regulate the
diversions of runoff" in a manner that would permit an equitable appor-
tionment of the runoff to enter Louisiana as otherwise set forth in the com-
pact.611
Reach V-Portion of Red River System Lying Wholly in Louisiana
The fifth reach of the river is composed of the main stem of the Red
River and all of its tributaries lying entirely within Louisiana. Following the
principles applied to other intrastate streams, Louisiana is given the free and
unrestricted use of the water in this reach.612
Enhancement of Water Quality in the Basin
The negotiators encountered great difficulty in arriving at a consensus on
the compact provisions dealing with the pollution and natural deterioration
of the water of the Red River basin. The Red River Valley Association, one
of the most influential organizations in the basin, supported a compact ap-
portioning the water of the river but opposed the creation of a strong re-
gional valley authority.613 Of more importance, however, the evolution of
609. Red River Compact, art. VII, § 7.02(b), 94 Stat. 3314.
610. Id.
611. Id. § 7.03(b), 94 Stat. 3314-15. The pledge by Arkansas to take "affirmative steps" is
triggered when the use of water in Arkansas reduces the flow at the Arkansas-Louisiana state
line to the following amounts: "(1) Ouachita River-780 cfs; (2) Bayou Bartholomew-80 cfs;
(3) Boeuf River-40 cfs; (4) Bayou Macon--40 cfs." Id. Since Arkansas does not guarantee to
maintain a minimum low flow to Louisiana in Reach IV, this pledge of affirmative action ap-
pears difficult to enforce.
612. Id., art. VIII, § 8.01, 94 Stat. 3315.
613. Red River Valley Ass'n 1959 Platform, at 4, 6 (adopted at 33d Annual Meeting, Apr.
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federal water quality laws between 1956 and 1978 reinforced the natural
inclination of the negotiators to give primacy to the role of the states in
the control of pollution.
Although the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 was amended
a number of times while the compact was being negotiated, the basic policy
of the act continued to recognize the federal role as supplemental to the
"primary responsibilities and rights of the states in preventing and con-
trolling water pollution.''614 The water pollution legislation passed by Con-
gress in 1956 established a very weak conference procedure for the abatement
of pollution of interstate waters.61 5 Since President Eisenhower opposed fed-
eral involvement in pollution control, the conference procedure was never
used to its capacity during his administration.616 Moreover, the enforcement
conference was invoked only on a limited basis in the early 1960s during
the Kennedy administration. 617
The major thrust toward a serious federal water quality program came
with the 1965 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 68
The 1965 water quality legislation created a new program that required de-
velopment by the states of water quality standards for all interstate streams
and the establishment of a plan for the implementation of the standards by
June 30, 1967.619 The promulgation of federal standards was authorized in
the event a state failed to set standards or developed standards which were
inadequate.6
20
In view of the standards-setting approach taken by the 1965 legislation,
interstate river basin compact commissions logically would have been ideal
governmental entities to establish water quality standards on interstate streams
where compacts existed. 62' The idea of an interstate pollution control au-
8, 1958). The Red River Valley Association particularly abhorred the precedent established by
the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). In the view of the Association, regional
valley authorities, such as the TVA, were "undesirable and unnecessary" and threatened to
"transcend state and local governments" and "become super-states very quickly." Id. at 4.
The Association not only supported in principle the completion of the compact for the Red
River, but also offered its assistance to expedite the negotiations and secure the "early ap-
proval" of the Red River Compact in the legislatures of the participating states and in Congress.
Id. at 6. The Association noted that "[t]he people of the Valley are already formulating plans
for the use of this water and are dependent upon its firm allocation." Id.
614. See MuYs, INTERSTATE WATER ComAcTs, supra note 82, at 60-61.
615. See Rarrza, supra note 38, at four-34.
616. Id.
617. Id. at four-35.
618. Id.
619. See MuYs, INTERSTATE WATER COmpACTS, supra note 82, at 61.
620. Id.
621. Id. See also Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part
II: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IowA L. REv. 432, 432 (1966). Professor
William Hines explained in his article on interstate arrangements for pollution control:
Pollutants introduced into water become completely vagrant and follow the nat-
ural flow of the watercourse. As a rule, the meanderings of watercourses show
little respect for the sanctity of state boundaries. Conditions of water pollution,
therefore, frequently assume a configuration that bears little resemblance to the
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thority with regional jurisdiction to regulate an entire river basin is appealing
for several reasons: (1) increased administrative efficiency; (2) promotion of
consistency in the establishment and enforcement of water quality standards
for the river; (3) ability to develop long-range water quality policies based
upon existing and proposed development in the basin; and (4) a greater
degree of compliance by offenders with abatement orders as a result of more
uniformity in the enforcement of pollution regulations.
6 2
Unfortunately, the 1965 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act spoke in terms of each state developing and implementing water
quality standards. Therefore, federal officials initially ruled that a river basin
compact commission-the logical "super-state organization" to handle pol-
lution matters within a river basin-could not legally carry out the standards-
setting function.62 Later this interpretation was modified to allow interstate
compact commissions to establish the standards if the affected states for-
mally designated the compact commission as their agent for these pur-
poses. 6
24
The central theme of the pollution provisions finally adopted by the ne-
gotiators of the Red River Compact is the affirmation that the primary duty
and responsibility in the water quality area lies with each signatory state.
The drafters of the compact neither intended for the Red River Compact
Commission to displace any state water quality control agency nor to usurp
the authority of such an agency. 621 Instead, the compact negotiators sought
to "provide a vehicle for the amicable solution of potential interstate pol-
lution problems.' '626
As mentioned in part V, the negotiators examined several methods of
pollution control enforcement, ranging from no direct enforcement by the
compact commission to different models of direct enforcement. The scope
of powers of other water pollution control compacts examined by the ne-
gotiators was quite varied. The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact
granted the interstate commission established to administer its provisions
political geography of any of the states affected. Great acumen is not required
to realize that little success is likely to accrue to attempts to regulate pollution
of interstate waters unless the control effort has a scope of planning and an
enforcement authority roughly congruent with the dimensions of the problem.
The vesting of regulatory power in some form of supra-state organization seems
essential to effective handling of pollution situations, the causes and effects of
which overflow state lines.
Id. at 432.
622. Id. at 433.
623. See Muys, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTs, supra note 82, at 61.
624. Id. at 61-62. Jerome Muys noted in his scholarly report on interstate compacts for the
National Water Commission in 1971: "IT]he upshot was that the federal quality standards
program, which seemed to provide an opportunity for the interstate [compact] commissions to
make a significant contribution on the very kind of problem for which they were created, had
the unfortunate result of generally by-passing those agencies." Id. at 62.
625. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 29. See also Beckman Letter
to Red River Valley Ass'n, supra note 37, at 1.
626. Supplement Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 29.
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broad standards-setting and enforcement authority; it basically followed the
pattern of the New York Harbor Interstate Sanitation Compact of 1935.627
At the other end of the spectrum, the Potomac River Sanitation Compact
and the New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact were
essentially given recommendatory authority only.62 The Klamath River Basin
Compact of 1957 adopted a blend of these two approaches. 629
The Red River Compact finally approved by the negotiators in 1978 sets
forth the dual objectives of promoting an active program for the control
and alleviation of natural deterioration and pollution of the water and en-
forcing the laws related thereto. The signatory states acknowledge that the
reduction of naturally occurring salinity within the river basin and the en-
hancement of water quality "may" require cooperative action by all of
them. 60 However, the authority over water quality vested in the Red River
Compact Commission, though exceeding that in some other compacts, is
rather anemic.
The Red River Compact Commission only has power to "recommend
reasonable water quality objectives to the states."1631 There are no criteria
to determine "reasonableness" nor are the states mandated to utilize or
enforce these water-quality objectives. The Red River Compact Commission
may "cooperate" with the federal government, the governments of the sig-
natory states, and other entities in devising and implementing programs for
controlling pollution and abating the natural contamination of the water of
the basin.632 Since it is dependent upon the state governments for financial
support and its authority is carefully circumscribed, the Red River Compact
Commission practically may be reduced to "cooperating" by sharing profes-
sional expertise and information, rather than through the joint sponsorship
of an expensive multiyear major construction program for the abatement
of contamination of the water.
An earlier draft of the Red River Compact included language that clearly
authorized and encouraged the Red River Compact Commission to apply
627. See Muys, INTERSTATE ,VATER CoMpAcTs, supra note 82, at 57. Both compacts include
provisions requiring concurrence by a majority of the compact commissioners of the affected
states before an enforcement order may be issued. Id. This voting requirement, in effect,
amounts to a veto power over enforcement, thereby undermining the compact commission's
enforcement authority. Id.
628. Id.
629. Id. at 57-58. The Klamath River Compact empowers the compact commission with the
authority to set water quality standards which, if violated and a complaint is made by an
aggrieved state, are the basis for recommended improvement measures by the compact com-
mission. Id. at 58. If the recommendations are not followed, the commission may take en-
forcement action against the polluters. Id.
630. Red River Compact, art XI, § 11.02, 94 Stat. 3317. The negotiators also said that while
"there is no serious manmade interstate pollution problem in the Red River Basin at present
[May 12, 1978], they recognize their obligation to maintain the adequacy of the basin's water
quality by all available means." See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at
29.
631. Red River Compact, art. XI, § 11.04, 94 Stat. 3317-18.
632. Id.
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for and receive funds for research, experiments, demonstrations, studies,
and training projects relating to water pollution control in the Red River
system.6 3 3 However, this language was dropped from the final version of the
compact. The failure to include a provision expressly authorizing the Red
River Compact Commission to seek financial assistance from sources other
than the state governments, coupled with certain limitations on financial
obligations which the commission may assume, seriously undermine the abil-
ity of the Red River Compact Commission to become an effective force in
the improvement of water quality in the basin.
For example, since the Red River Compact Commission has become op-
erational, the commissioners have been exploring ways to finance the Red
River Chloride Control Project proposed by the Corps of Engineers for the
abatement of the major sources of chloride contamination in the basin.6 34
At the fourth annual meeting of the Red River Compact Commission, held
on April 25, 1984, the chairman of the Legal Advisory Committee reported
the consensus of the legal advisers that the Red River Compact Commission
lacked the power to be a sponsoring agency of the proposed project.63" The
legal advisers concluded that nowhere in the compact is there a delegation
of power from the states to the Red River Compact Commission to enter
into contracts for the construction of the types of structures and facilities
entailed by the proposed project. 6 6 Therefore, the Red River Compact Com-
mission could not legally enter into a cost-sharing agreement with the Corps
633. See Rough Draft of Red River Compact, art. V, § B, 11 5-6, app. to Memorandum
from Richard Huff, Chairman, RRCNC Legal Advisory Committee, to the RRCNC Members
and Technical Advisers, at 12 (July 18, 1957). The Apr. 24, 1957 draft of the compact au-
thorized the permanent commission, which was to be established to administer the compact,
to engage in research investigations, experiments, demonstrations, studies, and training pro-
grams relating to water quality in the Red River basin; to construct treatment works to prevent
the discharge of untreated or inadequately treated sewage or other waste into any waters of
the system; to apply for and receive any and all assistance, information, research, surveys,
grants, allotments or allocations of funds which may be available to interstate agencies under
any state or federal statute; and to cooperate or undertake joint activities with state or federal
agencies. Id.
634. See Minutes of 2d Annual Meeting of RRCC, at 4 (Apr. 27, 1982). The resolution was
proposed by Texas, whose representative commented that Texas and Oklahoma "have lived
up to their part of a bargain with the federal government to 'virtually eliminate' man-made
salt pollution in the Red River Basin and that it now is time for Congress to do its part."
Id. The estimated costs of the projects totaled $150 million to $215 million in federal funds.
Id. At the third annual meeting of the RRCC the following year, Major General Hugh Rob-
inson, Southwestern Division Engineer with the Corps of Engineers, discussed with the com-
missioners the position of the Reagan administration on cost sharing in general and specifically
in relation to the Red River Chloride Control Project. See Minutes of 3d Annual Meeting of
RRCC, at 1-2 (Apr. 26, 1983). Following the conclusion of General Robinson's presentation,
the commission referred to its Legal Advisory Committee the question of what legal authority,
if any, the commission may have to enter into an agreement with the Corps of Engineers on
the Red River Chloride Project. Id. at 1. The report of the Corps of Engineers on the Red
River Chloride Project was also referred to the RRCC Engineering Advisory Committee for
review and comment. Id. at 2.
635. See Draft Minutes of 4th Annual Meeting of RRCC, at 3 (Apr. 25, 1984).
636. See Draft Verbatim Transcript of 4th Annual Meeting of RRCC, at 14 (Apr. 25, 1984).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss1/9
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of Engineers. In the opinion of the legal advisers, the Red River Compact
Commission is limited to serving only as a coordinating vehicle between the
states and the federal government with regard to such projects.
637
Each signatory state is required to maintain current records of waste dis-
charges into the basin, including the type and quality of these discharges,
and to furnish these records to the Red River Compact Commission upon
request. 638 The Red River Compact Commission is authorized to utilize the
provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in the event that all
attempts to reach a cooperative solution to an interstate pollution problem
fail.6 39
Red River Compact Commission involvement in a formal action to abate
pollution is triggered upon the receipt of a complaint from the governor of
a signatory state alleging two jurisdictional matters: (1) that the interstate
water of the basin in which the state has an interest is being materially and
adversely affected by pollution, and (2) that the state in which the pollution
originates has failed after reasonable notice to take appropriate abatement
measures. The Red River Compact Commission must then make appro-
priate findings and transmit these to the governor of the state from which
the pollution emanates, requesting that appropriate corrective action be
taken. 641
The Red River Compact Commission may not take any action with respect
to pollution that adversely affects only the state in which it originates. 642
The commission may initiate legal action in its own name against the person
or entity responsible for an interstate pollution problem. Before bringing a
legal action, however, the Red River Compact Commission must give sixty
days' advance notification to the governor of the state in which the pollution
source is located so that the state may have an opportunity to initiate action
in its own name.643 In addition, any signatory state that is materially and
adversely affected by pollution emanating from another member state may
institute legal action against any individual, business entity, association, po-
litical subdivision, officer, or agent of the other state in accordance with
applicable federal statutes.644 The right of a signatory state to bring a legal
action is without prejudice to other remedies available to the Red River
Compact Commission or another signatory state.
As discussed supra in part V, the ability of a member state to secure relief
from interstate water pollution originating in another signatory state was
facilitated by the enactment by Congress in 1962 of legislation of general
637. Id. at 14-15. See also Draft Minutes of 4th Annual Meeting of RRCC, supra note 635,
at 3.
638. Red River Compact, art. XI, § 11.05, 94 Stat. 3318.
639. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 29. See also Red River
Compact, art. XI, § 11.07, 94 Stat. 3318.
640. Red River Compact, art. XI, § 11.06, 94 Stat. 3318.
641. Id.
642. Id.
643. Id., § 11.07.
644. Id., § 11.08.
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application conferring jurisdiction upon the federal district courts in certain
pollution cases arising under the compact,65 and by the inclusion of similar
language in the Red River Compact consent legislation passed by Congress
in 1980. To the extent the federal government is an indispensable party to
litigation brought by one or more of the signatory states involving the pol-
lution of the river system, the consent legislation also partially waives the
sovereign immunity of the United States under certain conditions .
6
The role the Red River Compact Commission itself will play in interstate
pollution controversies will depend upon its ability to obtain the professional
expertise required for the investigation of a problem and the financial re-
sources necessary to defray the expenses of litigation. As explored in greater
depth infra, the Red River Compact Commission appears to be at the mercy
of the states for most, if not all, of its financial support. Thus, the com-
missioners will have to proceed cautiously and with great sensitivity to the
political ramifications of their decisions lest they offend their primary sources
of financial and other support. The dependence upon the support of the
states, in all likelihood, will seriously undermine, if not cripple, the ability
of the Red River Compact Commission to effectively address pollution prob-
lems.
Administration of the Compact
Article IX of the Red River Compact creates a nine-member interstate
administrative agency, the Red River Compact Commission (RRCC), to ad-
minister the terms of the compact. The RRCC is composed of two repre-
sentatives from each of the four signatory states, who are designated or
appointed in accordance with the laws of each state, and one commissioner
representing the federal government 47 The federal commissioner, who is
appointed by the President of the United States, is the ex officio chairman
of the Red River Compact Commission.64
Each state commissioner has one vote. However, if only one representative
645. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41. The consent legislation passed by Congress
in 1980 contains similar, though broader, language:
The United States District Courts shall have original jurisdiction (concurrent with
that of the Supreme Court of the United States, and concurrent with that of any
other Federal or state court, in matters in which the Supreme Court, or other
court has original jurisdiction) of any case or controversy involving the application
or construction of this Compact; that said jurisdiction shall include, but not be
limited to, suits between Signatory States; and that the venue of such case or
controversy may be in any judicial district in which the acts complained of (or
any portion thereof) occur.
Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, § 4, 94 Stat. 3305, 3320 (emphasis supplied). The
1962 legislation was restricted to controversies involving the construction or application of
interstate compacts which in whole or in part relate to interstate water pollution. 33 U.S.C.
§ 466g-l(a)(1) (1982).
646. See Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, § 2, 94 Stat. 3319-20.
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from a state attends a meeting, he is authorized to vote on behalf of the
absent commissioner from his state. 649 Representatives from three states con-
stitute a quorum. Failure by the President to appoint a federal commissioner
will not prevent the RRCC from operating. Instead, the eight state repre-
sentatives are empowered to elect a chairman of the commission.6 10 Even
though the RRCC became operational on February 18, 1981, no federal
representative has ever been appointed by the President.6 '
Any action taken by the RRCC concerning the administration of the com-
pact or any action requiring compliance with specific terms of the compact
requires six concurring votes. 652 The commission is also authorized upon the
receipt of six concurring votes to utilize the applicable federal statutes to
institute legal action in its own name against the person or entity responsible
for an interstate pollution problem.6 3 If an action proposed by the RRCC
affects existing water rights in a state and that action is not expressly pro-
vided for in the compact, eight concurring votes are required. 654 The re-
quirement of unanimity on certain extraordinary actions, in effect, gives each
state a veto power over the proposed action.
Any actions taken by the RRCC cannot augment its powers without the
risk of running afoul of the compact clause of the Constitution. The as-
sumption by an interstate compact commission of powers over water re-
sources in addition to those enumerated in a compact previously approved
by Congress is, in effect, a new compact among the states requiring in-
dependent approval and consent of Congress s.6 5
649. Id. § 9.03.
650. Id. § 9.01.
651. See Minutes of Ist Annual Meeting of RRCC, at 1 (Feb. 18, 1981); Minutes of 2d
Annual Meeting of RRCC, supra note 634, at 1; Minutes of 3d Annual Meeting of RRCC,
supra note 634, at 2-3; Draft Minutes of 4th Annual Meeting of RRCC, supra note 635, at
5, 6-7. John Saxton, a commissioner from Arkansas and director of the Arkansas Soil and
Water Conservation Commission, was elected at the first meeting of the Red River Compact
Commission as interim chairman pending the appointment of a federal chairman. Mr. Saxton
was reelected by the commission to this position during the annual metings held in 1982, 1983,
and 1984. Saxton resigned in 1985, and a new chairman has yet to be elected. Chairman
Saxton reported at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the RRCC that he had requested United
States Congressman John Paul Hammerschmidt of Arkansas to amend any legislation that is
appropriate and likely to pass during 1984 by including a provision that would enable a com-
missioned officer of the United States Army to serve as federal chairman of the compact
commission without jeopardizing his military commission. Id. at 5. The lack of a federal rep-
resentative to the RRCC exacerbates one of the fundamental weaknesses of a conventional
interstate water compact such as the Red River Compact, i.e., the failure to obligate the federal
government as a signatory party to the agreement. Any moral commitment that federal officials
may feel toward the cooperative implementation of the compact's provisions is undermined by
the lack of a federal representative to the permanent commission, which is now into its fourth
year of operation.
652. Red River Compact, art. IX, § 9.03, 94 Stat. 3315.
653. Id., art. XI, § 11.07, 94 Stat. 3318.
654. Id., art. IX, § 9.03, 94 Stat. 3315.
655. See Letter from Perry Morton, Assistant Att'y Gen., Lands Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Henry C. Beckman, RRCNC Chairman, at 3 (Apr. 22, 1957). Some of the legal advisers
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The composition and voting requirements of the RRCC avoid the problem
of tie votes, which has hamstrung other commissions such as the Pecos River
Compact Commission, when an equal number of states are signatory parties
to a conventional interstate compact. 6 6 The negotiators developed this voting
mechanism in response to proposals made during the early years of compact
deliberations for a complicated arbitration provision. The model of vesting
the federal chairman of the commission with the power to break a tie vote
apparently was never considered. As a practical matter, the requirement of
a three-fourths majority vote of all Red River Compact commissioners on
most actions should force the commissioners of three of the four states to
reach consensus in their decision making, thereby reducing the likelihood
of friction which in turn leads to litigation. One drawback of this voting
formula, however, is that the decision-making process may become pro-
tracted as the commissioners endeavor to reach the agreement necessary to
support the adoption of a proposed action.
Financial Support of the Commission
One of the principal drawbacks of the Red River Compact, like the sit-
uation historically with most interstate river basin compacts, is the inability
of the RRCC independently to finance and undertake programs designed to
implement the multiple objectives of the compact. Although the commission
at one juncture early in the negotiations apparently suggested that a water compact may con-
stitutionally provide for future augmentation of the powers of the compact commission, either
by an act of the commission itself or by supplemental agreement among the compacting states
without reference to Congress for approval. Id. The position taken by the U.S. Department
of Justice with regard to this suggestion was that "either bestowal by the states or assumption
by the Commission of powers in addition to those enumerated in a compact previously approved
by Congress is, in effect, a new compact among the states, requiring independent approval
and consent of Congress under article I, section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United
States." Id. For a discussion of the congressional consent requirement in general, see Muys,
supra note 82, at 174-75.
656. Pursuant to the terms of the Pecos River Compact, which was approved by Congress
in 1949, an interstate administrative agency known as the Pecos River Commission was created.
See Pecos River Compact, Act of June 9, 1949, ch. 184, art. V, 63 Stat. 159, 162. Under the
terms of the compact, the commission consists of one commissioner representing each of the
two signatory states of New Mexico and Texas and a nonvoting federal commissioner who
serves as chairman of the commission. Id. at art. V(a). Since there are only two voting members
of the commission, all actions require unanimity for adoption. There is no procedure set forth
in the compact for breaking a tie vote. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 560, 563-64
(1983). The Supreme Court in 1983 refused to adopt a Special Master's recommendation that
either the federal representative or some third party be given a vote on the commission and
be empowered to participate in all commission deliberations. Id. at 564. The Court said that
"[tlo provide a third, tie-breaking vote on regular Commission business would be to funda-
mentally alter the structure of the Commission." Id. at 564-65. Acknowledging that the "struc-
tural likelihood. of impasse on the Pecos River Commission is a serious matter," the Court
urged the two states to amend their compact to provide for some mutually acceptable method
for resolving "paralyzing impasses" such as this. Id. at 565. For an interesting chronicle of
the Pecos River Compact controversy, see Comment, Texas v. New Mexico: The Pecos River
Compact Litigation, 20 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 395-410 (1980).
[Vol. 38:1
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is empowered to establish an office, employ personnel, contract for technical
expertise, and acquire property, the express language of the Red River Com-
pact mandates the total dependence of the commission on the legislatures
and governors of the signatory states for funding.6 7 The expenses and sal-
aries of the compact commissioners are to be paid by their respective gov-
ernments.658 The costs of installing and maintaining additional stream flow-
gauging stations are to be equitably apportioned among the states involved
in the reach of the stream in which the gauging stations are located. 6 9 All
other expenses are to be borne equally by the signatory states and paid from
the Red River Compact Commission Fund, which is maintained by equal
payments of each signatory state into the fund. 6 ° There is no express agree-
ment among the signatory states to maintain funding of the commission at
a prescribed level, but the approval of the compact arguably reflects the
implicit agreement of the signatory states to provide adequate funding for
its proper implementation.
The Red River Compact does not contain any language expressly au-
thorizing the commission to obtain financial assistance from the federal gov-
ernment or other nonstate sources. However, it can be argued that the power
of the Red River Compact Commission to "[a]cquire, use and dispose of
... personal property as it may consider necessary," coupled with its man-
date to "[p]erform all other functions required of it by the Compact and
do all things necessary, proper and convenient in the performance of its
duties thereunder," authorizes the commission to seek funding from outside
sources and to accept gifts of money from private individuals and entities 61
The Supplemental Interpretive Comments of the Legal Advisory Com-
mittee indicate that the compact provisions concerning financial matters "are
not intended to prevent the Red River Compact Commission from taking
advantage of any financial assistance that might be available in the fu-
ture. ' 662 The legal advisers suggest, for example, that the terms of the com-
pact would neither preclude the commission from taking advantage of federal
financial assistance to pay for the installation of additional stream flow-
gauging stations through a cooperative program with the USGS, nor prevent
the commission from sharing stream gauge operating expenses with the
USGS. 63
The Red River Compact Commission lacks the authority to generate rev-
enue through taxation. The compact is silent as to the ability of the com-
mission to impose user fees, a revenue-generating mechanism that is limited
by the failure to join the federal government as a signatory party to the
657. See Red River Compact, art. X, §§ 10.01(b)-(d), 10.02(g), 94 Stat. 3316-17; art. IX,
§ 9.04, 94 Stat. 3315.
658. Id. § 9.04(a), 94 Stat. 3315.
659. Id. § 9.04(b), 94 Stat. 3315.
660. Id. § 9.04(c), 94 Stat. 3315-16.
661. Id., art. X, §§ 10.01(d), 10.02(c), 94 Stat. 3316-17.
662. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 25.
663. Id.
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compact. The RRCC must avoid incurring any obligation in excess of the
unencumbered balance of its funds and must not pledge the credit of any
of the signatory states.A The latter restrictions parallel the provisions in the
Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact litigated in West Virginia ex
rel. Dyer v. Sims."5 They also reflect similar constraints set forth in the
laws of some of the signatory states.6"
Powers and Duties of the Commission
The compact grants the Red River Compact Commission the authority
the negotiators thought necessary for the flexible implementation of its pro-
visions and the fulfillment of its objectives. Some of the more routine
"housekeeping" provisions include the authority to adopt rules and regu-
lations for the operation and enforcement of the compact; establish and
maintain an office; print and distribute proceedings and reports; obtain in-
formation from state and federal agencies; and enter into contracts with
state or federal agencies for the gathering of factual data, record-keeping,
and preparation of reports. The commission may either employ or secure
by contractual arrangements the engineering, legal, clerical, and other sup-
port it deems necessary for exercising its responsibilities. 667 In addition, the
commission may acquire, use, and dispose of real and personal property as
necessary to implement the compact. Since the commission lacks the power
of eminent domain, the acquisition of real property would be accomplished
presumably by voluntary transfer. Moreover, the ability to purchase property
is dependent upon the financial support which the commission receives from
the signatory states.
The compact contains a lengthy provision empowering the RRCC to con-
duct investigations, make studies, hold hearings, and prepare findings, re-
commendations, or reports relative to its implementation.6 The powers vested
in the commission include the authority to make an official finding that a
signatory state is or is not in violation of any provision of the compact. 6 9
Although it may file official certified copies of its determinations with ap-
propriate state and federal officials and agencies, the making of findings,
recommendations, or reports by the RRCC is not a condition precedent to
the initiation of a legal action by a signatory state for the protection of any
right accorded by the compact or the enforcement of the provisions of the
compact.670
The Red River Compact Commission must see that stream, reservoir, and
other gauging stations are established, maintained, and operated as necessary
664. Red River Compact, art. X, § 10.02(g), 94 Stat. 3317.
665. 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
666. ARK. CONST. art. 16, § 1, cl. 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 10, §§ 5, 23, 25, 26.
667. Red River Compact, art. X, § 10.01(c), 94 Stat. 3316.
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for the proper administration of the compact. 671 It must ensure that infor-
mation on stream flows, water quality, water storage, and other similar data
is collected, analyzed, and reported as necessary for the proper implemen-
tation of the compact.672 The commission must also make available to a
signatory state or the federal government, without subpoena, the testimony
of any officers or employees of the Red River Compact Commission having
knowledge of any facts relevant to any action arising under the compact.6 73
The other responsibilities of the RRCC relate to the preparation of a
budget and annual report. The commission is required to prepare and submit
to the governor of each state a budget covering anticipated expenses for the
next fiscal biennium.674 In addition, the commission must prepare an annual
report and transmit it to the governor of each signatory state and the Pres-
ident of the United States describing the activities of the commission for
the preceding year and accounting for funds received and expended.6 75
Conclusion
The negotiators of the Red River Compact heeded the advice of both the
legal scholars of their day and the Supreme Court in the major interstate
water pollution and apportionment cases prior to 1950. The near quarter
of a century devoted to the negotiation of the Red River Compact may be
unprecedented in the annals of interstate water compacts, but the compact
approach nonetheless is preferable to litigation as a mode of adjusting in-
terstate conflicts over competing uses of water.676 The American legal system
simply is not equipped institutionally to address the complex and multifa-
ceted problems the negotiators had to consider in their deliberations for a
compact for the Red River basin.
Many of the accomplishments of the Red River Negotiation Commission
are not reflected within the pages of the Red River Compact. These include:
(1) the inventory of water supply, water needs, water usage, and infor-
mation concerning existing projects and proposed developments within the
basin, which was completed by the technical advisers as a prelude to the
negotiation of the apportionment provisions of the compact;
(2) the modification by the Corps of Engineers of a federally sponsored
reservoir to facilitate the process of making apportionment decisions;
(3) the support of the activities of the U.S. Public Health Service and the
Corps of Engineers in surveying the quality of water within the river system
and researching and developing means by which chloride contamination may
be controlled effectively; and
(4) securing the enactment of federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on
the federal district courts in certain cases arising under an interstate water
671. Id. § 10.02(a), 94 Stat. 3316-17.
672. Id. § 10.02(b), 94 Stat. 3317.
673. Id. § 10.02(h).
674. Id. § 10.02(d).
675. Id. § 10.02(e).
676. See generally MEaYs & TARLOCK, supra note 152, at 419.
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compact that involve the pollution of the river system that is the subject of
the compact.
The five principal purposes set forth in article I of the Red River Compact
suggest that it is aimed at a comprehensive approach to water problems.
However, the Red River Compact Commission that was established to ad-
minister the compact was not endowed with the powers necessary to ac-
complish all of these objectives, particularly those involving flood control,
enhancement of water quality, and river basin planning.
Professor John E. Cribbet once observed: "Law has never pumped a
single gallon of water but a rational system of legal rights is essential to
proper allocation of the available supply. And as the demand comes closer
to the supply the role of law becomes more and more apparent. ' 617 One
should add that the role of law also becomes more and more important.
The most important accomplishment of the Red River Compact is the
apportionment of the water, except that in which the federal government
and the Indians retain interests, among the four signatory states. Estab-
lishment of legally binding rights to an equitable share of water available
in the Red River basin is essential so that each state can plan the development
of water uses within its boundaries with assurance that its investments in
water-dependent programs and projects will not be jeopardized by competing
uses in other states or by protracted litigation. Unfortunately, the primary
basis of apportionment-the percentage-of-flow method-will be difficult to
administer. 678
The consent of the United States Congress to the Red River Compact
transformed it into "a law of the United States." 679 A major consequence
of congressional consent is that no court, in the absence of infirmities that
vitiate the compact or federal legislation that preempts it in whole or in




Any action taken by the states to modify the provisions of the Red River
Compact or to augment the powers of the Red River Compact Commission,
requires the unanimous approval of all the signatory states, ratification by
their respective legislatures, and the consent of the Congress.
Even more important, the unanimous consent of the four signatory states
is required to terminate the Red River Compact. 6 ' Therefore, no state is
free to walk away from the compact even if released by two of the remaining
states. In the rare event that the compact is terminated, all rights established
under it shall continue unimpaired. 6n2 By requiring continuation of rights
created under the compact in the event it is terminated, the compact ef-
677. CRIBBET, supra note 44, at 368.
678. See supra note 565 and accompanying text.
679. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438
(1981); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 566 (1852).
680. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983).
681. Red River Compact, art. XII, § 12.01, 94 Stat. 3318. See also Supplemental Interpretive
Comments, supra note 21, at 30; Hearings, Statement by Col. Laubscher, supra note 14, at
8.
682. Red River Compact, art. XII, § 12.01, 94 Stat. 3318.
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fectively binds the states to the compact's allocation of water unless amended
by all of the signatory states with the consent of the Congress or unless
preempted by federal legislation. Thus, any vested rights that may have
inured during the life of the compact are protected. 683 On the other hand,
if the detailed apportionment provisions of the compact should prove in-
flexible in addressing the divergent conditions of the basin, the compact
cannot be easily changed.
The existence of the Red River Compact, of course, does not foreclose
the possibility that litigation will be required to resolve a dispute between
the signatory states. As Justice Frankfurter commented in West Virginia ex
rel. Dyer v. Sims, "a compact is after all a legal document. Though the
circumstances of its drafting are likely to assure great care and deliberation,
all avoidance of disputes as to scope and meaning is not within [the] human
gift. 
6 84
In retrospect, it is remarkable that the states persevered for nearly a quarter
of a century in the goal of completing a compact for the Red River basin.
The individuals who represented their states as negotiating commissioners
or technical advisers apparently comprehended the importance of their un-
dertaking. As writers more eloquent than this author have observed, water
is a limited resource that must be conserved and managed properly because
it is basic to the survival of the human race. 685 Next to water, all other
nonhuman resources pale in value. Water cannot be "used"-either con-
sumed or contaminated-with the same mentality that has characterized the
use of other natural resources, that is, once it is depleted or spoiled, some-
thing else will be invented or adapted to take its place. 86 Yet the nation's
supply of fresh water has been squandered and contaminated so rapidly and
so extensively that many experts predict that in a few years a crisis far worse
than the energy crisis of the 1970s will ensue, namely, the lack of clean,
usable water for domestic, agricultural, industrial, and recreational pur-
poses.6
7
The formulation and approval of the Red River Compact is a major step
in the direction of assuring a sufficient water supply to the states within
the river basin and of providing a legal mechanism, albeit somewhat limited
in power, for the improvement of water quality within the river system. The
inventory of water supply, which was completed during the negotiations,
and the apportionment of water made by the compact provide a firm foun-
dation for the basinwide planning and management of water usage. Each
683. See Supplemental Interpretive Comments, supra note 21, at 30.
684. 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951).
685. See FALLows, supra note 235, at 14-15 (asserting that in the late 1960s and early 1970s
the South was being polluted at a faster rate than any other region of the nation).
686. Id.
687. See REGENSTEIN, supra note 235, at 168. See also M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE
PoIsoNING OF AiERICA BY Toxic CHanbcALs 334-35 (1980); INTER TATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROB-
LEMS, supra note 234, at 34, n.142.
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signatory state has a better understanding of its water rights within the basin
and may proceed accordingly.
The Red River Compact Commission provides a vehicle for intergovern-
mental cooperation within the basin and the avoidance or early resolution
of interstate conflicts over the river. In a region ever mindful of states'
rights, the commission does not pose the threat of becoming a regional
supergovernment. The success of the commission in accomplishing the ob-
jectives of the compact will ultimately depend upon the degree to which
financial, administrative, and political support of the member governments
is forthcoming and the vision of the individuals who are appointed by the
states to serve as compact commissioners and technical advisers. The mission
of the commission is a vital one for there is no natural or artificial resource
more precious than water.
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